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This is a critically constructive study of the systematic thought of two ‘Reformational’1 
philosophers Dirk H.Th. Vollenhoven (1892-1978) and Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-
1977) within the contours of the Reformational vision which they both inherited from 
the founder of the modern Reformational tradition, Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920). 
While exploratory work has been done in this area, a full systematic comparison is 
undertaken here for the first time. Elements in the thought of the two philosophers 
which may seem to be at variance will be shown to be complementary or at least 
capable of correction by the thought of the other. This will be done by returning to the 
trinitarian basis of the Kuyperian vision, and more specifically, the notion of 
‘perichoresis’, which affirms at once the distinctiveness of the work of each of the 
triune Persons and the harmony of their joint achievement. It will be argued that this 
trinitarian grounding and ‘perichoretic’ reconstruction of the thought of the two 
philosophers provides a more fully-rounded Reformational account – one with a greater 
overall coherence than the work of either provides on its own – resulting in a 
philosophy true to the vision which they together inherited, offering a systematic 
framework serviceable alike for inter-disciplinary work in the contemporary academy, 






                                                 
1
 The term ‘Reformational’ will be used throughout this thesis to describe the movement initiated by 
Abraham Kuyper and developed primarily, but not exclusively, by Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. As will 
be explained in Chapter One, Reformational philosophy builds on the Reformed position – the latter 
largely associated with John Calvin – and Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd and their circle develop that 
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This thesis is a study of two thinkers with great potential significance for systematic 
Christian philosophy. Hitherto they have been largely neglected by the Christian 
mainstream on the grounds of their complexity and seeming inaccessibility. The project 
analyses the work of Dirk Vollenhoven and Herman Dooyeweerd in the context of the 
wider Reformational vision, especially as it is found in the voluminous writing and 
work of Abraham Kuyper, the founder both of the modern Reformational tradition and 
of the Vrije Universiteit in Amsterdam where Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd were on 
the professorial staff for almost all of their respective working lives.  
 
Herman Dooyeweerd’s work is relatively well known in the English-speaking world, 
although his influence has largely been confined to the ‘Reformational’ circles because 
of the complexity of his systematic thinking. Much less well known is the thought of 
Dooyeweerd’s close collaborator and reluctant critic, Dirk H.Th. Vollenhoven. Until 
quite recently, most of Vollenhoven’s output has been unavailable in English. He has 
been better known for his complex work on what has been called the ‘consequential [or 
‘consistent’] problem-historical method’.3 There has been much less focus on the 
systematic (or what he calls ‘thetical’) side of his systematic philosophical thinking.4 
 
The two philosophers together represent an accomplishment in systematic Christian 
thinking to match and, one might argue, exceed anything previously attempted in the 
Calvinian tradition, and in Christian systematic thinking generally. On the whole, 
throughout their long careers as professors of the Vrije Universiteit and co-leaders of 
what was then the Vereniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte (V.C.W. – the 
                                                 
3
 However, pioneering work has been done by Dr Anthony Tol, Dr John Kok and Dr Kornelis Bril, who 
are making Vollenhoven’s writings much more widely available.  
4
 In this regard both the Vollenhovian work of Dr Kok and Dr Tol (John H. Kok, ‘Vollenhoven and 
“Scriptural Philosophy” ’, P.R. (1988); John H. Kok, Vollenhoven: his Early Development (1992); 
Anthony Tol, ‘Time and Change in Vollenhoven’, P.R. 60 (1995) and his thesis (Anthony Tol, 
Philosophy in the Making: D.H.Th. Vollenhoven and the Emergence of Reformed Philosophy (2010); and 
Anthony Tol, ‘Reformational Philosophy in the Making’, P.R. 76 (2011)); on the one hand; and, on the 
other,  the Dooyeweerdian perspective of Professor Strauss (summed up in D.F.M. Strauss, Philosophy: 
Discipline of the Disciplines (2009)), have had a decisive influence upon me, as will appear in the 
footnotes, but far beyond what it is possible to convey in individual references. Eric Kamphof picks up 
the trinitarian basis of Vollenhoven’s systematic thinking (Eric J. Kamphof, ‘The triunity of life: on the 




Association for Calvinistic Philosophy), they maintained a common front against their 
detractors, many of whom were colleagues on the staff of the Vrije Universiteit. These 
differences were largely aired privately, and in the circle of their closest common 
adherents, but later more openly. The question of the relationship of Vollenhoven and 
Dooyeweerd’s thought was raised programmatically by Professor Jacob Klapwijk; and 
ground-breaking work has also been done recently by D.F.M. Strauss, whose 
comparison of the thought of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven identifies certain 




Thus, while presenting an appreciation of both of their contributions in building the 
edifice of Reformational Philosophy upon the foundations laid in the previous 
generation by Abraham Kuyper,
6
 certain problematical features in their respective 
positions, and the clear differences between them in a number of respects, should not be 
ignored or glossed over. Indeed, it will in part be the aim of this thesis to uncover these 
divergences. However, far from undercutting their contribution, this will allow for a 
fuller appreciation of their respective positions, not least because, I shall argue, in many 
respects they are mutually complementary and corrective. It is the concern of this thesis 
that the respective insights of both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd need to be drawn 
upon in order to allow for reparative reconstruction of Reformational philosophy. This 
will be carried out in the light of the tradition of their predecessor, and the broader 
Reformational tradition of which he was the flag-bearer. 
 
Chapter One outlines the Reformational vision, as it was handed on to Vollenhoven and 
Dooyeweerd by the Kuyperian tradition. It identifies three themes: the integrity of the 
individual before God the Father; the plural diversity of the created order under the rule 
of the Son; and the unfolding purposiveness of the historical process through the work 
of the Holy Spirit. These three themes, arising from a consideration of the triune work 
                                                 
5
Jacob Klapwijk, ‘Over mogelijkheden van christelijk filosoferen’ in M.V.C.W.  1971,3 (sept. 1971):  7-
10; Klapwijk, ‘Reformational Philosophy on the Boundary between the Past and the Future’, P.R. 52 
(1987). D.F.M. Strauss, ‘Appropriating the Legacy of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven’ in Journal for 
Christian Scholarship (2006). This latter was part of a wider exercise hosted by the Institute for Christian 
Studies and Redeemer College, both in Toronto, in which a number of short papers were presented 
characterizing the differences. 
6
 With Abraham Kuyper, one also needs to mention his younger colleagues Herman Bavinck (1854-1921) 
and Jan Woltjer (1849-1917) whose theological and philosophical contributions respectively were also 
critical in the foundation-laying process. Woltjer is currently a subject of doctoral research at the Vrije 




of God, provided the thematic context for the philosophical work which Vollenhoven 
and Dooyeweerd undertook both together and separately.  
 
Chapter Two examines how this Kuyperian vision was developed by each of the two 
philosophers over the course of their long and parallel careers as close interlocutors, 
collaborators, professorial colleagues and fellow founders of the movement of 
Reformational philosophy. The pluralistic vision of the world, worked out together in 
the early 1920s in the theory of the modalities, provided a common framework which 
they continued to work on together despite their differences of emphasis. Their 
divergences and the possibility of a deeper complementarity will be looked at 
systematically in the remaining chapters of the thesis. 
 
Accordingly, Chapter Three examines the ‘transcendental’ question of the different 
ways in which, over the course of their philosophical development, the structure of their 
respective accounts and the necessary conditions of experience diverge. While they both 
agree about the modalities – the irreducible ways of being and knowing governed by the 
appropriate laws and norms – they differ greatly in their systematic ontologies and 
epistemologies.
7
 I shall look at their respective presentations in this regard, noting their 
respective strengths and weaknesses in the light of the Kuyperian Reformational vision 




Chapter Four addresses the ‘transcendent’ question of ‘religious’ grounding as a 
prerequisite for a Reformational philosophy. It reviews Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s 
respective positions in two stages: first it addresses the question of the revelation of 
God’s work in the world, and then its reception by humanity – how that revelation re-
orients the total human response to God. In the former respect, I identify a certain 
sequential structure to Vollenhoven’s account, and a more hierarchical structure to 
Dooyeweerd’s account. In the latter respect, I note a possible convergence between 
Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd about the question of Direction, although this is 
                                                 
7
 The term ‘ways of being’ (Vollenhoven, Wijsgerig Woordenboek (2005): 262 (‘bestaanswijze’)) needs 
to be qualified by Dooyeweerd’s ascription of ‘Being’ to God and ‘meaning’ to the created order (see 
5.2.1). However, what is meant is simply that the ‘ways of being’ concerns ontology (what there is), 
while ‘ways of knowing’ concerns epistemology (how we know what there is). Both Vollenhoven and 





expressed sequentially for Vollenhoven in terms of an unfolding covenantal relationship 
under God’s Law, and hierarchically for Dooyeweerd with respect to the dependence of 
the ‘heart’ upon the Origin. 
 
Chapter Five considers the presupposita that regulate the systematic consideration of the 
necessary conditions of experience
8
 in the light of basic religious orientation.
9
 
Vollenhoven’s ‘consequential problem-historical method’ uncovers three ‘ground-
types’ into which the basic shape of all thinking in Western philosophy (and indeed 
perhaps all human thought) can variously be discerned. Although Vollenhoven does not 
state it explicitly in this way, it is the argument of the chapter that these reflect three 
different presupposita, each of which is a necessary, but distinctive, basis for a 
systematic understanding of the world as a whole. Generally, one of these presupposita 
is overemphasised to the neglect or diminution of the others, leading to certain 
distortions. It is argued further that these presupposita are congruent with two of the 
three Ideas which, post 1930, Dooyeweerd identifies as the basis of the Christian 
‘ground-Idea’, and a further Idea retrieved from his thinking in the 1920s. Overall, 
Vollenhoven’s ‘ground-types’, and the implicit presupposita that they express, tend to 
be described by him as mutually exclusive options, while Dooyeweerd’s ‘ground-Idea’ 
is burdened by an imbalance, with a concentration on the Idea of Origin and a 
subordination, or even eclipse, of the other Ideas. The need for greater systematic 
integration of the presupposita, in the case of Vollenhoven, and better balance of the 
‘ground-Idea’ in the case of Dooyeweerd, points to the need for a convergence which is 
outlined in the last chapter. 
 
Chapter Six draws on insights from more recent trinitarian thinking, more specifically 
by analogy with the notion of ‘perichoresis’ according to which equal but distinctive 
weight is accorded to the work of each of the Persons of the Trinity, while at the same 
time affirming their inter-dependence and harmonious interaction. In the light of this, it 
is argued that by analogy with the work of each of the Persons, the presupposita can be 
seen as distinct and yet also mutually complementary. Not only does a perichoretic view 
correct the sequential and hierarchical tendencies respectively of Vollenhoven’s and 
                                                 
8
 As dealt with Chapter Three. 
9




Dooyeweerd’s accounts of the interaction of the Persons; but, drawing on both of their 
insights, it also opens up new possibilities of presenting a fully rounded methodology in 
the form of three complementary ‘descriptive views’, which can serve for both intra- 
and inter-disciplinary studies and for practical application. 
 
Note on Style: In the footnotes and bibliography, I have followed an adapted version of 
Tyndale Short-Title. In the footnotes, the full name of authors, full title and date of 
publication is given on the first reference, and the surname with short title is used 
thereafter. The numbers immediately after the colon are pages, unless indicated 
otherwise. Where necessary, I have used ‘p.’ or ‘pp.’ to refer to the pagination of the 
published text. Following the practice for the Vollenhoven documents, the pagination of 
the original documents is indicated by ‘/’ or ‘//’ followed by ‘p.’ or ‘pp.’. For the 
numbering of Vollenhoven sources, I have followed the designations assigned by John 
Kok, which, for convenience of reference, I retain in the short-titles in the footnotes.
10
 
In a number of cases the references are numbered as ‘volume.page’ with the references 
for each volume separated by semi-colons. Full publication details for all items cited are 
given in the Bibliography. While I italicise words from other foreign languages, I have 
tended not to italicise quotations from modern languages, especially Dutch. Square 
brackets are used to signal editorial emendations for the purpose of clarity to quoted 
extracts. All dates, unless specifically given as B.C., are A.D. 
 
Throughout, the use of tense reflects the dual focus of this thesis. The historical 
background is indicated by the use of the the past tense, while the present tense is used 
to describe the structure of philosophical thought at each point.  
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Chapter One: Historical and Thematic Background to Reformational Philosophy 
 
In this chapter, I provide the wider background to what is called ‘Reformational’ 
philosophy, of which Dirk Vollenhoven (1892-1978) and Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-
1977) were the leading exponents in the Twentieth Century. 
 
The two philosophers’ thought needs to be set in the context of their common debt to 
Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920), the father of modern Reformational philosophy, and the 
founder of the Vrije Universiteit (V.U.) at Amsterdam at which both Dooyeweerd and 
Vollenhoven were professors. Kuyper himself was a leading figure in the tradition 
influenced by the thought of John Calvin (1509-1564), the founder of one of the main 
traditions in the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century which had resulted in a 
broad-scale break from the authority of the Roman papacy over questions of doctrine, 
especially over the issue of the nature of salvation. In particular, it was Calvin’s vision 
of the sovereignty of God over every area of life which influenced and provided the 
basis for Kuyper’s exposition of the character and place of a ‘Calvinistic’ or 
Reformational vision,
11
 not least in the face of the challenges to the Christian faith from 
the Western European enlightenment which came to prominence in the Eighteenth 
Century and which have shaped the Western mind-set subsequently. 
 
Calvin provides a thoroughgoing re-orientation of Christian theology to take full 
account of God’s sovereign acts in creation, redemption and the bringing of creation to 
its final transformation.
12
 For Calvin, the world is the ‘theatrum dei gloriae’ (the 
‘theatre of God’s glory’).13 He rejects any attempt to downplay the created order as 
somehow of secondary significance, or indeed somehow to be negated or transcended. 
Two distinguishing features of the Calvinian vision, to which Calvin’s theology gives 
rise, are: first, the recognition of the universal sovereignty of God over all things, over 
all areas of life and over history as a whole; and, second, the view of religion as a 
                                                 
11
 Both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd followed Kuyper in the use of the term ‘Calvinistic’, although 
Dooyeweerd later preferred the term ‘Christian philosophy’. ‘Reformational’ is a usage coined 
specifically to indicate the distinctive philosophical tradition which Kuyper set in train. 
12
 Benjamin W. Farley, ‘The Providence of God in Reformed Perspective’ (1992): 87-93. 
13
 Susan E. Schreiner, The Theatre of His Glory: Nature and the Natural Order in the Thought of John 




covenant between God and humanity.
14
 In particular, the Calvinian view is that grace is 
the restoration by God of the created order in response to human sin and its 
consequences in the wider creation. The purpose of grace is not only as a remedy for 
sin, but also transformatively to realise God’s deeper purposes. The promise of grace 
does not stand ‘over against’ nature but is God’s provision with respect to sin (although 
not itself the opposite of sin: sin and grace are not ontologically equivalent or 
correlative – grace is the remedy for sin not its balance or corollary). While creation is 
fallen in every respect it is also redeemable in every respect through God’s grace – total 
human depravity calls for total redemption not only for humanity itself but also for the 




Calvin’s all-encompassing vision was inherited and developed as a social and cultural 
programme in the late nineteenth century Netherlands by the towering figure of 
Abraham Kuyper (1837-1920), the father of Reformational philosophy. Kuyper sought 
to set out a Calvinian philosophy that responds to the challenges of the modern world.
16
 
He does this by highlighting the need for a distinctively Christian ‘world and life view’ 
(or ‘worldview’ for short)17 that takes account of both the diversity and the unity of 
human experience in the light of God’s sovereignty over every area of life. This is a 
position that Kuyper came to through a series of decisive events in his life. 
 
                                                 
14
 Vollenhoven, Het Calvinisme en de reformatie van de wijsbegeerte (33a) (1933): 21.  
15
 Albert M. Wolters, ‘The Intellectual Milieu of Herman Dooyeweerd’ (1985): 4-5; Vollenhoven, C.R.W. 
(33a); Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvijn als Bouwer 2’, Polemios 2 (1947); Dooyeweerd, De Wijsbegeerte der 
Wetsidee (1935): 1.484; Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (1969): 1.516 
(Dooyeweerd refers to Calvin, Institutes: 2.1.9).  
16
 I shall not follow the tendency which has been dominant in Western thought to identify the ‘world’ 
with that which is external to ‘me’ or ‘us’ (whoever ‘I’ or ‘we’ might be). Rather the ‘world’ includes 
‘me’ or ‘us’ as much as it does ‘my’ environment, and in relating to the world ‘I’ am relating to ‘myself 
as much as to my environment.  
17
 The term used by Kuyper in his seminal Lectures on Calvinism (Kuyper, Lectures on Calvinism (1976): 
11-12; Peter Somers Heslam, Creating a Christian worldview: Abraham Kuyper’s Lectures on Calvinism 
(1998): 88-96; David K. Naugle, Worldview: the history of a concept (2002): 16-25). The notion of a 
‘world and life view’, or ‘worldview’ for short, seems to have been borrowed most immediately from 
James Orr who made it the theme of his Kerr Lectures in 1891 (James Orr, The Christian View of God 
and the World as Centering in the Incarnation (1989)). In its wider context, the term ‘Weltaunschauung’ 
was first used, albeit in passing, by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Judgement and taken up, amongst 
others, by G. W. F. Hegel, Wilhelm Dilthey and Friedrich Nietzsche (Naugle, Worldview: the history of a 
concept: 55, 58, 68-107; see also Albert M. Wolters, ‘On the idea of a Worldview and its Relation to 
Philosophy’: 14-25; Jacob Klapwijk, ‘On Worldviews and Philosophy’ (1989): 41-55; Anthony Tol, 
‘Foreword’ (2005): viii). I am aware of the criticism that this implicitly uses a strongly visual metaphor, 
but the use of ‘view’ is not meant to privilege the faculty of sight over any of the other faculties. The 




Kuyper’s father was a pastor of the state church, the Hervormde Kerk. He had resisted 
the ‘Afscheiding’ (‘secession’) of 1834, a breakaway element in the ‘Réveil’ (‘revival’ 
or ‘reawakening’), which had begun to have an influence in the Netherlands in the early 
part of the nineteenth century.
18
 The young Abraham Kuyper enrolled for theological 
studies at the University of Leiden in 1855. That university was dominated by figures 
from a liberal theological background such as J.N. Scholten (1811-85), the leader of the 
movement that Kuyper came later to believe sought to accommodate Christianity to the 
worldview of the Enlightenment.
19
 In contrast to this, in the exercise of his pastoral 
responsibilities in his first parish at Beesd in the province of Gelderland between 1863 
and 1867, Kuyper came into contact with simple, heart-felt belief. His encounter with 
Pietje Baltus (1830-1914), a peasant woman in his congregation, led to his conversion 
and his adoption of orthodox Calvinism.
20
 Deeply influenced by this encounter, Kuyper 
came to stress the need for inner transformation through the work of the Holy Spirit in 
personal religious experience. This is inner rebirth, or ‘palingenesis’ which takes place 
in the ‘heart’, the religious centre of human existence. Indeed it was his discovery of the 
centrality of the ‘heart’ that was later to influence both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd 
so deeply in their joint enterprise.
21
 This inner transformation or rebirth is not merely an 
emotional experience but involves the adoption of an entirely new worldview. It is a 
religious re-orientation of humanity in a cosmic context.
22
 Kuyper’s own personal 
religious experience gave rise to his leadership of the ‘Doleantie’ (‘grieving’), which led 
                                                 
18
According to Praamsma, the more aristocratic members of the Réveil kept themselves distinct from the 
Afscheiding, while at the same time expressing sympathy with it (Louis Praamsma, Let Christ Be King: 
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to the break in 1886 with the national Hervormde Kerk and the subsequent founding of 




This concern for inner spiritual transformation was matched by a vigorous engagement 
in the social and political issues of the day. 
 
On the social and political front, Kuyper found himself in opposition to the ideals and 
consequences of the French Revolution. In this he followed, and was deeply influenced 
by, Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer (1801-1876) who, in his seminal work, Ongeloof en 
Revolutie (‘Unbelief and Revolution’, 1847), seeks to bring the concerns of the Réveil to 
wider social expression as an alternative social vision to the ideals of the French 
Revolution.
24
 In 1879 Kuyper was instrumental in founding the Anti-Revolutionaire 
Partij (A.R.P.), in which he then took a leading role, serving as Prime Minister of the 
Netherlands from 1901 to 1905.
25
 He also founded the Vrije Universiteit at Amsterdam 
in 1880 to provide an academic environment within which the movement he influenced 
(‘neo-Calvinist’ or ‘Reformational’ as it came to be called26) could be nourished and 
elaborated. 
 
The French Revolution, to which the A.R.P. was a response, was part of a broader 
cultural movement. The French Revolution had taken place in a social and cultural 
context characterised by a deepening scepticism about Christian belief, illustrated by 
Voltaire’s imprecation against Christ and Christianity: ‘Écrasez l’Infâme’ (‘crush the 
infamous one’).27 Even more profound was the scepticism of Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
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(1712-1778) about revealed religion, combined with his radical political philosophy.
28
 
In the eyes of Kuyper and fellow Reformational thinkers, the worldview of the 
Enlightenment was marked by an unstable, contradictory and unresolveable tension 
between the ideal of personal freedom and the science ideal characterised by 
mathematically quantifiable rationality.
29
 Following the ‘turn to the subject’ initiated by 
Descartes, the subjective human cogito was asserted to be the ultimate ground of 




Thus, the joint but competing commitments to personal freedom (seen in terms of the 
undermined human personality) and to scientific rationality (seen in terms of the ideal 
of a mechanistically determined physical process) shaped the Enlightenment worldview. 
Between them, they entirely displaced any belief in God.
31
 Doubts were expressed 
about belief in a transcendent deity, or at least in one who is active in the world and in 
human experience. In the nineteenth century, thinkers such as Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-
1872) questioned the idea that belief in God was anything but a projection of human 
yearnings for meaning.
32
 Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) took this further, and 
enunciated the view that belief in God is antithetical to human freedom, since 
Christianity, in his view, is based on a falsehood. In place of the Christian faith that he 
rejected he set out the ideal of creating an ethic of human freedom unconstrained by the 
superimposition of moral requirements of (putatively) transcendent origin.
33
 In the 
Netherlands, similarly, E. Douwes Dekker (1820-1887), who wrote under the name of 
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‘Multatuli’, set himself in opposition to all forms of organised religion.34 
 
Alongside this ideal of unconstrained personal freedom, but in tension with it, is the 
rational-mathematical ideal. According to this latter ideal, the universe is to be 
understood entirely as a machine, fully determined by the process of cause and effect 
running along Newtonian lines.
35
 Newtonian mechanics were held by some, most 
notoriously Pierre-Simon, Marquis de Laplace (1749-1827), to dispense with any need 
for the ‘hypothesis’ of God.36 The idea of dispensing with God’s agency was extended 





Kuyper sees the ‘dogma of Evolution’ or the ‘Evolution-theory’38 as a form of 
deterministic pantheism, in that it involves dissolution of the boundaries between God 
                                                 
34
 Kuyper, ‘Blurring’: 363-368; Kuyper, To be Near unto God (1925): Ch. 106, p. 647; Praamsma, 
Kuyper: 20.  
35
 Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727), Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica (1687); see Dooyeweerd, 
‘Criteria’: 207. This was not a view of the world that Newton himself held, but his Principia Mathematica 
came to represent the mechanistic science-ideal (Mike King, Secularism: The Hidden Origins of Disbelief 
(2007): 142, 258).  
36
 Colin E. Gunton, The Triune Creator: A Historical and Systematic Survey (1998): 133. It can perhaps 
be argued that this did not necessarily mean that Laplace does not believe in God, only that God is not a 
consideration in his astronomical calculations (see King, Secularism: The Hidden Origins of Disbelief: 
127-128).  
37
 Full title: On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured 
Races in the Struggle for Life. Darwin himself was reluctant to draw these conclusions (King, Secularism: 
The Hidden Origins of Disbelief: 148), but the claims were made on his behalf, not least by Thomas 
Huxley (1825-1895 ) who coined the term ‘agnostic’ to describe his lack of belief (rather than any active 
disbelief ) in God or any transcendent being.  
38
 I.e., not so much the scientific hypothesis itself, but the worldview associated with it (Kuyper, 
‘Evolution (1899)’ (1998)). This needs to be carefully qualified in that although Kuyper did attempt (not 
very successfully) to critique Darwin’s theory, his fundamental concerns were the philosophical 
assumptions which he took to inform Darwin’s theory, and the worldview which Darwin’s ideas have 
inspired. Menninga suggests that the absence of mention of God in Darwin’s theory does not mean 
necessarily that it is incompatible with the Christian doctrine of creation, only that scientific theories are 
incomplete explanations of reality; and that Kuyper prematurely rejects theistic theories of evolution 
(Clarence Menninga, ‘Critical Reflections on Abraham Kuyper’s Evolutie Address’, Calvin Theological 
Journal 33 (1998): 439, 441-432); Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.84 (n. 1, not in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, 
‘Schepping en evolutie (bespreking van J. Lever, Creatie en evolutie)’, P.R. 24 (1959); Dooyeweerd, 
Reformation and Scholasticism Volume Three: Philosophy of Nature and Philosophical Anthropology 
(2011): 189-220; Dooyeweerd, ‘[Letter to Prof. J.J. Duyvené de Wit]’ in Dooyeweerd Archives (1963) 
quoted in J. Glenn Friesen, ‘Dooyeweerd versus Vollenhoven: The Religious Dialectic within 
Reformational Philosophy’, P.R. 70 (2005): 112; Vollenhoven, ‘De wijsbegeerte van het evolutionisme 
(57c)’, Mededelingen van de Vereniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte (1957); Vollenhoven, 
‘Getuigen in de wetenschap (59d)’ (1992): 140; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen rondom de tijd (63b)’ (1992): 
180-184; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd in onze kring (68b)’ (1992): 180-183. For a general 
bibliography of Reformational literature on this question, see Bruce C. Wearne, ‘Creation and Evolution 
Bibliography: Selected Reformational Contributions (1899-2011)’, P.R. 76 (2011): 163-168; with special 




and the world. Instead of a transcendent deity, the proponents of the ‘Evolution-theory’ 
now saw the world as containing within itself the seeds of its own origin and destiny 
without any need for, or reference to, a transcendent Creator. It was not so much the 
details of Darwin’s account that are a matter of concern to Kuyper (although he did 
address them, albeit with mixed success), but rather the pantheistic understanding of the 
world to which, he argues, it gives rise. He argues that Evolution-theory seeks to reduce 
the organic to the mechanistic, the aesthetic to the merely useful, ethics first to sociality 
or psychology and then to a mechanistic explanation, and finally, denies the possibility 




‘Modernism’, the worldview of European Enlightenment which began in the late 
seventeenth century, was only one of a number of alternatives to the Christian 
worldview, of which, Kuyper argues, Calvinism is the most consistent expression. 
Kuyper himself identifies a number of worldviews: ‘Paganism’, ‘Islamism’, 
‘Romanism’ and ‘Modernism’.40 These different worldviews reflect an underlying split 
or ‘antithesis’ that runs through humanity as the struggle between two dynamic 
principles: that of obedience to God, and that of disobedience to God and rebellion 
against him.
41 The idea of this antithesis harks back to Augustine’s influential vision of 
the continuing tension, from the time of the fall until the return of Christ, between the 
Civitas Dei and the Civitas Terrena.
42
 For Kuyper, participation in the Civitas Dei 
requires a thorough re-orientation of one’s basic stance towards God. This orientation is 
reflected in, and underlies, a worldview. This underlying orientation cannot be arrived 
at by theorising, but is entirely the work of the Holy Spirit upon the human heart. 
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Kuyper locates the key locus of the change in the human heart
43
 in the ‘sphere of special 
grace’ (‘de sfeer der bijzondere genade’) rather than in the exercise of reason.44  
 
In this respect, Kuyper breaks decisively with the rationalist side of the Enlightenment. 
However, this is not an irrationalist move, since, as we shall see below, following 
Calvin, he emphasises that God deals with the created order in a lawful rather than an 
arbitrary way. Indeed, by stressing the lawfulness of God in his dealing with the created 
order, Kuyper breaks with the unconstrained personality-ideal. For Kuyper, as for 
Calvin,
45
 the Persons of the Trinity bind themselves in a covenant for the existence and 
wellbeing of the world. The love among the three Persons of the Trinity and their 
common love for the world is the sole basis for the trustworthiness of their covenant to 
the world in its creation, redemption and transformation; since the covenant is an eternal 
promise made, in the first instance, by the Persons to one another.
46
 In this way two 
opposite positions are rejected: the intellectualist one, which sees the creation of the 
world as somehow a reflection of God’s mind (with God as subject to the laws of his 
own creation), and the voluntarist one, which sees the creation of the world as a sheer 
act of will (with God as utterly arbitrary).
47
 God is, as John Calvin puts it, both ‘legibus 
                                                 
43
 Dooyeweerd, ‘Roomsch-katholieke en Anti-revolutionaire Staatkunde (R.K. en A.R.S.)’ in Adviezen en 
Studies (1923): 52.  
44
 Dooyeweerd, ‘De staatkundige tegenstelling tusschen Christelijk-Historische en Antirevolutionaire 
partij (C.H. en A.R.P) 3’ in Dooyeweerd Archive (1923): 117; Dooyeweerd, ‘Introduction by the Editor in 
Chief ... [to The Idea of a Christian Philosophy: Essays in Honour of D.H.Th. Vollenhoven]’, P.R. 38 
(1973): 10. However, Kuyper himself is not entirely free of rationalistic elements (see Harry Fernhout, 
‘Man, Faith and Religion in Bavinck, Kuyper, and Dooyeweerd’ (M. Phil., Institute for Christian Studies, 
Toronto: 41-70)).  
45
 Philip Walker Butin, Revelation, Redemption, and Response: Calvin’s Trinitarian Understanding of the 
Divine-Human Relationship (1995): 55-94; Peter A. Lillback, The Binding of God: Calvin’s Role in the 
Development of Covenant Theology (2001): 212-214. While Calvin explicitly emphasizes the 
implementation of the covenant in history through the mediation of the Son, the eternal covenant between 
the Father and the Son, and by implication is implicit in Calvin’s theology and is made explicit in later 
Reformed thinking where the inner-triune covenant is called the ‘covenant of redemption’ or the pactum 
salutis – somewhat misleadingly, since it also involves the triune act of creation (Ralph Allan Smith, The 
Eternal Covenant: How the Trinity Reshapes Covenant Theology (2003): 15-31; Peter Golding, Covenant 
Theology: The Key of Theology in Reformed Thought and Tradition (2004): 138-142; Richard A. Muller, 
Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics (2003): 4.255-274 especially 266-267).  
46
 In terms of Vollenhovian-Dooyeweerdian modal analysis, love is ethically qualified. But the 
characterisation of the relations of the Trinity as loving involves all the modalities: the Persons proclaim 
divine status (pistical or faith modality), they give glory (aesthetic), they deal justly (juridical), effectively 
(economical), appropriately (social), truly (analytical), etc. with respect to one another. This is not to say 
that the triune Persons are bound by laws – only that in their self-revelation, they set out a basis for the 
life of the world expressed in each of the modalities. In Chapter Five, I shall argue that this basis is 
expressed in the Ideas of Origin, Coherence and Purpose.  
47
 Calvin’s own theology is often read in these voluntarist terms. It admittedly does have voluntarist 





solutus’ (‘free of law’) and equally ‘non exlex’ (‘non arbitrary’)48 – ‘legibus solutus’ 
because laws result from the mutual compact of the three Persons acting out of freedom 
and love, not out of submission to any external or impersonal law or principle; ‘non 
exlex’ because the mutual love of the Father, Son and Spirit gives the universe both 
stability and settled character. The acts of creation, redemption and transformation find 
their highest unity in the work of the Son. He participates in all these acts, not as a 
foreign element but as a full co-director of the ‘Eternal Counsel of Peace’ (‘eeuwigen 





I shall now trace three themes common to the Reformational vision of the work of God 
in the world. In articulating this vision, Kuyper and those who followed him built on the 
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strongly trinitarian character of Calvin’s theology. We can see this trinitarian character 
reflected in three central themes of Kuyper’s exposition: first, the integrity of all 
individuals before God the Father – the Father uniquely creates and calls individuals, 
not least human individuals as integral beings; second, the plural diversity of the created 
order under the rule of the Son, through whom alone all things cohere – the Son is Lord 
over every area of life; and third, the unfolding purposiveness of the created order 
through the work of the Holy Spirit, who transforms all things and brings about the new 
heaven and the new earth – the Holy Spirit effects the acts of creation, redemption and 
the bringing of all things to their state of final glory. 
 
I shall look at these themes as Kuyper expounded them in conjunction with some later 
reflections by Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. 
 
 
1.1 The Integrity of the Individual Subject before God the Father 
 
The first overarching theme in Reformational thought which I shall address, then, is that 
of the integrity of the individual subject or ‘subjèct’ (to follow Vollenhoven’s later 
orthography).
50
 This emphasis on the integrity of the individual subjèct is in keeping 
with the broad vision of God’s sovereignty over the whole of life. Just as all areas of life 
are to be affirmed as created by God and therefore to be valued, so too should the 
material palpability and individual uniqueness of ordinary things be respected and 
celebrated. The sacred/secular split treats some elements of creation as ‘higher’ and 
others as ‘lower’. But for Kuyper, all created things are on one level coram Deo.51 We 
see this represented in the Golden Age of Dutch painting, where the value of the 
individual thing, no matter how commonplace, was expressed with care and attention to 
detail within the overall composition. As Kuyper puts it, the Dutch school, which 
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flourished during the period of greatest Calvinist influence in that country, opened one’s 
eyes to ‘the small and insignificant’.52  
 
Each human being stands before God as a unique creature, and as such, is responsible to 
God for his or her actions and indeed for the basic underlying orientation which gives 
rise to those actions. The original relationship of human beings with God, other human 
beings and their environment has become distorted through sin and rebellion. Humanity 
is in a state of disobedience, and creation as a whole has been distorted as a 
consequence. However, in the midst of the all-pervasiveness of sin and its consequences 
in the rest of creation, each individual human being still has the responsibility to turn to 




The Reformational vision of the individual as subjèct to God and God’s law needs to be 
distinguished from the notion of ‘substance’ that informs the dualistic understanding of 
the individual.
54
 This notion posits an underlying reality ‘beneath’ the appearance of 
things as we experience them. It was developed first in the context of Greek thought, 





The Greek view is characterised by a tension between the eternal becoming of ‘matter’ 
and the eternal being of ‘form’. On the one hand, ‘matter’, in the Greek view, expresses 
dynamism and vitality; on the other, ‘form’ expresses the ideal of perfect order and 
unchangeability. The older Greek nature religions of Gaia (mother earth), Uranus (the 
god of the skies), Demeter (goddess of crops) and Dionysus (the god of wine) had 
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deified the matter principle as the eternal origin of all that exists; but this was contested 
by the culture religion of the gods of Mount Olympus, not least Apollo (the god of 
form). Dooyeweerd argues that culture religion represents the deification of the eternal, 
unchanging concepts of unity, truth, goodness and beauty. These involve the use of 
‘theoria’, of abstract thought, which is a way of entering the realm of divine eternity. 
Aristotle’s notion of substance is an attempt to combine form and matter through the 
use of theoria in such a way as to recognise the underlying continuity of form 
(‘substance’) through the changes of matter (‘accidents’) to which an entity is subject. 
But here too, through reason (the ‘logos’) the human substance can realize its higher 




Related to the notion of substance, first in Greek and then medieval thought, is the 
notion of a ‘principium individuationis’, i.e., the process by which individuality is 
generated either by form from matter or vice-versa. The notion of the principium 
individuationis was developed by Aristotle and then taken up by Thomas Aquinas 
within the form/matter schema.
57
 Aristotle himself derives it from Hippocrates, 
according to whom form individualises matter. However, in his later thinking he 
reverses this, and for him,
58
 as for Thomas Aquinas who takes him up in this regard in 
the medieval period, it is matter which individualises form.
59
 In particular for Thomas, 
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the ‘rational soul’ (‘anima rationalis’), the form of humanity, is individualised by the 
human body, the matter of human existence.
60
 However, according to Reformational 
philosophy, the principium individuationis cannot genuinely account for individuality, 
since both form and matter are universal in character – merely combining them cannot 
generate the ‘this-ness’ of individual persons and things.61  
 
In his development of the Reformational critique begun by Kuyper, Dooyeweerd argues 
that Thomas Aquinas takes up Aristotle’s notion of substance, albeit stripped of its 
original religious basis, and then replaces Aristotle’s view of God as supreme form with 
the biblical doctrine of God the creator. Following Plato and Aristotle as well as later 
Hellenistic philosophers, Thomas attempts to understand being in terms of the four 
eternal concepts, or ‘transcendentals’, as he calls them: unity, truth, beauty and 
goodness.
62
 These transcendentals, for Thomas, define the being of all things, but only 
by analogy with the Being of God, where they exist in perfect form. In this latter 
respect, it is argued that Thomas shows the influence of neo-Platonist philosophy (in 
which form and matter are organised into a hierarchy of being), rather than purely 
Aristotelian influence. Nevertheless, it demonstrates his dependence on a schema in 
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which the diversity of material experience is understood in terms of an underlying 
theoretical form – a form that gives it value and intelligibility. Dooyeweerd argues that 
Thomas’s addition of the category of grace to this picture only intensifies the dualism 
that runs through it. According to the ‘natural’ categories which Thomas derives from 
the Greeks, individual things are seen, first, as unordered matter, then given form 
through the process of causality (understood along Aristotelian lines
63
), and finally 
made sacred as objects through the infusion of grace (the latter seen as a ‘donum 
superadditum’: ‘an additional gift’, i.e., additional to its original created nature). 
Understanding the world is left neutrally to the work of reason, supplemented by grace: 
‘grace’ describes that which is directly revealed or provided by God, and ‘nature’ that 
which pertains to the world as one finds it through the course of everyday human 
investigation.
64
 This grace/nature combination epitomises what Reformational thinkers 
tend to call ‘scholasticism’,65 a term which we shall meet repeatedly in the course of this 
study. 
 
More specifically, the notion of substance, as a key concept of the scholastic 
inheritance, is not confined to ancient or medieval philosophy. It has also played an 
important role in modern philosophy, not least in the thought of Descartes, for whom 
the thinking self intuits an underlying substance belonging to the objects of cognition in 
which properties inhere.
66
 By this method, he comes to intuit himself as a thinking 
substance (‘res cogitans’) with a point of location in the physical world (‘res 
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extensa’).67 This move is a critical one in the shaping of modern philosophy. According 
to Dooyeweerd, it is taken up by Kant with his notion of the ‘homo noumenon’ (the 
‘transcendental’ subject) i.e., the recipient of sensation and the agent of rational 
deduction which is the necessary condition of the unification of thought and 
experience.
68
 The notion, especially that of the self as substance, still plays a critical 
part in more recent Western epistemology, even when the ontology of an underlying 
metaphysical substance pertaining to all things has been rejected.
69
 The alternative 
philosophical traditions of empiricism (notably by David Hume
70
) and logical 
positivism (notably by Bertrand Russell
71
) replace the notion of a transcendental human 
subject with the posit of the self as a mere bundle of sensations. However, even in the 
case of the latter, the notion of a recipient to whom these bundles of diverse sensations 
are presented remains. Dooyeweerd argues, with respect to modern philosophy, that the 
individual is neither a ‘natural substance’, an inbuilt category of mental process, nor, 




Both Vollenhoven (in his mature thought) and Dooyeweerd argue that the notion of 
‘substance’ – be it in its ancient, medieval, or modern form – is a false ‘solution’ to the 
question about how the individual, encountered in naïve experience, is and can be 
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 Among Reformational philosophers, the notion of ‘substance’ was put 
forward by the South African philosopher, Hendrik Stoker, in order to safeguard 
individual continuity – a proposal which Dooyeweerd rejects as ‘neo-scholastic’.74 The 
notion of substance (be it in its classical or modern form) is an attempt to make the 
individual the bearer of his, her or its own meaning, or to ground him, her or it in some 
sort of pre-existent combination of form and matter. For example, human beings are 
seen in dualistic terms as souls and bodies, and, in one account (that of Thomas), the 
soul is seen as the form of the body. Faith is then added onto this picture as a capacity 
of the soul brought into effect through grace. Further, the notion of substance involves, 
at least implicitly, recourse to a conception of a self-enclosed, self-subsistent entity.
75
 
Substances are interchangeable and capable of being defined conceptually, whereas, at 




From a Reformational perspective, then, the notion of substance – whether according to 
Aristotle, Thomas or in its more recent use in modern philosophy – cannot provide us 
with an account of individuality. Nor does it do justice to the integrity of the individual 
before God. All dualisms are to be rejected – whether they are the Greek division 
between form and matter, the medieval dualism between grace and nature, or the 
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To be consistent with this rejection of all forms of dualism, human beings are not to be 
understood as souls and bodies, but as integral entities.
78
 As will be argued, the ‘heart’ 
(as the Reformational reading of the Bible has it) is not a distinct entity or element 
within the human constitution. It is simply the human being seen most basically in terms 
of his or her relationship with God.
79
 While Kuyper’s account retains a somewhat 
dualistic character, his account of the heart provides what Dooyeweerd regards as the 
radical break with ‘scholasticism’ and it is this which lays the basis for a better 
integrated anthropology, one more in keeping with the biblical roots.
80
 From a 
Reformational perspective, an individual only receives meaning from beyond the 
horizon of temporal experience: i.e., in dependence on the Origin of all meaning and 
existence,
81




To sum up: from a Reformational perspective, all created things have equal ontic status 
in that the being of all created individuals is equally and directly dependent on the 
Father. This vision of the direct dependence of every creature upon God contrasts with 
the picture of the ‘great chain of being’ in which God’s relationship is mediated 
hierarchically down this chain of being from ‘higher’ creatures, or ‘higher’ created 
elements, to ‘lower’ ones.83 Further, all entities in the world are to be understood not as 
phenomenal representations of an underlying reality (such as a substance), but rather as 
creatures called into being, and subject, moment by moment, to God’s call and purpose. 
This does not exclude the functional differences one from another, nor that human 
beings and other sentient creatures have the capacity for true knowledge, and (as is the 
case for all creatures) can truly be known. But while it is only human beings who can 
come to know their dependence upon God, their dependence upon God, as with all 
creatures, is prior to that knowledge: the (noetic) direct or indirect awareness of God 
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arises from the real (ontic) dependence of humanity, as of creation as a whole, upon 
God.  
 
The theme of the integrity of individuals before God needs to be seen in the context of 
the subjugation of all relationships to the sovereign rule of Christ. This is the second 
Reformational theme, to which I shall now turn. 
 
 
1.2 The Irreducible Plurality of Society and the World under the Son 
 
The second Reformational theme, then, is the affirmation of the world’s irreducible 
plurality under the rule of the Son, in whom it is created, through whom it is redeemed, 
and by whom it will be judged. The Son is the Co-creator and the Saviour of the world – 
and is the latter only because he is already the former. There is therefore no grace/nature 
division. From a Reformational perspective, ‘grace’ and ‘nature’ should not be set 
against one another – the proper distinction is between creation and re-creation.84 ‘Re-
creation’ means the transformation of the first creation after the entry of sin – it is a 
purging of its subsequent fallenness, and a healing of its wounds, not the nullification of 
its original goodness. 
 
Kuyper sees human society neither as an undifferentiated whole, nor as a conglomerate 
of atomistic individuals. Both the collectivist and individualist tendencies are present in 
unstable combination in the ideas of the French Revolution and the developments to 
which it gave rise.
 
Against both collectivism and individualism, he sets out a vision of 
society in which there are clearly differentiated social structures, arising from the order 
of creation but unfolded in history, each with its own appropriate sphere of 
responsibility and competence. For Kuyper, all spheres of the society (family, business, 
science, art as well as state and church) are directly under the Lordship of the Son.
85
 He 
calls this ‘sphere sovereignty’ (‘souvereiniteit in eigen kring’). However, he uses the 
                                                 
84
 Kuyper, ‘Common Grace (1902-4)’ (1998): 171-174. 
85




notion of ‘sphere sovereignty’ in various and somewhat different ways.86 This creates 
difficulties, as his uses of the term are not entirely compatible with each other, certainly 
not in their initial exposition. There are at least three different ways in which he uses the 
notion. 
 
The first sense is outlined in his inaugural address at the V.U., where he presents a 
theory of societal institutions. He elaborates this vision in greater detail in his 1898 
Stone Lectures at Princeton, where he sets out a view of ‘sphere sovereignty’ in which 
state, church, and all institutions of society are envisaged as possessing distinctive areas 
of competence and appropriate operations according to their specific task or function.
87
 
He draws on the well-developed pluralist tradition in Reformed thought from John 
Althusius (1557-1638) on.
88
 However, in working out what ‘sphere sovereignty’ 
actually means, Kuyper is still deeply influenced by nineteenth century currents of 
thought, namely, historicism and organicism. 
 
With respect to historicism, like his predecessor in the Anti-Revolutionary movement, 
Groen, Kuyper was influenced by the view that legitimacy is rooted in the sheer fact of 
what is given in a specific situation and its particular cultural character.
89
 Linked with 
this is the notion of the corporate autonomy of societal ‘corporations’, including the 
church.
90
 Groen and Kuyper were also influenced by the historical-legal school of 
Friedrich Karl von Savigny (1779-1861),
91
 and Georg Friedrich Puchta (1798-1846); or 
alternatively, the corporatist conservatism of Friedrich Julius Stahl (1802-1861).
92
 
However, Kuyper is critical of Stahl because he confines legality within the boundaries 
of human knowledge and fails to see how it arises primordially from religion. He argues 
that all ethical right is rooted in God’s claim upon all creation. Sheer conservatism, even 
if based on one’s respect for God’s sovereign providence in specific situations, cannot 
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do justice to the call of God to humanity as a whole, and individual responsibility in the 
moment of decision,
93
 since merely appealing to the status quo does not properly take 
into account the depth of the human response. 
 
With respect to organicism, one can see its influence in Kuyper’s description of 
relationships as the state of being joined together like ligaments of a body, and parts of a 
wider whole. He tends to express his conception of society in terms of what he 
describes as its ‘organic relations’, especially those of the family, local communities 
and their constituent elements.
94
 This is also behind his somewhat conservative – albeit 
deeply appreciative – attitude towards women, and explains his support of proposals 
such as household suffrage exercised by the male head of the household.
95
 More 
generally, he expresses a historicistic organicism in a way that idealizes the 
Gemeinschaft, the ideal of the natural community (of family or kinship group), as the 
normative characteristic of society.  
 
The first sense of Kuyper’s ‘sphere sovereignty’ was developed later by both 
Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. Both these latter contend that Kuyper is vague and 
inconsistent about how the spheres were actually defined, and suggest that this lack of 
clarity prevents him from developing a systematic social and political theory.
96
 Both 
give accounts of how the range of institutions in society act in accordance with 
universal principles, not simply as a conservative defence of existing corporate rights or 
practices. As we shall see, far from Dooyeweerd’s advocacy of pluralism being a 
reactionary stance, he sets out a normative basis on which ‘progressive’ and 
‘reactionary’ tendencies in the development of society can be identified, so that the 
former could be promoted and the latter counteracted.
97
 This in turn provides the basis 
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for a pluralistic vision of society, according to which not only the power of the state but 
also of any other overweening institution or element can be held in check. Only thus can 
there be genuine social flourishing.
98
 Dooyeweerd especially develops an account of 
social institutions, with particular attention to the philosophy of law. Further, the way in 
which Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd develop ‘sphere sovereignty’ provides more 
systematically for a philosophy encompassing the whole of creation rather than merely 
human society. In this regard, they were building on the second sense of ‘sphere 
sovereignty’ to which I now turn. 
 
The second sense of ‘sphere sovereignty’, which is implicit rather than explicit in 
Kuyper’s thinking, is of diversity as a creational principle. Although he does not 
number or provide us with a systematic description of them, for Kuyper there are 
numerous and diverse domains which govern relations among individuals: religious, 
political, scientific, artistic, economic, and familial. Each is subject directly to the Son 
and obeys its own laws of life.
99
 For Kuyper, this plurality is expressed in the form of a 
diversity of ‘creation ordinances’ relevant to different kinds of relations (to be 
distinguished from the institutional plurality of the first sense of ‘sphere sovereignty’ 
described above).
100
 The diversity of the created order depends for its true character on 
the rule of Christ over every area of life. Kuyper’s best-known statement proclaims the 
need to make all aspects of life subject to Christ. As he puts it:  
 
‘…there is not a square inch in the whole domain of one’s human existence over 
which Christ, who is Sovereign over all, does not cry: “Mine!’’ ’101 
  
This is a striking vision of Christ as the ascended Lord, who rules with the authority of 
the Father by virtue of his status not only as the one in whom and through whom all 
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things were created, but also as Saviour and, further, as future Judge. For Kuyper, the 
general principle of Calvinism involves what he calls ‘the cosmological significance of 
Christ’. In speaking of Christ’s ‘cosmological significance’, he has Christ’s redemptive 
role in view, as well as his prior creative one. Christ is redeemer of all creation because 
he is creator of all. For this reason, Christ’s work includes the ‘restoration of the entire 
cosmos’, not simply the ‘redemption of individual sinners’.102  
 
From a more consistently Reformational perspective, the way that Kuyper describes the 
Lordship of Christ over creation as a whole is not entirely satisfactory. There are 
residual ‘scholastic’ elements in his thought, not least in his distinction between 
‘archetype’ and ‘ectype’: the archetype being located in its eternal origin in God, and 
the ectype being the temporal expression of the eternal truth. He emphasises the role of 
the Son as mediator of creation, possibly at the cost of attributing to ‘creation 
ordinances’ an absoluteness that subjects the work of God to quasi-divine structures 
(similar to Plato’s ‘laws’). The Logos as Kuyper conceives it tends to be understood as 
an impersonal principle of a logical character, and he tends to accord the creation 
ordinances eternal status as universals existing alongside God with a pre-ordained 
fixity. Both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd were to critique Kuyper for this reason.
103
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However, despite their critique of these residual scholastic elements, this second, wider 
sense of sphere sovereignty as creational diversity was rigorously developed by 
Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. As we shall see, their conception of ‘sphere sovereignty’ 
would later be set within the diversity of norms that govern all relationships.
104
 It is 
complementary to the first sense of ‘sphere sovereignty’, which affirms the diversity of 
the corporate structures of society, and the need for this diversity to be respected, 
nurtured and protected. However, there is a third sense of ‘sphere sovereignty’ which 
has sometimes come to eclipse the other two senses as the ‘the Kuyperian position’. 
This third sense, which I shall consider now, is of a different order to the first two, and 
arguably at variance with them. 
 
This third sense of ‘sphere sovereignty’ can be seen in Kuyper’s rectorial address of 
1892, ‘De Verflauwing der Grenzen’ (‘the blurring of the boundaries’). This sense of 
sphere sovereignty is what was subsequently called ‘verzuiling’ (‘columned society’), 
where the only remedy for the pervasive influence of pantheism (defined very broadly) 
was to form an independent ‘life-sphere’ (‘levenskring’) in which educational and other 
institutions for each group of believers, defined confessionally, are established.
105
 Here, 
as Heslam points out, he uses the term ‘sphere’ to indicate not a social institution or 
association, but, a ‘realm of human existence’ or, more specifically, a confessionally 
defined zone or complex of institutions and associations defined by the fundamental 




It is this sense of ‘sphere sovereignty’ as ‘verzuiling’ that has had the most notable 
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impact on the social and political ordering of the Netherlands. But it is also the most 
problematical of the senses of ‘sphere sovereignty’. It is in danger of drawing a straight 
line from the fundamental religious belief of the members of a given community to the 
corporate expression of that belief. This can result in a form of separatism along 
confessional lines without fully taking into account the distinctly creational structure of 
each of the social entities concerned.
107
 It might lead to the dominance of one institution 
over another in a way that violates their sphere sovereignty in the first sense. For 
example, it might give undue dominance to the church as an institution over other 
institutions or associations, leading to an over-concentration on one aspect of creation at 
the expense of another (such as faith over justice). Also, as Heslam points out, it is 
unclear how it can be related to the original creation order, since the confessional 
diversity which arose out of doctrinal controversies (although perhaps not arising for 
cultural or other reasons) can only have arisen after the fall. In this regard, it seems to be 
in conflict also with the sense of ‘sphere sovereignty’ that stems from the diversity 




Despite the different ways in which ‘sphere sovereignty’ has been understood (and also 
despite the problems of the historicistic influences upon the ‘sphere sovereignty’, 
especially in its social expression) we can still trace a common theme of a creation 
subject to God and harmoniously diverse to the extent that it is subject to God in the 
different aspects of the created order. As we shall see, despite differences in the way 
they were influenced, both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven sought to promote Kuyper’s 
vision of the Lordship of Christ over every area of life. Creation, although at present 
fallen and subject to the distortion of sin, needs to be seen in all of its harmonious 
diversity; and, moreover, needs to be seen in terms of the unfolding of God’s purposes 
in history. It is this last theme to which I shall now turn. 
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1.3 The Purposiveness of the Historical Process through the Spirit 
 
The third theme of the Reformational vision is the affirmation of the purposive nature of 
the historical process. As in the first theme we see the integrity of each individual 
subject coram Deo, and in the second the sovereignty of Christ over every area of life, 
so in the third we see the work of the Spirit in bringing about God’s purposes in and 
through the historical process.  
 
The work of the Holy Spirit takes place within the context of the covenant between God 
and the whole of the created order generally, and with humanity in particular. Kuyper 
develops this first in terms of God’s original action of creation effected through the 
work of the Holy Spirit.
109
 Further, it is seen in the in the work of the Holy Spirit in 
‘particular’ and ‘common’ grace. The former concerns the work of the Holy Spirit as 
revealed in the human heart – the specific work of God in the elect, those who are 
beneficiaries of God’s efficient grace.110 This is central to the account of election and 
saving grace in the theology of John Calvin.
111 
As we have seen, it is taken up in 
Kuyper’s account of palingenesis: God’s saving purposes are revealed at the centre of 
human experience, for each individual.
112
 Alongside this, the Holy Spirit restrains the 
effects of sin through his universal influence over all people. For Kuyper, this insight is 
expressed in his notion of ‘common grace’: the notion that the Spirit is not simply 
working in the hearts of individuals (‘particular grace’), but also in the cultural 
development of creation and human society as a whole.
113
 Special grace and common 
grace presuppose one another – it is through common grace that special grace is 
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possible and vice versa.
114
 Just as in particular grace the elect are brought to salvation 
through the work of the Holy Spirit with Christ as the mediator of salvation, a role for 
which he is fitted as mediator of creation, so the world at large is restored by the Holy 
Spirit on the basis of Christ as mediator of creation (common grace) and through the 
sideways implications of his work as redeemer of humanity (special grace). Thus, 
because special grace is centred on Christ, and because his Body shares in his honour, 
common grace is an ‘emanation’ of special grace and flows back into special grace, 
which has as its end and purpose the glorification of the Son. On the other hand, 
common grace can be seen as a preparation for the reception of special grace in that it 
holds open the sense of God, restrains entire human degeneracy and opens the way for 
the gospel to be received.
115
 Just as special or particular grace looks forward to the 
transformation of the elect through the particular work of the Holy Spirit, benefiting 
through the prior work of common grace in overcoming evil as an obstacle to the 
gospel, so common grace, through the sideways implications of special grace, looks 
forward towards the transformation of the entire universe. This transformation of the 
universe does not imply the destruction or supercession of its material character, but 
rather its re-orientation towards God and the restoration of its original goodness.
116
 
Heslam points out that for Kuyper the destiny of the creation is, in Kuyper’s words, ‘the 
restoration of the entire cosmos’.117 Thus, the account of God’s providence brings 
together God’s saving purposes for the elect, together with his intentions for creation as 
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a whole.  
 
Thus the purposes of God are worked out by the Holy Spirit in creation as a whole. 
Kuyper rejects the ‘Romanist’ teaching that there are two spheres: the earthly and the 
heavenly, with corresponding human capacities, ‘natural’ and ‘super-natural’; and the 
fall seen as involving the loss of the latter but not the former. In terms of the 
Reformational perspective, enunciated by Kuyper, there is no final distinction between 
the everyday and the sacred. The distinction is rather that between the principium of the 
work of the Spirit and the prinicipium of the world at enmity with God. According to 
this understanding, miracles are marked out purely according to their revelatory power, 
not because they are more directly the work of God than any others.
118 
Sexual and other 
physical appetites are not in any sense deficiencies or elements of the created order that 
somehow need to be transcended. The issue is not the desires themselves, but the way in 
which they are directed and given expression. Unlike Plato’s view of reality, physicality 
is not seen as something from which we are to be healed or from which we are to 
escape,
119
 but as something that needs to be redeemed, restored, and transformed 
according to God’s purposes. Kuyper argues that this involves an appreciation of the 
‘cosmological significance’ of Christ. This was something that had been lost sight of 
prior to the Reformation with the rupture between the life of nature and the life of 
grace.
120
 He argues, rather, from a Calvinist standpoint that the whole of humanity is 
fallen in every respect, but that the full implications of human sinfulness (which left to 
itself would lead to the degeneracy of human life) have been kept in check by common 
grace. This restraint of evil is the reverse side of the coin to the unfolding of created 
potential. Through common grace, sin is not permitted entirely to destroy the potential 
of the created order. Common grace makes history possible, not, in Kuyper’s words, as 
‘an endless, unvarying repetition of the same things’, but as ‘constant change, 
modification, and transformation in human life’. God is constantly bringing about new 
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things by which life can be enriched; indeed, God brings to light hidden talents and 
develops human history by a ‘regular process’, securing humanity and its cultural 




Redemption, then, from a Reformational perspective, is not the recovery of some lost 
constituent element of humanity or of the world, nor does it involve the abandonment of 
certain elements or features of the world. From this perspective sin is neither the loss of 
a property or substance, nor even a deficiency in being – it is a wrong orientation of 
one’s stance towards God, and how this works out in the way we live. Faith is not an 
additional element in the human constitution, something to be given or restored, but a 
re-orientation of one’s whole being to God through the redemption one has in Christ 
through the work of the Holy Spirit.
122
 Similarly, the Christian hope is not for a future 
disembodied state but for the resurrection, in Christ through the Spirit, of the whole 
human life, bodily restored, in a transformed universe.
123
 The implication of this is that 
Christians are called, through God’s Spirit, to engage in all aspects of society, alongside 
their neighbours, and thus realise created potential, and more than that, become agents 
for its transformation, through common grace. The world at large is the objective of 
God’s final purposes and is to be subject in its wholeness to God’s rule.124 In the light of 
this final purpose, the development of the world has value in itself, not simply as a 
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Thus, through the working of the Holy Spirit in creation, the restraint of the effects of 
sin at large through common grace, and the restoration of humanity to full fellowship 
with God through special grace, Kuyper sees an overall purposiveness in the direction 
of history and the whole temporal process.  
 
 
1.4 The Three Trinitarian Themes of the Reformational Vision 
 
To sum up this chapter as a whole: the Reformational vision takes the affirmation of 
God’s sovereignty over every area of life. This is a vision inherited from John Calvin, 
and is central to Reformed theology. It was re-affirmed in a comprehensive way by 
Abraham Kuyper, in response to the Enlightenment’s scepticism about God’s agency in 
the world, to the reorganisation of society along secularist lines following the French 
Revolution, and more broadly to the dualisms which variously characterised Greek, 
medieval and modern thought. The vision which Kuyper enunciated is a symphony 
consisting of three themes. These three themes are: the integrity of the individual 
subject before God;
126
 the irreducible plurality of the world and of society under the rule 
of the Son;
127
 and God’s providence for the world, both for humanity and the wider 
cosmos, through the work of the Spirit.
128
 The three themes point to God’s threefold 
agency in the world: the will of the Father addresses all created beings as whole entities 
and expresses the Father’s care for each individual creature; the revelation of the Son 
models for us the many different ways in which the world is and should be; and the 
work of the Spirit transforms the world according to God’s purposes. While the work of 
God has this threefold character, it is a work carried out jointly by Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit in creation, redemption and the transformation of redeemed humanity and the 
world.  
 
Kuyper’s lead was followed by a new generation of Reformational thinkers who 
continued his work. Chief among these were Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven. The two 
philosophers were guided by Kuyper’s vision of the sovereignty of God over every area 
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of life, but sought to express this in a more consistent and comprehensive way than 
Kuyper himself had been able to achieve. This systematic approach encompassed all 
areas of knowledge, and sought to address universal human experience in a much less 
culturally specific way than that of Kuyper.
129
 Both were critical of elements in 
traditional Reformed theology which they felt compromised the integrity and global 
nature of this vision, and sought to set out a systematic philosophical structure which 
enshrined the Calvinian vision, but excluded those elements antithetical to it. As we 
shall see, neither Dooyeweerd’s nor Vollenhoven’s appropriations of the Kuyperian 
tradition were straightforward. Indeed, both came under strong criticism in the 1930s 
for departing from it in significant ways. However, both followed the trail blazed by 
Kuyper, and were inspired and shaped by the vision he enunciated.  
 
In the chapters which follow, I shall look more closely at Vollenhoven and 
Dooyeweerd, as the two leading Reformational philosophers of the Twentieth Century. I 
shall explore how the three themes of Reformational thought illuminate the shape and 
working out of their philosophical systems and see how satisfactorily these themes are 
reflected in the structure of their thinking. To begin with, in the next chapter, I shall 
provide an overview of the development of their respective philosophies.
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Chapter Two: Vollenhoven’s and Dooyeweerd’s Philosophical Development 
 
Both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, who are the major subjects of this study, drew on 
the pluralistic vision of their predecessor, Abraham Kuyper, which has been the subject 
of the previous chapter. The two figures were almost exact contemporaries 
(Vollenhoven just two years older than Dooyeweerd), and both were educated within 
the Gereformeerde Kerken tradition.
130
 From 1926, for a period of some forty years, 
they were Professors of Philosophy and of Philosophy of Law respectively at the Vrije 
Universiteit (V.U.) at Amsterdam. In this chapter, we shall see how the two 
philosophers worked out that vision in a systematic way to address not only social 
structures but also an understanding of created reality as a whole. Although they were 
collaborators in developing a comprehensive Christian philosophy, they differ in their 
accounts of how this vision is worked out. I shall present an overview of their 
philosophical development in order to see their mutual influence and divergences. That 
in turn will provide the background for a systematic comparison of the structure of their 
respective philosophical positions in the later chapters.  
 
I shall look at the philosophical development of each in turn, starting with Vollenhoven. 
 
 
2.1 An Overview of Vollenhoven’s Philosophical Development 
 
The role of Dirk Vollenhoven in the development of Reformational thought is much less 
well known of than that of his brother-in-law. Even in his retrospective reflection on 
Vollenhoven’s philosophical contribution, Dooyeweerd largely focussed on the 
development of his own philosophical thinking.
131
 However, as his slightly older 
contemporary, Vollenhoven preceded Dooyeweerd in his own philosophical reflection, 
and arguably pioneered many of the key insights which Dooyeweerd later elaborated. 
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1886 from the state Hervormde Kerk, joined the previous split, the Afscheiding, of 1834 (see Chapter 
One introduction).  
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As we shall see, by the time of their joint appointment as professors at the V.U. in 1926, 
their philosophical positions were very close. However, towards the end of that decade, 
their philosophical positions began to diverge. Nevertheless, in looking here at 
Vollenhoven’s distinctive development, as well as in the rest of this thesis, I shall 
endeavour to show that their insights, in important respects, remained complementary 
and indeed, exactly in their differences, are mutually corrective. 
 
Dirk Hendrik Theodoor Vollenhoven was born on 1 November 1892 in Amsterdam. His 
family were members of the Gereformeerde Kerken, the denomination that had come 
into being under the leadership of Abraham Kuyper and others as a result of the 
‘Doleantie’ of 1886.132 Accordingly, ‘Dik’ (as he was known in his family) was brought 
up within the Gereformeerde ‘pillar’. He attended the Eben Haëzer primary school and 
the Gereformeerde Gymnasium in Amsterdam, a class ahead of Dooyeweerd, and in the 
same class as Dooyeweerd’s sister, Hermina Maria (‘Mien’), his future wife.133 The 
Gereformeerde Gymnasium was presided over by the Reformed classical scholar, Jan 
Woltjer, from whom he derived a deep reverence for the Kuyperian vision of a Christian 





He enrolled at the V.U. in September 1911, where he studied literature and theology, 
and later, philosophy.
135
 During the years 1914-1918 he worked on his doctoral thesis at 
the Vrije Universiteit, entitled The Philosophy of Mathematics from a Theistic 
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 Johan Stellingwerff, D.H.Th. Vollenhoven, 1892-1978: reformator der wijsbegeerte (1992): 7-10. 
134
 Woltjer’s approach can perhaps be characterised as a ‘Platonistic scholasticism’, in contrast to the 
‘Aristotelian scholasticism’ which dominated the theology department of the Vrije Universiteit in the 
1920s and 1930s (see J.H. Kok, ‘Woltjer’ (2007)).  
135
 While undergraduates, Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd shared an interest in philosophy and literature, 
which could take a somewhat mystical cast, a tendency from which Vollenhoven was dissuaded by 
Woltjer, his teacher and soon to be supervisor of his doctoral research. J. Glenn Friesen points to several 
student writings in the journal Opbouw, of which Vollenhoven was the founding editor from March 1914. 
These included a review of books by Frederik van Eeden (1860-1932), a psychiatrist and mystical thinker 
in whom Dooyeweerd was also interested (Vollenhoven, review of F.van Eeden and W. Versluijs, Paulus 
ontwaken (14h), Opbouw 1 (1914); Vollenhoven, ‘Sirius en Siderius’, Opbouw 1 (1914). Both articles are 
quoted by J. Glenn Friesen, ‘Two Ways of Reformational Philosophy: Anthony Tol’s comparison of 
Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’ (2011): 12-13). Vollenhoven also showed an interest in the writings of 
Pierre Daniël Chantepie de la Saussaye (1848-1920) and A. H. de Hartog (1869-1938) (Vollenhoven, 
Gastcolleges: 208; George Puchinger, ‘Dr D.H.Th. Vollenhoven’ (1961): 88; Stellingwerff, Vollenhoven: 
10; Friesen, ‘Two Ways’: 14-15). However, possibly influenced by Woltjer, Vollenhoven published an 
article in Opbouw in 1916 that was severely critical of de Hartog (Vollenhoven, ‘Gereformeerd blijven? 






 His position in his doctoral thesis, in which he sets out a view of what he 
called ‘theistic’ philosophy, centres on a view of the self as an active substance 
constructing its understanding of the world.
137
 After graduating with his doctorate, he 
served as a Gereformeerde Kerken pastor, first in Oostkapelle in Zeeland, and then, 
from May 1921, in The Hague.
138
 These were formative years philosophically for 
Vollenhoven, and were marked by two key shifts in his systematic thinking.  
 
The first shift concerned the nature of the human person or self. It came about through 
his interaction with Antheunis Janse (1890-1960), a schoolmaster, who initially entered 
into correspondence with Vollenhoven over issues arising from their common interest in 
the philosophy of mathematics. Largely through the influence of Janse, Vollenhoven 
abandoned his previous view of the self as substance. In his later view, he rejects any 
schema of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ in the relationship between the heart or soul and the 
body as well as any notion of the instrinsic immortality of the soul. Instead, 
Vollenhoven came to see the human being as an integral unity with the soul seen not as 
a separate entity but, as Vollenhoven was later to put it, the ‘pre-functional’, ‘religious’ 
centre of the human being. Following biblical usage, like Kuyper, and, as we shall see, 
like Dooyeweerd as well, he calls this religious centre, the ‘heart’. As we shall see, for 
both philosophers, this was to prove critical in their account of the distinctive character 
of a Christian philosophy.
139
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2-3, 9-231, 308-353. 
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Nature and Grace, based on Reason’ (1978); Vollenhoven, W.W.Th.S. (18a): 157-158, 228-229; 
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 Stellingwerff, Vollenhoven: 12-16, 33-50, 58-73; Johan Stellingwerff, Geschiedenis van de 
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1960). Morgenster van een reformatie in de twintigste eeuw (1989): 16-20; Stellingwerff, Vollenhoven: 
39-41, 51, 60-63; Bril, ed., Laatste: 110-116; Johan Stellingwerff, De Vrije Universiteit na Kuyper: de 
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mature thought he understands the whole person as a temporally located unity (Vollenhoven, 
Introduction: §§92-93, 109-126, 139, pp. 61-62, 69-93, 103-105. Vollenhoven, Inleiding tot de 






The second, and parallel, shift in his position concerned the character of knowledge 
itself. In the period immediately following the completion of his thesis, his view shifted 
from one in which knowledge was seen as unfolding intra-mentally, to one where it was 
seen as being appropriated from a diversity of external givens unfolded over time.
140
 
While intuition is central for Vollenhoven in his early and later epistemology, there is a 
shift for him in its basic character. Initially, Vollenhoven (following Henri Bergson, 
1859-1941) sees intuition as the constitution of experience into intelligible wholes 
(something approaching what he later calls ‘perception’). Accordingly, in his thesis of 
1918, he describes the different levels of intuition. These levels relate to the process of 
perception whereby the concreteness of a particular percept is reflected upon with 
increasing levels of abstraction.
141
 Subsequent to writing his thesis, he came to see 
                                                                                                                                               
Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen rondom de tijd (63b)’: 184-193; ‘Problemen rondom de tijd’(1963); 
Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd (68b)’: 206-207). ‘Immortality’ in Scripture properly belongs to 
God alone, and it is not correctly attributed to humanity or any part of the human constitution (e. g., the 
‘soul’ seen as immaterial substance). For Vollenhoven, the whole person, including the body, is the image 
of God (Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 43-44; Bril and Boonstra, ed., S. Kaarten: 270, 279). That image is 
not some sort of possession, or an aspect of one’s being. All the functions that form the body are together 
an ‘entire cloak of functions’ (‘geheel de functiemantel’). This unity is located in the ‘heart’ or ‘soul’ 
(Vollenhoven, Gastcolleges: 246-247). Vollenhoven notes that in Scripture, ‘spirit’ means ‘[D]irectional 
principle’ (‘richtings-princiep’) – it cannot be identified with any component or element of the human 
constitution (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §139, pp. 104-5). The division between ‘spirit’ and ‘flesh’ is not 
between two parts or functions of a human being, but between the human being as regenerated and 
animated by the Holy Spirit, and fallen human nature, the ‘body of death’. The heart is ‘pre-functional’, 
i.e., it has a unity prior to the exercise of the diversity of physical or mental functions (Vollenhoven, 
C.R.W. (33a): 43-44 (n. 39 – Vollenhoven quotes Rom. 47.24 , 41 Cor. 15.44, 42 Cor. 45.41-48); 
Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§ 92, 93, 114, 121, pp. 61-62, 75-77, 80-83; Vollenhoven, ‘Historia 
Philosophiae (II - I) (41d)’: 8, 34-37; Vollenhoven, ‘Divergentierapport I (53)’: 115-117; Vollenhoven, 
‘Problemen rondom de tijd (63b)’: 184-190; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd (68b)’: /2, p. 201; Bril 
and Boonstra, ed., S. Kaarten: 293). It is the whole embodied human being who is raised immortal 
(Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 44-45 (n. 40)). Vollenhoven argues that God can subject the whole person, 
soul and body alike, to both temporal and eternal death (‘Verslag van de studieconferensie op 4 en 5 
januari 1943 te Amsterdam’, C.V.C.W. (1945): 33-34). By the same token, it is the whole person, body 
and soul, that is redeemed, not merely a disembodied entity described variously as ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’. The 
Christian hope is located not in any notion of the intrinsic immortality of the soul, but only in the work of 
God in Christ, through whom alone is the triumph over death. Thus, much less equivocally than 
Dooyeweerd as we shall see (see 4.2.2), and even Kuyper (see Chapter One introduction footnote), he 
firmly distances his conception of basic religious commitment from any possible metaphysical 
anthropology located in a supra-temporal level of reality. Rather, religion, for him, is the stance of the 
whole human person in time, through Christ alone. I shall address the meaning of the terms 
‘religion’/’religious’ and ‘heart’ in 4.1.2. For a comparison with Dooyeweerd’s position, see 2.2 and 
4.2.2. 
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 Stellingwerff, Vollenhoven: 51; Kok, Vollenhoven: 20-21; Tol, Philosophy: 362-364. See 4.1.2. 
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 He took over the categories of intuition as described by Höffding in his exposition of Bergson, namely 
that of concrete, analytical and metaphysical:  
1. Concrete intuition – I am aware that this is something,  
2. Practical intuition – I see some x persisting through the changes of phenomena,  





intuition as having an architectonic role. This architectonic role involves a ‘metalogical’ 
function for intuition, a way of organizing the elements of experience in the light of an 
overall philosophical schema.
142
 During this period, Vollenhoven engaged in an 
intensive programme of reading, especially the Baden school of neo-Kantian 
philosophers. Through this reading, he shifted his focus from the process of knowing to 
the laws or norms appropriate to the different kinds of subject matter. Drawing on the 
notion of intuition (‘schouwen’) derived from the Baden neo-Kantians he came to the 
position that knowledge is not uniform or homogeneous, but diverse in kind, each field 
of human activity having norms appropriate to it.
143
 The norms are not to be thought of 
as the creation of the human mind, but of ‘holding’ (‘geldend’) extra-mentally,144 each 
field being governed by its own distinctive norms or laws. However, despite the 
epistemic diversity, there was nevertheless a ‘heteronomy’ (i.e., a mind-independent 
                                                                                                                                               
4. Metaphysical intuition – I intuit the individual through ideas.  
Vollenhoven does not use the notion of practical intuition, but he uses the others in the Bergson/Höffding 
list (Vollenhoven, W.W.Th.S. (18a): 349-351; Kok, Vollenhoven: 61-65,75, 80-81; Tol, Philosophy: 90-
97, 112 (n. 55), 142 (n. 80), 152 (n. 92), 122-130, 429, 500. Vollenhoven draws on H. Höffding, La 
philosophie de Bergson exposé et critiqué, traduit d’après l’édition danoise avec un avant-propos par 
Jaques de Coussange (1916)). 
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Proeve eener ordening van wijsgeerige consepties (39k) (1939): 24); ‘nature-grace’ (Introduction, §130, 
p. 96); the ‘form-content’ (‘vorm-inhoud’) schema (Vollenhoven, ‘Enkele grondlijnen der kentheorie 
(26b)’, Stemmen des Tijds 15 (1926): 391-398; Vollenhoven, ‘Kentheorie en natuurwetenschap (26d)’, 
Orgaan der Christelijke Vereniging van Natuur- en Geneeskundigen in Nederland (1926): 57; 
Vollenhoven, ‘Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)’, P.R. 13 (1948): §1, pp. 59-60 (Hoofdlijnen: 13-14); Kok, 
Vollenhoven: 358-359), and that of ‘macrocosmos-microcosmos’ (Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 242, 
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 In 1919 Vollenhoven speaks of ‘the goals set by God for the areas of science, morals and art, in 
obedience to the norms that God has set’ (Vollenhoven, ‘Paedagogiek en paedagogie (19ms)’ (1919): 17 
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to Grosheide (1921)’;  Tol, Philosophy: 93 (n. 34)).  
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 Vollenhoven asserts: ‘But the norm as such differs from all that exists. Norms have their own mode of 
being. They hold [i.e., have validity]’ (Vollenhoven, ‘Iets over het stelsel van Bergson (21ms)’ (1921): 8 
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ordering) to the whole, which reflects an underlying ‘systasis’ (i.e., ontic145 coherence) 
that needs to be taken into account in the process of ‘synthesis’ (i.e., noetic 
coherence).
146
 In the summer of 1920, Vollenhoven spent a period of study under the 
psychologist, Felix Krüger (1874-1948) in Leipzig,
147
 looking at the relation of intuition 
and the intellect broadly within Bergson’s philosophical framework. Drawing on 
Bergson’s insights, he sharpened his sense of the importance of time, a view which 




The stimulus for this second, parallel, shift in his thinking was his lifelong intellectual 
partnership with Herman Dooyeweerd. While a student, Vollenhoven had re-established 
his friendship with Hermina Dooyeweerd, whom he married in October 1918. Herman 
Dooyeweerd, his brother-in-law, moved up to The Hague in 1919. The two brothers-in-
law engaged in intensive philosophical discussion,
149
 which led, in mid-1922 to a 
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 The ‘ontic’ in this sense is that which is apprehended, as opposed to the ‘noetic’, which is one’s 
apprehension of that which is apprehended. Dooyeweerd himself distinguishes the ‘intentional’ and the 
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Vollenhoven: 3; Vollenhoven, ‘Iets over het stelsel van Bergson (21ms)’.   
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 Dooyeweerd is inconsistent in his characterisation of Vollenhoven’s role in the development of 
Reformational philosophy. In 1935, he mentions Vollenhoven along with the South African philosopher, 
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‘discovery’ or ‘find’ (as Vollenhoven later describes it).150 The evidence indicates that 
this ‘find’ crystallised in the thinking of the two philosophers the notion of what later 
became known as the ‘modalities’ (i.e., the irreducible plurality of the many different 
aspects of created reality).
151
 However, Vollenhoven was not to have the opportunity to 
develop this significant intellectual breakthrough jointly with Dooyeweerd straight 
                                                                                                                                               
which ‘Dooyeweerd’s doctrine of functions’ (i.e., modalities) arose (Stellingwerff, Vollenhoven: 52 
(‘Dooyeweerds functieleer’)).  
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 Letter from Vollenhoven to Cornelius Van Til, 4 Feb., 1936 (Dooyeweerd-Van Til correspondence, 
Westminster Theological Seminary (quoted by Henderson, Illuminating Law: 33; and Tol, Philosophy: 
367-368)). J.G. Friesen suggests that the ‘find’ might have been Okke Norel’s article published in 1920 in 
a journal to which Vollenhoven also contributed (Friesen, ‘Two Ways’: 19). However, there is no 
mention in Norel’s article of any modalities or equivalents such as is developed in a rudimentary way in 
‘Kosmos en Logos’; although the article might have reinforced their common ‘Christian’, ‘critical’ or – 
for Dooyeweerd – ‘transcendental’ realism with its affirmation of the Logos as the ground (‘grond’) and 
purpose (‘doel’) of creation (Okke Norel, ‘Prof Gunning als wijsgeerig denker’, Stemmen des Tijds 9 
(1920): 142-143; I am grateful to Dr Friesen for this article). A more certain background is Vollenhoven’s 
increasing emphasis on the ‘metalogical’ role of intuition. Henderson says that Vincent Brümmer reports 
that Dooyeweerd told him that Vollenhoven accompanied him on his walk in the dunes, which, as we 
shall see (2.2), is when Dooyweerd described how he came to the discovery of the modalities (Henderson, 
Illuminating Law: 186; see also Stellingwerff, Geschiedenis van de Reformatorische Wijsbegeerte: 33). 
The chronology which Vollenhoven gave to Puchinger is especially important in the light of the key 
‘discovery’ of 1922, as this seems to indicate that this latter was the product of their conversations. This 
also seems to chime with the ‘sub-spheres’ which Dooyeweerd pointed to in his debate with the neo-
Kantian legal scholar, G. Scholten on 8 April 1922 (Dooyeweerd, ‘Staatsbemoeiing en Individueele 
Vrijheid (discussiebijdrage)’, Handelingen van de Vereeniging voor Wijsbegeerte des Rechts 7 (1922): 
33; see Verburg, H.D. leven en werk: 29-31; Henderson, Illuminating Law: 29, 40-46; Tol, Philosophy: 
281-290). Vollenhoven described later how they both ‘discovered’ (‘ontdekten’) the irreducibility of the 
diverse aspects as the biotic, the juridical, the pistical etc.’ (Puchinger, ‘Dr D.H.Th. Vollenhoven’: 90 (‘de 
onherleidbaarheid der diverse aspecten als het biotische, het juridische, het pistische enz.’)), and this was 
confirmed by Dooyeweerd who spoke of working out the Kuyperian vision of sphere sovereignty ‘as 
early as 1922’ (Dooyeweerd, ‘Introduction by the Editor in Chief’: 7). Dooyeweerd’s letter to Ridderbos 
(Dooyeweerd, ‘[Letter of 16 January 1924 to Prof. [Jan] Ridderbos]’ in Kuyperstichting Archive,V.U. 
(1924) quoted in Henderson, Illuminating Law: 46-47) and Vollenhoven’s to Janse in early 1924, not long 
after his recovery from his severe mental collapse of the previous year, show a close common conception 
of the spheres over which the divine ordinances pertain (Vollenhoven, ‘[Letter of 24 February 1924 to A. 
Janse]’ in A. Janse Archive 157 (1924) – I am grateful to Anthony Tol for supplying me with his 
transcribed copy; Tol, Philosophy: 330; Stellingwerff, Vollenhoven: 51-57). Tol suggests that the ‘walk 
on the Dunes’ took place in 1923 and he identifies the ‘discovery’ with Dooyeweerd’s later articulation of 
the ‘law-Idea’ (‘wetsidee’; see 2.2), a term which Vollenhoven only himself used on a much later 
occasion, perhaps in deference to Dooyeweerd (Tol, Philosophy: 353 (n. 196)). However, while I agree 
that Dooyeweerd’s articulation of the term ‘law-Idea’ can be dated to 1923, the ‘find’ or ‘discovery’ was 
the crystallisation of the modalities, dated to mid-1922. 
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 For a description of the modalities see Chapter Three introduction. Albert Wolters suggests that a key 
influence might have been Nicolai Hartmann (1882-1950), the successor to Paul Natorp (1854-1924) at 
Marburg, who himself came to embrace an epistemological realism in his Metaphysic der Erkentnis 
(1921), and later, suggested a theory of levels (‘Schichtentheorie’) which has some similarity to 
Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s modal scale (Wolters, ‘Dooyeweerd’: 1-15). However there is little 
direct evidence for the influence of Hartmann on Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s thinking and 
Dooyeweerd argues later that he came to his own view before Hartmann’s theory came to be published. 
Further, Hartman’s ‘levels’ are structured polarities, rather than modalities as in the case of Vollenhoven 
and Dooyeweerd (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.51 (not in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, ‘Van Peursen’s critische vragen 
bij A New Critique of Theoretical Thought’, P.R. 25 (1960): 122-124; Verburg, H.D. leven en werk: 80-
82; Jan D. Dengerink, De Zin van de Werkelijkheid: Een Wijsgerige Benadering (1986): 195-210; 




away. In November, he experienced a severe nervous breakdown which rendered him 
incapacitated for much of the following year.
152
 It may possibly have been related to the 
spiritual crisis that he was going through at the time – a crisis brought on by his 
correspondence with Janse (leading, as we have seen, to his rejection of the notion of 
the soul as a separate entity or substance). Nevertheless, his intellectual partnership with 
Dooyeweerd held firm, and it became clear that the two brothers-in-law had both been 
thinking and working along similar lines.
153
 Vollenhoven was given the post of 
Professor of Philosophy at the V.U. in 1926, while Dooyeweerd was appointed to the 
chair of Philosophy of Law. This made their continued co-operation possible.
154
 In his 
inaugural lecture, as well as other writings that year, Vollenhoven sets out a position, 
similar to that of Dooyeweerd, of a harmonious and irreducible multiplicity of fields of 
vision or modalities.
155
 His systematic thinking was soon further elaborated in his 
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 Dooyeweerd indicated later that on taking up his post at the Kuyper Foundation that he had already 
come to a conception of his philosophy, ‘although extremely rudimentary’ (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: v (‘nog 
zeer rudimentaire conceptie’); Verburg, H.D. leven en werk: 40-41(n. 48)), i.e., by October 1922 (see 
Dooyeweerd, ‘[Letter of Application to J.J.C. van Dijk, Minister of War, for Deputy-Directorship of the 
Kuyper Foundation, 15 May 1922]’ (1961): 47-49; Dooyeweerd, ‘[A letter to the board of the Kuyper 
Foundation, 16 Sept. 1925]’ (1925); Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.vii. For a fuller discussion, see Henderson, 
Illuminating Law: 30-50). The document entitled ‘Kosmos en Logos’, still largely unpublished, which 
Dooyeweerd seems either to have brought with him to the Kuyper Foundation , or which he drafted soon 
afterwards, bears, with some reservations, Vollenhoven’s intellectual fingerprints and expresses the 
‘critical realism’ of their common thinking at the time (Vollenhoven, ‘Letter to Grosheide (1921)’;  
Vollenhoven, ‘Iets over het stelsel van Bergson (21ms)’: 8; and Vollenhoven, ‘Hegel (21c)’: 80). 
Vollenhoven wrote to Janse in November, 1922 about the relation of one’s soul to the distinct terrains 
which bear a close resemblance to the variously named ‘all areas of life’ (‘alle terreinen des levens’), 
‘region categories’ (‘gebiedskategorien’), ‘fields of vision’ (‘gezichtsvelden’) or ‘modalities’ 
(‘modaliteiten’) described in ‘Kosmos en Logos’ (Stellingwerff, Vollenhoven: 62; Tol, Philosophy: 369). 
This was to be the keystone of a radical new Calvinist epistemology which the two men seemed to have 
intended to work on together. Later, Dooyeweerd wrote (in September 1925) to the Directorate of a plan 
made ‘two years’ (in fact, three years) earlier which has to be temporally abandoned because of 
Vollenhoven’s illness (Dooyeweerd, ‘[A letter to the board of the Kuyper Foundation, 16 Sept. 1925]’ ; 
Henderson, Illuminating Law: 34-35; Stellingwerff, Vollenhoven: 63-65; Stellingwerff, V.U. na Kuyper: 
118). Dooyeweerd incorporated this document wholesale early the following year into a document on 
Roman Catholic political theory, which he was obliged to prepare for the A.R.P., so that at least it would 
have some circulation (Dooyeweerd, ‘Kosmos en Logos’ in Roomsch-katholiek en Anti-revolutionaire 
Staatkunde (1923); Tol, Philosophy: 320-341, 361). The reservations about the extent of Vollenhoven’s 
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(Tol, Philosophy: 341, 367).  
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 Verburg, H.D. leven en werk: 86; Stellingwerff, Vollenhoven: 69-71, 73 (n. 66); Stellingwerff, V.U. na 
Kuyper: 121-122; Stellingwerff, Geschiedenis van de Reformatorische Wijsbegeerte: 40-41. 
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 Vollenhoven, Logos en ratio; beider verhouding in de geschiedenis der westersche kentheorie (26a) 
(1926); Vollenhoven, ‘Enkele grondlijnen der kentheorie (26b)’; Vollenhoven, ‘Kentheorie en 




‘Isagôgè,’ the ‘introductory’ syllabus to the study of philosophy which Vollenhoven 




As we shall see in the following section, at this time, Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s 
thinking began to diverge in some significant respects. However, despite his growing 
philosophical differences with Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven publically maintained a 
common front with him. The two brothers-in-law set up the Association of Calvinistic 
Philosophy or Vereniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte (V.C.W.) in December 
1935, with Vollenhoven as Chairman (a post he was to hold until 1961), and 
Dooyeweerd as editor-in-chief of the main academic journal of the association, 
Philosophia Reformata. The founding of the V.C.W. also represented a closing of ranks 
against the onslaught of ‘Reformed scholasticism’,157 which (as we shall see below) was 
increasingly vehement in its vociferous denunciation of the fledgling movement of 




The onslaught by ‘Reformed scholasticism’ on the philosophical movement led by 
Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd had been building up close at hand. In the course of the 
1930s, Vollenhoven’s colleagues in the theological faculty at the V.U. of Amsterdam 
confronted him aggressively. A central target of this attack were the views Vollenhoven 
expressed in his book of 1933, Het Calvinisme en de reformatie van de Wijsbegeerte,
159
 
and indeed, amongst other things, an attack on Vollenhoven’s critique of the soul/body 
dualism and his account of the ‘heart’ as the religious centre of human existence. The 
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 There were some initial syllabi from 1926 on (Vollenhoven, ‘Philosophia systematica I (Kentheorie), 
1926-7 (26msA) ‘ (1926); Vollenhoven, ‘Philosophia systematica II (27ms)’ (1927); Vollenhoven, ‘Draft 
syllabus [Proto Isagôgè Philosophiae] (28c)’ (1928)) with the successive versions of the Introduction 
proper from 1929 on until 1943, and a reprint of the 1943 version in 1967 (Vollenhoven, Isagôgè 
Philosophiae (29b) (1929); Vollenhoven, Isagôgè Philosophiae (30d) (1930); Vollenhoven, Isagôgè 
Philosophiae (31f) (1931); Vollenhoven, Isagôgè Philosophiae (39h) (1939); Vollenhoven, Isagôgè 
Philosophiae (43b/67b) (1943/1967)). Vollenhoven annotated his own copy of a 1941 edition until 1945, 
the basis for the edition recently published in 2005 (Vollenhoven, ‘Isagôgè Philosophiae 1930-1945: 
Textkritische uitgave, Filosophie in de traditie van de Reformatie’ (2010): 13-15; Tol, ‘Foreword’: v; 
Kok, Vollenhoven: 366-382).  
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 ‘Reformed scholasticism’ denotes the by now predominantly Aristotelian approach of the group of 
academics across the different disciplines which dominated the Vrije Universiteit in the 1920s and 1930s. 
As we have seen in 1.1, ‘scholasticism’ refers to an approach dominated by a grace/nature dualism.  
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 Vollenhoven, ‘Vereeniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte’, Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor 
Wijsbegeerte en Pschologie 51 (1958); Stellingwerff, Vollenhoven: 120-127; Puchinger, ‘Dr D.H.Th. 
Vollenhoven’: 94-97 (including Vollenhoven’s address as founding chairman); Dooyeweerd, ‘Na vijf en 
dertig jaren’, P.R. (1971); Dooyeweerd, ‘Introduction by the Editor in Chief’: 14. 
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charges centred upon Vollenhoven’s denial of the ‘immortality of the soul’, which 
suggests the conclusion that it was Vollenhoven (himself proxy, perhaps, for Janse) who 
was the real target of the attack, rather than Dooyeweerd, since it was he who primarily 
contested the immortality of the soul, and indeed its very existence as a substance or 
entity.
160
 Between 1937 and 1939, the Curators of the V.U. examined both Vollenhoven 
and Dooyeweerd, and charges were brought against them by Valentijn Hepp (1879-
1950), Professor of Theology at the V.U. in Amsterdam.
161
 This was accompanied by an 
even fiercer attack on Vollenhoven by Hendrik Steen, a student of the son of Abraham 




The public attack on Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd was accompanied by a quasi-
judicial investigation of the theological positions of the two philosophers by the 
authorities of the Vrije Universiteit. Both professors were required to appear before the 
Curators, with Hepp as the major accuser. The matter was delegated, eventually, to the 
circle of the professors of the University for further consideration, and with the hope 
that it might be resolved, but the matter remained in abeyance.
163
 Despite the somewhat 
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 This will be discussed further in 4.1.2. Despite his criticism of the notion of the immortality of the 
soul, Vollenhoven, still holds that there is some sense in which human existence survives death prior to 
the resurrection (Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 43-45 (nn. 43-45); J. Glenn Friesen, ‘The Investigation of 
Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven by the Curators of the Free University’, 2005, 2006, 
<http://www.members.shaw.ca/hermandooyeweerd/Curators.html> accessed 7 May 2007; Tol, 
Philosophy: 477-479 (nn. 164-169); Tol, Philosophy: 242-243, 252, 257-263). As we shall see, 
Dooyeweerd’s position, with his notion of the ‘supra-temporal heart’ is somewhat different, at least prima 
facie (2.2. and 4.2.2).  
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 For background on Hepp see Stellingwerff, V.U. na Kuyper: 145-158 and Harinck G., ‘ “Het zwarte 
schaap van de gereformeerde theologie”. Over V. Hepp’, In de Marge 3 (2004). Hepp had previously 
attacked them in a series of brochures (V.H. Hepp, Dreigende deformatie (1936-1937)).  
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 Hendrik Steen, Philosophia deformata (1937). Steen’s title mocks the title of the journal of the 
Association of Calvinist Philosophy, begun in 1936 (Friesen, ‘Investigation’).   
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 ‘Notulen (getypt) van 18 mei t/m 7 januari 1938’ in Archief College van Curatoren (1937-1938); 
‘Notulen (getypt) van 3 februari 1938 t/m 9 december 1950’ in Archief College van Curatoren (1938-
1950); Friesen, ‘Investigation’;  Stellingwerff, Vollenhoven : 129-150; Stellingwerff, V.U. na Kuyper: 
185-251; A. Th. Van Deursen, Een hoeksteen in het verzuild bestel. De Vrije Universiteit 1885-2005 
(2005): 167-169; Verburg, H.D. leven en werk: 208-228. With respect to the issue of the hypostasis of 
Christ, Hepp claimed to be following Kuyper in asserting that in assuming humanity, the Son assumes an 
impersonal nature, i.e., that it lacks any individual characteristics. This was in accord with his view of 
human nature as a general substance. Against him, Vollenhoven affirmed, not that there is a separate 
person belonging to the nature of Christ, but that Christ has an individuality enhypostatically in the reality 
of the Word made flesh. Vollenhoven admitted to a possible ambiguity in the way he expressed it (in that 
he might be seen to be affirming that the human nature of Christ has an individuality distinct from the 
Person of the Son, i.e. that he be taking a ‘Nestorian’ position), and promised to reformulate it in a printed 
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in Philosophia Reformata setting out his position on the matter. The Curators were not satisfied with the 
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inconclusive outcome of the whole affair, the intervention spearheaded by Hepp against 
both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven left a mark in the attitude of the two philosophers to 
theologians. Ironically, it was Dooyeweerd who evinced the strongest reaction in this 
regard, refusing to have any philosophical statement subjected to theological scrutiny.
164
 
Vollenhoven at least attempted to enter into debate with the theologians, although he 
was not prepared to let historical statements of belief stand without careful scrutiny, in 
the light of wider scriptural affirmations, of the underlying philosophical assumptions. 
 
These controversies did not seem directly to affect the development of Vollenhoven’s 
systematic philosophical thinking. In the course of the 1930s he shifted from seeing the 
relation between God and the cosmos as a dualism with the Law as a boundary between 
God and the cosmos,
165
 to one in which Law is seen as impinging in the created order, 
binding its elements together and implementing God’s rule over that order.166 A third 
shift in his thinking came in the 1950s with his view of God’s eternal Law as a process 
of successive unfolding, each stage in its unfolding representing the specific work of 
                                                                                                                                               
(Vollenhoven, C.R.W.: 47; ‘Notulen (getypt) van 3 februari 1938 t/m 9 december 1950’: 607, 609-641; 
Friesen, ‘Investigation’; Vollenhoven, ‘Anhypostatos? (40a)’, P.R. 5 (1940): Hepp, Dreigende 
deformatie: III; Stellingwerff, V.U. na Kuyper: 131-134, 138-139, 146-148; Stellingwerff, Vollenhoven: 
131-134, 150 (nn. 131-133); G.C. Berkouwer, The Person of Christ (1954): 314-319). The ‘scholastic’ 
approach to Reformed theology lost its dominance at the Vrije Universiteit after the Second World War 
with the appointment of G.C. Berkouwer to the theology faculty in 1940 and to the chair of theology 
succeeding Hepp in 1945. Hepp died in 1950. See Dooyeweerd, ‘[Interview by Boeles]’: 54, 57. 
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 This is evidenced by the title of his article of 1958: ‘The Relationship between Philosophy and 
Theology and the Conflict of the Faculties’ (Dooyeweerd, ‘De verhouding tussen wijsbegeerte en 
theologie en de strijd der faculteiten’, P.R. (1958)).  
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one of the Persons of the Trinity.
167
 In general, Vollenhoven’s thought was increasingly 
starting to emphasise God’s action in the world, and not just God’s sovereignty over the 
world, and doing so in explicitly trinitarian terms. He did not abandon his thinking of 
the early and later 1930s, but rather incorporated elements of his previous thinking as 
sub-features within the new overall categories he was starting to explore.
168
 This can be 
seen in his systematic analysis of the history of Western philosophy, which he called the 
‘consequential [or consistent] problem-historical method’,169 to which I now turn.  
 
Ever since his inaugural lecture of 1926,
170
 Vollenhoven had shown a strong interest in 
tracing the line of philosophical development from the ancient Greeks up to the present 
day.
171
 However, from around 1946, Vollenhoven began to approach this far more 
systematically.
172
 One early fruit of his work on the ‘consequential problem-historical 
method’ was the publication in 1950 of his volume on the Greek period.173 This was to 
have been the first of a series of volumes, but no further volumes appeared – possibly 
because he continued to refine his categories, as well as his placing of the different 
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 Vollenhoven, Logos en ratio.  
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philosophers in those categories (often to the bewilderment of even his closest 
colleagues).
174
 However, I shall argue that, despite the kaleidoscopic character of this 
task, there were critical systematic implications from the way his investigations yielded 





Even though he did not engage in any further revision of the Isagôgè after 1945,
176
 he 
provides hints of his continued systematic thinking in scattered addresses and 
publications.
177
 From the early 1950s, he started to articulate his divergence from 
Dooyeweerd’s systematic philosophical thinking, first in private, and then, after he 
stepped down in 1963 as Chairman of the Vereniging voor Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte, 
on a number of occasions within the close circle of the V.C.W., or at its local 
meetings.
178
 However, he still did not feel fully free to publish his views, except 
towards the end of his life, when he attempted to put some thoughts together for an 
article in Philosophia Reformata, comparing his own position with those of 
Dooyeweerd and the South African Reformational philosopher, Hendrik Stoker.
179
 His 
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We see then how Vollenhoven’s thought developed from an initial intra-mental focus 
on the self as thinking substance, to the diversity of the different fields of knowledge 
that there are in the world – and, in his ‘consequential problem-historical method’, to 
the presupposita which shaped how this diversity is apprehended systematically. I shall 
now provide an overview of the development of Dooyeweerd’s thinking similar to that 
which I have just provided for Vollenhoven. 
 
 
2.2 An Overview of Dooyeweerd’s Philosophical Development 
 
Vollenhoven’s slightly younger contemporary and brother-in-law, Herman 
Dooyeweerd, achieved much greater prominence than he did, and Dooyeweerd’s name 
tended to dominate the Reformational tradition of the twentieth century to the extent 
that ‘Reformational’ and ‘Dooyeweerdian’ came almost to be seen as interchangeable 
terms. However, as has been seen already, and as will be argued below, the relationship 
can be better understood as a complementary partnership, each bringing different 
insights to bear. 
 
Dooyeweerd was born on 7 October 1894.
181
 His background through his father was 
Kuyperian, while his mother had been influenced strongly by the tradition represented 
by the famous preacher, Herman Frederik (or Hermann Friedrich) Kohlbrügge (1803-
1875), who emphasised the grace of God to the sinful believer. This combination of a 
Christian vision of God’s universal sovereignty combined with an intense personal piety 
remained a continuing element in his upbringing.
 
Like Vollenhoven, he went to the 
Eben Haëzer primary school in the Gereformeerde ‘pillar’, and then, for secondary 
school, to the Gereformeerde Gymnasium in Amsterdam. Again, like Vollenhoven, as 
the natural next step, Dooyeweerd enrolled in the V.U. in 1912.
 
He was initially 
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181




somewhat disappointed by the lack of a thoroughgoing working out of a full Calvinistic 
worldview by the teaching staff of that university.
182
 At the same time, his mystical 
tendency can be seen in the articles that he wrote for the student almanac of the V.U. in 
1915 on his own religious orientation, and on the poet and thinker, Frederik van 
Eeden.
183
 His doctoral thesis, completed in 1917, is largely a technical examination of 
the constitutional role of the Dutch cabinet. This brought home to him the chaotic state 
of contemporary theory in the field of jurisprudence. After completing his thesis, 
Dooyeweerd found himself in critical dialogue with the Baden and Marburg schools of 
neo-Kantians, both greatly influential in the Netherlands at the time. This accentuated 





Dooyeweerd’s interest in the development of a fully-fledged Calvinistic philosophy was 
spurred on and advanced through his relationship with Vollenhoven, especially from the 
time when they were both living in The Hague, where (as we have seen) Vollenhoven 
was a Gereformeerde pastor, and where Dooyeweerd was employed, initially in 
government service and later in the service of the Anti-Revolutionary Party (A.R.P.). In 
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 Verburg, H.D. leven en werk: 16-17; Dooyeweerd, ‘[Interview by Boeles]’: 38. Verburg mentions 
comments that Dooyeweerd made in an interview in 1973 to this effect (‘Television interview with 
Herman Dooyeweerd, 1973’ (1973); Henderson, Illuminating Law: 17-21).  
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 An interest he shared with Vollenhoven (see 2.1 footnotes; Dooyeweerd, ‘De neo-mystiek en Fr. van 
Eeden’, Almanak van het Studentencorps aan de Vrije Universiteit. (1915); Dooyeweerd, ‘Wat ik op de 
laatste N.C.S.V. conferentie vond’ (1915); Marcel E. Verburg, Herman Dooyeweerd: Grenzen van het 
theoretisch denken (1986): 24; Henderson, Illuminating Law: 22; Friesen, ‘Two Ways’: 15). J. Glenn 
Friesen sees a link between Dooyeweerd’s mysticism and that of Kuyper to Franz von Baader (1765-
1841), the German Roman Catholic philosopher and theologian (J. Glenn Friesen, ‘The Mystical 
Dooyeweerd: The Relation of His Thought to Franz von Baader’, Ars Disputandi 3 (2003)). He argues 
that Kuyper came to a knowledge of Baader via the Dutch theologians J.H. Gunning and De la Saussaye 
(see above), at least with respect to the notion of the supra-temporal heart which, as we shall see below, 
come to the fore in Dooyeweerd’s thought during the course of the 1920s (J. Glenn Friesen, ‘The 
Mystical Dooyeweerd Once Again: Kuyper’s Use of Franz von Baader’, Ars Disputandi 3 (2003)). 
Contrary to Friesen’s contention, D.F.M. Strauss argues that the mysticism of Baader and the other 
thinkers mentioned by Friesen was of an organistic character, rather than one of ‘sphere sovereignty’ in 
the Reformational sense, and moreover, denies that Dooyeweerd can be characterised as a mystical 
thinker since he wants to deny both rationalism and irrationalism (D.F.M. Strauss, ‘Intellectual influences 
upon the reformational thought of Dooyeweerd’, P.R. 69 (2004): 160-162, 172-173, 179; see reply by J. 
Glenn Friesen, ‘Dooyeweerd and Baader: A Response to D.F.M. Strauss’ (2005)).  
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 Dooyeweerd, De Ministerraad in het Nederlandsche Staatsrecht (1917): 30-31 (quoted in Henderson, 
Illuminating Law: 24-25; see also Verburg, H.D. leven en werk: 25-26); Dooyeweerd, ‘Normatieve 
Rechtsleer. Een kritisch methodologische onderzoeking naar Kelsen’s normatieve rechtsbeschouwing’ in 
Dooyeweerd Archive (1922). Henderson mentions the Marburg school: Herman Cohen (1842-1918), 
Rudolf Stammler (1856-1938), Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945), Hans Kelsen (1881-1973), and from the 
Baden school: Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915), Heinrich Rickert (dates given above), Gustaf Radbruch 




December 1920, Dooyeweerd wrote to Vollenhoven expressing his interest in 
deepening his own philosophical understanding with Vollenhoven’s help. He mentioned 
his interest especially in the way in which Vollenhoven was starting to identify the 
diversity of forms of knowledge, reflecting the diversity of reality (an insight which, as 
we have seen, Vollenhoven was developing through his reading of the Baden school of 
neo-Kantians).
185
 The conversations between the two brothers-in-law rapidly bore fruit. 
As noted in the previous section, in mid-1922 (as the evidence seems to indicate), there 
was the discovery of the modalities – a breakthrough that Dooyeweerd then refined and 
developed.
186
 The task that they now undertook together involved working out Kuyper’s 
principle of ‘sphere sovereignty’ (‘souvereiniteit in eigen kring’) in a systematic way. 
Whereas for Kuyper this was a primarily a social vision, for Dooyeweerd and 
Vollenhoven it extended to a philosophical account of the whole of created reality, and 





In October 1922, Dooyeweerd became deputy director of the Kuyper Foundation, the 
research institute of the A.R.P. During his time there, he came to a view of the place of 
the heart as the keystone of a reformed epistemology. He recounts an incident shortly 
after he began working at the Kuyper Foundation in 1922 when he picked up a 
collection of Christian reflections by Kuyper.
188
 He was gripped by Kuyper’s account of 
the ‘heart’ as the centre of human existence and the root of true knowledge flowing 
from one’s underlying relationship with God. He saw this as a radical break from the 
medieval ‘scholastic’ conception, in which the heart was regarded as being the seat of 
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 Dooyeweerd, ‘[Letter of 17 December 1920 to Vollenhoven]’ in Vollenhoven Archive (1920). This is 
printed by Stellingwerff (Stellingwerff, Vollenhoven: 47-48); Tol supplies two small corrections to 
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Boeles]’: / 38; quoted in Verburg, H.D. leven en werk: 40 (Verburg gives p. 37); Henderson, Illuminating 
Law: 37-38). See 2.1 footnotes. 
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Vollenhoven, Introduction: §112, pp. 71-73; Wolters, ‘Dooyeweerd’: 5-8; Dooyeweerd, ‘[Interview by 
Boeles]’: 48-51. 
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the emotions, distinct from the intellect and the other human faculties, rather than 




As he settled down at his desk in the Kuyper Foundation,
190
 Dooyeweerd had two 
alternative conceptions of law and of the political order to respond to, namely those of 
the Christian Democrats (Roman Catholic) and the Christian Historical Party. Although 
these parties were political allies, Dooyeweerd had the task of ensuring that the A.R.P. 
developed its thinking along distinctively Calvinistic (or more specifically Kuyperian or 
what were later called ‘Reformational’) lines. Thus Dooyeweerd developed his account 
of a distinctive Calvinistic political philosophy (informed by its own comprehensive 
epistemology and ontology) in dialogue with two opposing but equally powerful 
intellectual traditions in Christian thought. The first was the tradition of Thomism 
(which informed the thinking of the Christian Democrats) as the classical representative 
of Roman Catholic political thought, a tradition which had been revived in the Roman 
Catholic Church at the end of the nineteenth century, encouraged by the publication of 
the papal encyclical Aeterni Patris (1879). The second was that of historicism, informed 
by the writings of Lutheran political thinkers of the nineteenth century (characteristic of 
the Christian Historical Party). 
 
In discussing the first tradition, Dooyeweerd argues, in broad terms, that Roman 
Catholic political theory is classically informed by the notion of natural law.
191
 Natural 
law is an amalgam of Stoic, Aristotelian, and neo-Platonist philosophies, combined with 
classical Roman law. The world is seen in self-contained terms and all events are the 
teleological realisation of potential intrinsic to the cosmos – more specifically, the 
realisation in form of previously unformed matter. For Aristotle, God is seen as the First 
Cause from which a chain of cause and effect proceeds. Thomism, taking further the 
synthesis of neo-Platonism and Christian doctrine developed by Augustine of Hippo, 
adds a Christian view of a transcendent God into this picture of a self-contained cosmos 
and then attempts to provide an account of God’s action in terms of the Aristotelian 
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 Henderson, Illuminating Law: 113-115 (Henderson refers to the 1973 interview by I.K.O.N. ‘1973 
television interview’); see also Kuyper, Lectures: 25; Stellingwerff, Geschiedenis van de Reformatorische 
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framework. However, the Thomist claim that God is the First Cause gives rise to the 
antinomy of human freedom. On the one hand, human beings are held to have free will, 
and, by determining their own actions, limit God’s causality. On the other hand, human 
beings are, by implication, unfree, since all their actions are caused by God. The only 
way to resolve this antinomy is to adopt a dualism in which, on the one hand, there is 
the realm of natural law, within which state power is exercised; and on the other hand, 
the realm of grace, in which human beings are brought by divine assistance, through the 
mediation of the church, to eternal salvation. By extension, the church, as the instrument 
of grace, assists human free will, and is seen as superior to the state, which is the 
instrument of natural law as applied in the political realm. The ‘common good’ is seen 
as the supreme objective in the political realm, but it remains an inadequate guide for 
the exercise of state power: it neither provides limits for the role of the state, nor the 





With regard to the second tradition, Dooyeweerd notes that Christian historical political 
theory had been developed by powerful and influential nineteenth century Lutheran 
thinkers such as Von Savigny and Stahl; these thinkers saw the law and its authority 
much more in terms of the political status quo.
193
 The historical (or more properly the 
‘historicist’) approach holds to the continual changefulness of the norms which govern 
political life at the cost of their constancy.
194
 Instead it absolutises the human capacity 
for cultural formation, characterised by what Dooyeweerd calls the ‘historical’ 
modality.
195
 All truth is seen in terms of cultural formation, and therefore, is made 
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 Dooyeweerd, ‘R.K. en A.R.S.’;  Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvinism and Natural Law’: 3-38; Dooyeweerd, 
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 D. F. M Strauss, points out that cultural change has an analogy (retrocipation) to the physical (or 
energetic) modality, but this needs to be balanced harmoniously with cultural constancy, which has an 
analogy (retrocipation) with the kinematic modality. Cultural change requires cultural constancy: the 
latter cannot be reduced to the former or vice versa. Moreover, as Roy Clouser, another Dooyeweerdian 
thinker, argues, the cultural-formative (or ‘historical’) modality (see below) cannot be seen in isolation, 
but only properly in harmony with all the other modalities, including both the kinematic and the physical 
(Strauss, P.D.D.: 271-274; Roy A. Clouser, ‘A Critique of Historicism’ (2000): 110-116).  
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 The ‘historical’ modality, according to Dooyeweerd, characterized by formative control, embraces 





relative to a particular historical context.
 
Against the historicist position, Dooyeweerd 
argues for the creational sovereignty of God over all cultures and historical 
circumstances. In his mature thought, Dooyeweerd’s view is that it is necessary for the 
norms which govern human behaviour and patterns of thought first to be grasped by the 
mind analytically (i.e., in a way appropriate to the logical or analytical modality), and 
then brought to formation or ‘positivised’ with a specific cultural context (i.e., in a way 
appropriate to the ‘historical’ or cultural-formative modality). However, the human role 
in analysis and the positivisation of norms does not mean that cultural and other norms 
– let alone the laws of number, space etc. – are culturally relative. In fact, all laws and 
norms have a universal scope.
196
 Thus in contrast with historicism, Dooyeweerd does 
not abandon the notion of universality. He argues that principles can be positivised for a 





Thus Dooyeweerd attempted to steer the A.R.P.’s philosophy between the Scylla of the 
unchanging complex of natural law and the Charybdis of historical relativism (or 
conversely, uncritical acceptance of the status quo) represented by historicism. Both 
these traditions would remain his discussion partners throughout his life. However, 
merely to state the problems he faced in these terms is misleading. He did not merely 
wish to navigate a middle course – much more than that, he wished to find a 
                                                                                                                                               
the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea’, P.R., 73 (2008): 156-157, 163-164). For Dooyeweerd, the 
‘historical’ is one of the modalities (see Chapter Three introduction), not, as for Vollenhoven, the overall 
unfolding of time. Vollenhoven, somewhat reluctantly, made use of Dooyeweerd’s term ‘historical’ for 
what he preferred to call the ‘form-giving’ modality (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §171, p. 121; 
Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd (68b): 207-211(‘vormgevende’); Vollenhoven, ‘The Consequential 
Problem-Historical Method’: 104; Bernard Zylstra, ‘Samenvatting gesprek met Vollenhoven, 1 december 
1965’ in Vollenhoven Archive (1965)). He is careful to distinguish the ‘historical’ modality from what he 
calls the ‘genetic connection’ (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §100, pp. 164-105 (‘historische’,‘genetische 
verband’)). See 3.1.3. 
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 See Chapter Three introduction.  
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 While Dooyeweerd is not entirely consistent in his statement of his position (as has been pointed out 
by Strauss), this insight represents a critical intellectual breakthrough (Dooyeweerd, ‘De staatkundige 
tegenstelling tusschen Christelijk-Historische en Antirevolutionaire partij (C.H. en A.R.P) 1’ in 
Dooyeweerd Archive (1923); Dooyeweerd, ‘C.H. en A.R.P. 2’; Dooyeweerd, ‘C.H. en A.R.P. 3’;  
W.d.W.: 2.139-227; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.192-298; Dooyeweerd, De zin der geschiedenis: 3-5, 16-20; 
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tijd (68b)’: 209-211; Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 184-185; Vollenhoven, ‘The Consequential 




distinctively Calvinistic basis upon which to critique these two positions and provide a 
systematic alternative. While Dooyeweerd’s ostensible aim was to produce responses to 
the natural law and Christian historical positions of the parties in coalition with the 
A.R.P., his deepest concern was to address the issues with which he had been wrestling 
prior to his appointment at the Kuyper Foundation, and which had been the subject of 
intense and extensive discussion with Vollenhoven in the two years preceding his 
appointment.  
 
In other words, Dooyeweerd’s concerns were wider than merely the dialogue with the 
A.R.P.’s Christian political partners. His overarching concern lay in the question of 
epistemology. Here, as we have seen above, his main discussion partners (figuratively 
speaking) were the Marburg and Baden neo-Kantians. It was this discussion which 
raised for him the deepest questions of epistemology.
198
 Accordingly, he produced a 
document entitled ‘Kosmos en Logos’ which substantively set out the basis of his 
epistemology. In this text we see a close alignment with the sort of position to which 
Vollenhoven was also moving.
199
 Against the Marburg neo-Kantian subsumption of all 
ontology and epistemology under the logical act of appropriation, Dooyeweerd affirms 
the pre-logical status of the world as ‘cosmos’. He argues against the neo-Kantians, 
those of the Marburg and Baden schools alike, that the ontic (the range of what is ‘out 
there’) is irreducible to the noetic (one’s intra-mental representations). Before one can 
make sense of the world logically (the point from where the Marburg neo-Kantians 
start), one is already presented with several other ‘fields of vision’ (‘gezichtsvelden’): 
numerical, spatial, temporal and physical. For Dooyeweerd, there is a diversity of 
different epistemic constructions (‘Gegenstände’), each formed by the knowing subject, 
appropriate to a particular ‘field of vision’ or ‘modality’. Each of those aspects is 
governed by its own laws or norms and so forms a distinctive and irreducible law-
sphere. Therefore, considerations of logic can only be taken into account after these 
other (mind-independent) aspects of the world have first been accounted for.
200
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During the course of 1923, Dooyeweerd came to characterise his philosophy as the 
‘philosophy of the cosmonomic Idea’ or ‘… law-Idea’ (‘wijsbegeerte der wetsidee’).201 
For Dooyeweerd this ‘cosmonomic Idea’ plays an architectonic role similar to that 
which Vollenhoven, by 1921, had come to accord to the ‘metalogical’ role of 
intuition.
202
 With the help of this framework, Dooyeweerd embarked on an extensive 
programme, publishing a Calvinist overview of philosophical development through the 
centuries. This culminated in the enunciation of a Calvinist worldview in the Kuyperian 
                                                                                                                                               
characterises his position as a ‘transcendental realism’ (Dooyeweerd’s italics) which he describes as ‘a 
middle ground between the Thomistic-Aristotelian speculative epistemology, on the one hand, which 
presupposes a rational community of being between God and the rational creature, and the critical 
idealism of Kant, on the other’ (Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvinism and Natural Law’: 17). This is also called 
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(Dooyeweerd, ‘Normatieve Rechtsleer. Een kritisch methodologische onderzoeking naar Kelsen’s 
normatieve rechtsbeschouwing’;  Verburg, H.D. leven en werk: 33; Tol, Philosophy: 9, 290-299; see 2.1). 
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‘critical idealism’ which characterises the different schools of Kantian thought. Critical realism 
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heightened with respect to the Marburg neo-Kantians who not only see the world in throughly mind-
dependent terms, but also see that mind-dependency in terms of a specific form of knowledge, the logical 
or analytical (see Chapter Three, introduction). Henderson sees Dooyeweerd’s espousal of critical realism 
to be influenced by Anne Anema (1872-1966), who taught him at the V.U. and to whom, of all his 
teachers there, Dooyeweerd seems to have felt the greatest affinity (Henderson, Illuminating Law: 19-20).  
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 Dooyeweerd, ‘De leer der rechtsoevereiniteit en die der staatssoevereiniteit in haar consequenties voor 
de verhouding van Overheid en onderdanen’ in Dooyeweerd Archive (1923); Dooyeweerd, ‘C.H. en 
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N. Kraay, ‘Successive Conceptions in the Development of the Christian Philosophy of Herman 
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Matthias Schneckenberger (1804-1848) where it is a characterisation of Calvin’s Christology and ethics 
(Dooyeweerd, ‘C.H. en A.R.P. 3’: 6; Dooyeweerd, ‘In den strijd om een Christelijke staatkunde 1’: 9 (n. 
1); Stellingwerff, Geschiedenis van de Reformatorische Wijsbegeerte: 35; Verburg, H.D. leven en werk: 
63). Henderson queries Dooyeweerd’s claim to have found the actual term in Schneckenberger 
(Henderson, Illuminating Law: 123), while Friesen queries whether Schneckenberger’s characterisation of 
the Calvinist ‘law-Idea’ is consistent with Dooyeweerd’s own view (Friesen, ‘Two Ways’: 53-57). 
Dooyeweerd later replaces the term ‘wetsidee’ with that of the ‘transcendental ground-Idea’ (compare 
Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.114, 115 with Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.147, 148).  
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tradition: that of the Lordship of Christ over every sphere of life,
203 
a position he 
developed further upon his appointment as Professor of the Philosophy of Law at the 
V.U. In his inaugural address he articulates a vision of God’s providential world plan 
combined with the affirmation of God’s sovereignty over every sphere of creation – a 
re-articulation of Kuyper’s vision of the unfolding of God’s sovereign purposes in the 




By the early 1930s, however, the foundational emphasis on God’s providential purposes 
 (that of the divine world-plan) seems to have been relegated to the theological store-
cupboard, rather than continuing to guide and shape his philosophical thinking.
205
 While 
in his personal piety Dooyeweerd continued to believe in God’s providence, it ceased to 
play the key systematic and foundational role it had done when he set out his 
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Natuurrech: 3; see Verburg, H.D. leven en werk: 70; Henderson, Illuminating Law: 117 (n. 209); Tol, 
Philosophy: 361). In this article he sees the modalities as ordered by the ‘Logos’, which he identified with 
the logical modality (Dooyeweerd, ‘Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem in ‘t licht der wetsidee (A.R.S.)’, 
A.R.S.(3-m) 2 (1928): 17-21, 31-34, 36-41); Dooyeweerd, Het juridisch causaliteitsprobleem: 17-21, 31-
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Bijdragen, aangeboden door Hoogleraren der Vrije Universiteit ter Gelegenheid van haar 50-jarig Bestaan 
20 October, 1930 (1930): 231-222; Henderson, Illuminating Law: 149; Verburg, H.D. leven en werk: 96). 
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philosophical vision in 1926. This shift, from the vision of God’s active providential 
role in the world towards an emphasis on supra-temporality, was precipitated by two 
key catalysts – although it also drew together a number of concerns which had occupied 
him for much longer. 
 
One catalyst was his reading of Heidegger. Dooyeweerd made an intensive study of 
Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) after its publication in 1927. For 
Heidegger, ‘Being’ is not something which belongs to the ‘Da’ – the thatness of the 
world in which one finds oneself – it is not given. Rather, one is to understand oneself 
as ‘Being-in-the-world’ (Da-sein) as the constitutive basis of who and what one is; and 
it is thus (in the face of one’s death and finitude) that one is to take full account of 
oneself and that which is presented to one for one’s (self-determinately) appropriate 
attention and concern.
 Dooyeweerd’s position is exactly the reverse of Heidegger’s. 
While Heidegger denies being to God, Dooyeweerd asserts that only God has ‘Being’, 
and that it is from this ‘Being’ that the world has ‘meaning’ (i.e., creaturely 
dependence).
206
 Whereas Heidegger sees the human person bounded by temporal 
existence in their ‘thrownness’ (‘Geworfenheit’), Dooyeweerd seeks for a basis on 
which that temporal existence can be transcended, and the elements of the temporal 
order seen in true relation to one another. Dooyeweerd argues, pace Heidegger, that true 




Another catalyst in the shift in Dooyeweerd’s thinking away from the Idea of 
Providence was the rise of Fascist and National Socialist ideology in Italy and 
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Germany. In the early 1920s he had argued that the German romantics, notably 
Friedrich Schelling (1775-1854) and Johann Fichte (1762-1814), at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, had influenced Stahl and other Christian thinkers, including the 
Christian Historical Party, to think of the historical process as intrinsically 
authoritative.
208
 In the later 1920s and 1930s, this concern was intensified and he saw 
historicism, with its organic conception of society, leading to the rise of Fascism and 
Nazism.
209
 The extreme emphasis on history as the self-attesting basis of norms and 
values, such as was held by the different forms of historicism, seems to have led 
Dooyeweerd in reaction to seek a non-historical, supra-temporal vantage point, free of 




In response to these considerations, Dooyeweerd came to seek a point of reference that 
is not located within time. As early as 1924, Dooyeweerd writes of the cosmonomic-
Idea as a central lookout tower, but this thought is not yet developed systematically.
211
 
By 1928, he raises the question of the need for an Archimedean point, which is not itself 
located in any of the modalities.
212
 Finding the Archimedean point involves the 
recognition that the ‘totality of meaning’ (‘zin-totaliteit’) of the world depends upon the 
‘Being’ (‘Zijn’) of God. By 1931, this ‘totality-Idea’ (as Dooyeweerd called this 
recognition) had come to dominate and structure Dooyeweerd’s thinking.213 From this 
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supra-temporal creaturely root (‘boven-tijdelijke creatuurlijke wortel’) one can have a 
‘view of totality’ (‘blik der totaliteit’), whereby the diversity of the temporal order can 
be unified with temporal diversity ‘below’ and supra-temporal unity ‘above’.214 Thus, 
despite certain modifications in the way he expresses his new conception, from the end 
of the 1920s on, there is a general shift in Dooyeweerd’s thought towards a somewhat 
hierarchical ontology and epistemology.
215
 This new emphasis on the Archimedean 
point and the view of totality eclipses the central role which God’s providence had 
played in Dooyeweerd’s thought in the mid 1920s. Instead, there is a universal ordering 
structure, which (from 1930 on), he confusingly came to call ‘cosmic time’. Setting 
aside the question of whether ‘cosmic time’ is properly time at all,216 we shall note that 
for Dooyeweerd, this a priori structure is, as he puts it, ‘the functional structure of 
reality’.217 He speaks of an ‘all-sided cosmic coherence of the different aspects of 
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meaning … in a cosmic order of time’.218 As we shall see, this ‘cosmic order of time’ is 
not so much time (i.e., actual time) as the ordering of the modalities combined with the 
duration of individuals. It is the way in which the different modalities are harmonised 
without being reduced to one another. Accordingly, the coherence of all things is 
located in the concentration of the human consciousness, albeit the redeemed human 
consciousness, as the concentration point which unifies the diversity of human 
experience.
219
 Thus Dooyeweerd’s thought takes on an ahistorical character and a 
hierarchical structure, with totality being the supra-temporal mediating link between the 
eternal Origin and full-blown temporal diversity.  
 
This hierarchical structure, with the Archimedean point situated between God and the 
rest of the created order, is reflected in his magnum opus, De Wijsbegeerte der 
Wetsidee, published in 1935-6. Seeing the modalities from the standpoint of the supra-
temporal heart as the Archimedean point represented what Dooyeweerd later called the 
‘First Way’ – a forerunner of what he came to call his ‘transcendental critique’, as we 
shall see below.
220
 Critics suggested that the argument of De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee 
rests on a petitio principii  in that it depends on the prior acceptance of a conception of 
the heart as the supra-temporal Archimedean point – a point from which the order and 
diversity of the modalities can be discerned.
 221
 H. Robbers, S.J., from the Roman 
Catholic side, argued against Dooyeweerd’s rejection of the autonomy of philosophy.222 
Another critic was J.C. Franken, who argued against what he considered the dogmatic 
basis of Dooyeweerd’s argument.223  
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To meet the criticisms levelled against the ‘First Way’, Dooyeweerd began to develop 
what he called his ‘Second Way’, where his aim is to start not with the fully-fledged 
outline of the modalities in relation to the Archimedean point, but with the character of 
theoretical thought itself.
224
 He argues that his ‘Second Way’ can properly be called a 
‘transcendental critique’: it is ‘transcendental’ because it appeals to structures common 
to all human experience and reflection, not just specifically Christian ways of thinking; 
and it is a ‘critique’ because it suggests that the contradictions one encounters when one 
tries to understand the world cannot be resolved by theoretical thought alone, but are 
based on foundational principles or ‘Ideas’.225 The presupposita are those of ‘Origin’, 
‘totality’ (or ‘unity’), and ‘coherence’. Dooyeweerd argues that these three presupposita 
or Ideas are revealed by critical self-reflection to be interdependent. These presupposita 
cannot themselves be theoretical, nor the conclusion of theoretically based argument, 





Dooyeweerd’s concern in his ‘transcendental critique’ is to show that theoretical 
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thought cannot itself have a religiously neutral foundation.
227
 Theoretical thought needs 
to have pre-theoretical foundations of a religious character (be that a religious character 
grounded in dependence upon a transcendent Origin, or one grounded upon an apostate 
alternative constructed from one or other aspect of the world).
228
 He is deeply critical of 
the secular Western Enlightenment view of the thinking subject, to which the material 
of cognition (which he calls the ‘Gegenstand’) is presented.229 Marking out the different 
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areas of analysis is unavoidable in theoretical thought. However, even there the divide 
between the thinking subject and the subject matter of analytical investigation is 
misleading and distorting. For Dooyeweerd (and indeed for Vollenhoven), the human 
‘subject’ is not to be seen as divorced from his or her situation and the diversity of 
relationships of which he or she is part.
230
 Human beings are inescapably in the world 
and part of it. Any attempt to conceive of oneself as a thinking subject remote from the 




Thus, Dooyeweerd seeks to demonstrate that theoretical thought necessarily depends on 
prior religious beliefs – be they Christian or an alternative religious starting point – even 
if this does not seem ‘religious’. Basic religious belief (that is, the fundamental 
orientation of one’s world and life view) is expressed in what he calls ‘ground-
motives’.232 He identifies four ground-motives which have shaped Western thought and 
                                                                                                                                               
between Hendrik Van Riessen and Dooyeweerd (Hendrik Van Riessen, Wijsbegeerte (1970)), and later 
taken up by Strauss. Strauss argues that an account of the Gegenstand as the setting against and then the 
synthesising of the logical modality with another modality is at best contradictory and at worst incoherent 
(D.F.M. Strauss, Begrip en Idee (1973): 106-129; Strauss, ‘Structure of Analysis’: 35-56; Strauss, P.D.D.: 
361-367; Dooyeweerd, ‘Gegenstandsrelatie’: 83-101; and Dooyeweerd, ‘The Epistemo-logical 
Gegenstand-relation and the Logical Subject-Object Relation’: 1-8. See also Hendrik G. Geertsema, 
‘Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique: Transforming it Hermeneutically’ (2000): 83-91; J. Glenn 
Friesen, ‘Dooyeweerd versus Strauss: Objections to Immanence Philosophy within Reformational 
Thought’ (2006); and J. Glenn Friesen, ‘Did Dooyeweerd Contradict Himself?’ (2008)). A way through, 
or around, this discussion is, as hinted at initially, to see the Gegenstand as an analytically qualified 
artefact, produced as a provisional hypothesis by a specific community within a specific context (see M. 
D. Stafleu, ‘Theories as Logically Qualified Artefacts’, P.R. 46/47 (1981/1982)). The Gegenstand can 
take different forms, as Dooyeweerd himself indicates, according to the specific modality concerned. 
(Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.403; Dooyeweerd, N.C: 2.469; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedie van de 
Rechtswetenschap ‘Inleiding’: 12-14; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 28-32). Not only can 
there be Gegenstände created by the modal abstraction of the different kinds of relations, a Gegenstand 
can also be created with respect to individuality functions (with theoretical notions of physical entities, 
plants, animals, social entities etc), making a typical structure of individuality into a (individuality) 
structural Gegenstand (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.403; 3.46; Dooyeweerd, N.C: 2.469; 3.65). 
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 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.399-407; 3.46; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.466-472; 3.65; Hendrik Hart, 
‘Dooyeweerd’s Gegenstand Theory of Theory’ (1985): 143-149. Like Vollenhoven, he understands 
‘subject’ in two senses (see footnote in 1.1). The first (Vollenhoven’s ‘subjèct’) is about the subjection of 
the individual to God – the opposite of the Western Enlightenment view of the human thinking subject to 
which all the matter of analysis is subjected. The second sense of ‘subject’ (Vollenhoven’s ‘súbject’) is 
understood in terms of its relationship to the object, but not as thinking subject to the Gegenstand but as 
the active polarity in a law or norm governed relationship. In other words, in both senses of ‘subject’, it is 
not a question of knowledge by a detached observer, but all knowledge involves the practical engagement 
of the knower within the context of a relationship within which that knower is engaged through the 
process of knowing.  
231
 As Polanyi has argued subsequently, one cannot engage with the world without prior, passionate 
expectations within what he calls a ‘fiduciary framework’ (Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: 
Towards a Post-critical Philosophy (1958): 267).  
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 The term ‘ground-motive’ is used by Dooyeweerd to designate the basic ‘religious’ beliefs (i.e., basic 







 The Christian ground-motive, as Dooyeweerd states it, is that of creation, fall 
and redemption by Jesus Christ as the incarnate Word of God in the communion of the 
Holy Spirit.
234
 Dooyeweerd contrasts this Christian ground-motive with a number of 
‘apostate’ ground-motives. First, there is the form/matter motive that he takes to 
characterise the religious foundation of Greek thought.
235
 Second, there is the 
grace/nature ground-motive characteristic of what Dooyeweerd calls ‘scholasticism’, 
produced by the synthesis of the Greek ground-motive with Christian revelation. (The 
grace/nature ground-motive differs from the form/matter ground-motive in that it allows 
                                                                                                                                               
Dooyeweerd originally used the term ‘ground theme’ (Dooyeweerd, ‘De vier religieuze grondthema’s in 
den ontwikkelingsgang van het wijsgerig denken van het Avondland: Een bijdrage tot bepaling van de 
verhouding tusschen theoretische en religieuze dialectiek’, P.R. 6 (1941). For background see Geertsema, 
‘Transcendentale Openheid’: 50-51; Kraay, ‘Successive 2’: 22-36; Albert M. Wolters, ‘Ground-Motive’, 
Anakainosis 6 (1983): 1-2; Ralph W. Vunderink, ‘Ground Motifs – A Modest Revision’ (2000)).  
233
 Dooyeweerd, ‘De vier religieuze grondthema’s’: 163-164; Dooyeweerd, Transcendental Problems: 
59-77; Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte’: 46-63; Dooyeweerd, ‘Christian Philosophy’: 24-35; 
Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 48-50. It has been pointed out that Dooyeweerd’s four ground-
motives are similar to those identified by Abraham Kuyper in his Lectures on Calvinism, namely 
Paganism, Romanism, Modernism and Calvinism, leaving out Islamism (Kuyper, Lectures: 9-40; 
Dooyeweerd, R. & S. 1;  Dooyeweerd, R. & S. 1; Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en Bezinning ; Dooyeweerd, 
Roots ; see Klapwijk, ‘Reformational Philosophy’: 109). Dooyeweerd tends to write the ground-motives 
as ‘form-matter’ etc. However, I shall use the form ‘form/matter’ etc. in order to indicate that they 
involve two dialectically opposed principles, one set over the other (see 4.2.2). While the ‘ground-
motives’ feature as such only from the late 1930s and are not in the W.d.W, yet they can be traced back to 
Dooyeweerd’s earliest thinking (see Dooyeweerd, ‘R.K. en A.R.S.’ 4-6, 48-49).  
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 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.472 (but see below); Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.60-61, 102, 113, 173-174, 177, 
180, 190, 191,192, 197, 240, 244, 248, 257, 267, 280, 292, 501-502, 507, 524; 2.91, 146, 289; 3.26, 71, 
169, 195, 214, 524, 582, 603; Dooyeweerd, ‘De vier religieuze grondthema’s’: 169  (omitting the mention 
of the work of the Holy Spirit); Dooyeweerd, Transcendental Problems: 67-69; Dooyeweerd, 
‘Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte’: 46-47; Dooyeweerd, ‘Christian Philosophy’: 24-25; Dooyeweerd, In the 
Twilight: 41, 136; Dooyeweerd, The Secularization of Science (1954): 4; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia 
Introduction: 58-61. Dooyeweerd does not mention the ‘Biblical motive of creation, fall into sin and 
redemption . . . . ‘ in W.d.W.( as in N.C.) but elsewhere he speaks of ‘the Christian confession of Creation, 
fall into sin and redemption’ (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.27-28 (‘de belijdenis van Schepping, zondeval en 
verlossing’); Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.30 (see also 3.147, 448, 469, 520)).  
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 Form/matter ‘ground-motive’: Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.25, 61-68, 72, 112-113, 177-178, 180, 182, 
190, 201, 360, 532, 539, 2.39, 57, 97, 144-145,154, 289, 417-419; 3.11, 13, 26, 199-200, 711, 737, 779 
(none of these in W.d.W.); form/matter ‘schema’/‘scheme’: W.d.W.:1.340, 368, 371-372, 438, 447; 
2.10-12, 29, 49, 149-153, 347, 347, 442, 489; 3.95, 126, 500, 564; Dooyeweerd, N.C: 1.374, 400, 404-
405, 470-471, 479; 2.9, 12, 14, 31, 50, 208-212, 417, 419, 512, 558; 3.126, 151-152 (n. 1), 553, 640; 
form/matter ‘theme’: Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.760 (not in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, ‘De vier religieuze 
grondthema’s’: 164-168; Dooyeweerd, Transcendental Problems: 62-67; Dooyeweerd, R. & S 1: 3-11, 
44-321; Dooyeweerd, R. & S 2: 247-414; Dooyeweerd, Transcendental Problems: 23; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 
1.62; Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte’: 49-54; Dooyeweerd, ‘Christian Philosophy’: 27-29; 
Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 38-41; Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en Bezinning: 14-110; Dooyeweerd, 
Roots: 15-36; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 50-58). Bril argues that Dooyeweerd is heavily 
influenced by the analyses of Friedrich Nietzsche, and Francis Macdonald Cornford (1874-1943) (Bril, 
‘Historiography’: 124). Full references and discussion in Choi, ‘Dialogue and Antithesis’ (77-82). 
Vollenhoven objects to Dooyeweerd’s characterisation of Greek philosophy predominantly in terms of 
the form and matter themes (C.V.C.W., 33 (Dec 1945); quoted in Bril, ‘Historiography’: 124). He himself 
later provided a somewhat different account, as we shall see (see Bril, ‘Historiography’ – this will be 




for the genuine sinfulness of humanity – this sinfulness is seen to work in a realm 
somehow over and above the original constitution of the world.)
236
 Finally, there is the 
Enlightenment freedom/nature ground-motive characterised by a dichotomy between 
the ‘personality ideal’ (‘freedom’), and that of the rational and empirical analysis of the 
physical order (‘nature’).237  
 
The relation of the ground-motives to the totality-Idea and the notion of the 
Archimedean point remains unclear, and indeed after the publication of A New Critique 
of Theoretical Thought, it has been observed that Dooyeweerd did not mention the 
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 See 1.1 footnote for the explanation of the term ‘scholasticism’. Dooyeweerd, W.d.W. :1.474-493; 
2.498-500; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.65-66 (not in W.d.W.), 508-527; 2.565-567; Dooyeweerd, ‘R.K. en 
A.R.S.’ 6-8, 52; Dooyeweerd, ‘C.H. en A.R.P. 3’: 57-61; Dooyeweerd, ‘De vier religieuze 
grondthema’s’: 169-170; Dooyeweerd, Transcendental Problems: 70-73; Dooyeweerd, R. & S. 2: passim; 
Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 44; Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvinistische Wijsbegeerte’: 55-56; Dooyeweerd, 
‘Christian Philosophy’: 29-30; Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en Bezinning: 111-142; Dooyeweerd, Roots: 
111-147; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 61-63. Dooyeweerd wrote a series of articles against 
‘scholasticism’, many of them combined in the second volume of his Reformation and Scholasticism, 
unpublished during his lifetime (Dooyeweerd, ‘[Interview by Boeles]’: 54). Dooyeweerd’s analysis has 
been discussed critically by H. Robbers (H. Robbers, ‘Het natuur-genade-schema als religieus 
grondmotief der scholastieke wijsbegeerte’, Studia Catholica (1948); with response: Dooyeweerd, ‘Het 
wijsgerig tweegesprek ... Thomistische philosophie en de W.d.W.’; H. Robbers, ‘De Calvinistische 
wijsbegeerte der wetsidee in gesprek met Thomisme’, Studia Catholica 24 (1949); with response 
Dooyeweerd, ‘De analogische grondbegrippen der vakwetenschappen en hun betrekking tot de structuur 
van de menschelijken ervaringshorizon’, Medelingen der Koninglijke Akademie van Wetenschappen 17 
(1954)); H. Robbers, ‘Analogie der grondbegrippen in de wetenschappen, de wijsbegeerte en de 
theologie’, Studia Catholica 29 (1954); with reponse: Dooyeweerd, ‘Het gesprek tussen het neo-
thomisme en de wijsbegeerte der wetsidee’, Bijdragen. Tijdschrift voor filosofie en theologie 27 (1966)); 
and M. F. J. Marlet (M.F.J. Marlet, Grundlinien der kalvinistischen ‘Philosophie der Gesetzesidee’ als 
christlicher Transzendentalphilosophie (1954); with response: Dooyeweerd, ‘Het gesprek tussen het neo-
thomisme en de wijsbegeerte der wetsidee’; M.F.J. Marlet, ‘Wijsbegeerte der wetsidee en thomistisch 
denken’ (1961); with response: G.C. Berkouwer, ‘Identiteit of Conflict?’ P.R. 21 (1956); and J. A. 
Aertsen (Jan A. Aertsen, ‘Uit God zijn alle dingen: enkele overwegingen bij de 700ste sterfdag van 
Thomas van Aquino’, P.R. 39 (1974); Jan A. Aertsen, Natura en Creatura: De denkweg van Thomas van 
Aquino (1982); see Hendrik G. Geertsema, ‘Dooyeweerd in discussie met de rooms-katholieke filosofie’ 
(1989); and Choi, ‘Dialogue and Antithesis’: 83-97). Vollenhoven gives his own account of Thomas (see 
Vollenhoven, Logos en ratio: 18-30; Vollenhoven, W. Woodenboek: 414-416; Vollenhoven, 
Gastcolleges: 93-4, 204-205). A somewhat different account of Thomas is given by ‘Radical Orthodoxy’, 
which follows the lead, in this respect, of Henri de Lubac (Henri de Lubac, Mystery of the Supernatural 
(1967), arguing for a continuity between grace and nature in Thomas’s vision. See James K.A. Smith, 
Introducing Radical Orthodoxy: Mapping a Post-secular Theology (2004): 156-166).  
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 In De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, there is an extensive discussion of the rise of the ‘the ground-
antinomy in the humanistic cosmonomic Idea’ (‘grond-antinomie in de humanistische wetsidee’) (1.171= 
Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.216) marked by the antinomic tension between the science ideal and the ideal of 
personality (1.151-471). However, while this is paralled in A New Critique (1.187-506) there are subtle 
differences in presentation with specific mention of what is now a freedom/nature ‘ground-motive’ 
(Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.36, 62-63, 187, 190, 193, 499, 501; Dooyeweerd, ‘De vier religieuze 
grondthema’s’: 170-171; Dooyeweerd, R. & S 1: 17-19; Dooyeweerd, Transcendental Problems: 73-77; 
Dooyeweerd, The Secularization of Science: 16-24; Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 45-51; Dooyeweerd, 
Vernieuwing en Bezinning: 143-180; Dooyeweerd, Roots: 148-188; Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvinistische 
Wijsbegeerte’ : 56-63; Dooyeweerd, ‘Christian Philosophy’: 31-35; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia 






 There is some evidence that from the late 1950s he either 
modified or clarified the position that he had seemed to hold since 1930.
239
 In public, he 
expressed the view that he felt like ‘tearing out his hair’ at the way his statement of the 
‘supra-temporal heart’ had been misunderstood.240 This remains an unresolved and 
controversial element in his philosophical system, although, as I shall argue in Chapter 
Four, it is possible to read Dooyeweerd in such a way that the difficulties raised by his 
notion of the ‘supra-temporal heart’ – and his divergence in this regard with 
Vollenhoven – can be resolved.241  
 
In his later systematic thinking, Dooyeweerd developed the notion of ‘enkapsis’: a 
specific coming together of diverse individuality-structures, not least in the case of the 
human person.
242
 In Chapters Three and Six I shall consider this notion and others, 
which together point to a more concretely situated systematics than his notion of 
‘cosmic time’ and the ‘totality-Idea’ might seem to indicate.243  
 
Dooyeweerd retired in 1965, although he continued to be active until his death in 1977.  
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 Kraay, ‘Successive 2’: 31. Kraay argues that A New Critique is an awkward hybrid between the 
Archimedean point conception found in Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, and the ground-motive conception, 
which was developed after the publication of the W.d.W. He points out that apart from the later, hybrid 
mention of it in A New Critique, Dooyeweerd’s last serious exposition of the Archimedean point 
conception was in 1948 (Dooyeweerd, Transcendental Problems). Dooyeweerd writes in the preface to A 
New Critique, that while he added in new conceptions, ‘I had to restrict any changes to what was 
absolutely necessary, if I did not want to write a new work’ (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.x; Kraay, ‘Successive 
2’: 31, 39).  
239
 ‘[D]e religieuze concentratie juist een centrale relatie tussen het menselijk ik en de eeuwige God 
impliceert die nooit in de tijd kan opgaan’(‘just because [the heart as] the religious concentration is the 
central relation between the human I and the eternal God does not mean that it rises above time’) 
(Dooyeweerd, ‘Van Peursen’s critische vragen bij A New Critique of Theoretical Thought’: 103).  
240
 The incident in question was after a lecture in 1964, but it has been variously interpreted (Strauss, 
‘Legacy’: 4; J. Glenn Friesen, ‘Why did Dooyeweerd Want to Tear out his Hair?’ (2006): 12-21).  
241
 See 4.2.2. 
242
 Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.696 (not in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, R. & S 3: 1-2; Dooyeweerd, ‘Substantiebegrip 
... enkaptisch structuurgeheel’: 68. Dooyeweerd describes the process of ‘enkapsis’ as that whereby 
individuals retain their structural individuality within the greater whole (or alternatively by assimilation, 
where they do not), and their going out of being (Dooyeweerd, R. & S 2: 1-2; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.696). 
Dooyeweerd took up the terminology developed by the anatomist Martin Heidenhain (1864-1949) and 
taken up by Theodor L. Häring in his book, Über Individualität in Natur und Geisteswelt (1926). 
Heidenhain used the term to describe the relation between the separate organs and the whole organism, 
whereas Häring gave it more general use to explain the whole and its parts. Dooyeweerd rejects both 
these applications and re-conceives the term ( Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 3.558-561; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 
3.634-636, 696 (not in Dooyeweerd, W.d.W. ); Dooyeweerd, R. & S 3: 3-4). Unlike Häring’s conception, 
as we shall see, for Dooyeweerd, ‘enkapsis’ is not a relation between a whole and its parts, but links two 
or more individuals, each bound with the other or others but retaining its own distinctive individuality 
(Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 3.561-564; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3. 637-639; for Dooyeweerd’s enkaptic account of 
the human person see Dooyeweerd, R. & S 3: Part Two). See 3.2.4. 
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The verdict on Dooyeweerd’s philosophical achievement, given on Dooyeweerd’s 
seventieth birthday by G.E. Langemeijer, then Chair of the Royal Dutch Academy of 
Sciences, was that the he was ‘the most original philosopher which the Netherlands has 
ever produced, not excluding Spinoza’.244 Through the whole of his time as Professor of 
Philosophy, as well as in the years preceding their joint appointments to the V.U., he 
worked in close co-operation with Vollenhoven, using this time and stability of tenure 
to elaborate a Christian philosophy of almost unrivalled comprehensiveness and 
rigour.
245
 Overall, the partnership between the two philosophers was long and fruitful, 
and over the course of their long joint tenure at the V.U., and before and after that, their 
combined achievement was both significant and remarkable. Nevertheless, the 
systematic divergences between the two philosophers remained unresolved in a number 
of critical respects during their respective lifetimes, for reasons which will be discussed 
in the following chapters. 
 
 
2.3 A Reformational Vision for the Whole Created Order 
 
In this chapter we have seen how Reformational philosophy as developed by Dirk 
Vollenhoven and Herman Dooyeweerd took the stage against the background of 
Reformational thought as seen in the work of Abraham Kuyper. Together they 
developed a systematic elaboration of Kuyper’s notion of sphere sovereignty. However, 
whereas Kuyper had largely developed his insights in a social context, Vollenhoven and 
Dooyeweerd carried this basic insight through far more rigorously and comprehensively 
than had their pioneering predecessor. They built on the foundations laid by Kuyper and 
elaborated his social vision to develop a global philosophy of the created order as a 
whole. So far, I have presented a narrative account of their philosophical development. 
In the rest of this thesis, I shall attempt a systematic comparison of their respective 
philosophies. 
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 Commemoration editorial in Trouw, 6
 October, 1964, on the occasion of Dooyeweerd’s seventieth 
birthday.  
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 Verburg, H.D. leven en werk: 396. The closest comparison might be that of the ‘transcendental 
Thomist’ philosopher, Bernard Lonergan (1904-1984) – see Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A Study in 




As we have seen, Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd tried to devise a Christian philosophy 
that would take full account of the totality of human experience.
246
 From a 
Reformational perspective, the systematic philosophical task involves two basic 
questions together giving rise to a third. The first basic question is the ‘transcendental’ 
one: in what way is our experience of the world structured? This is itself a composite of 
two further questions: the question of what there is (the ontology of the world), and the 
question of how we know it (the epistemology of the world). The second basic question 
is the ‘transcendent’ one. It involves what is called in Reformational terms the 
‘religious’ orientation of those engaged in the philosophical task. This second basic 
question is not one which secular philosophy asks, or even recognises as valid, 
committed as it is to the ideal of religious neutrality. But, from a Reformational 
perspective, the ideal of religious neutrality conceals a religious commitment of its own, 
so that the question of religious orientation can be suppressed but cannot be evaded.
247
 
Linking these two questions is the consideration of the presupposita that Vollenhoven 





Therefore in the following chapters, I shall look first at how they systematically take 
account of the elements of the world (or what I call the necessary conditions of 
experience);
249
 second, at the way their respective philosophies have a Christian basis 
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 In Chapter Six, I shall call these the ‘transcendentals’.  
247
 Clouser, Myth 2nd edn.:  9-233.  
248
 ‘Transcendental’ is a term with a long history. As indicated previously, I shall be using it in the 
Kantian sense of a condition of any possible experience or reflection (see Pereboom, ‘Kant on 
Justification in Transcendental Philosophy’), not the medieval scholastic sense (see 1.1). Further, it is 
necessary to distinguish ‘transcendental’, which refers to the conditions of our experience (indeed the 
necessary condition for any possible experience), and ‘transcendent’,  which refers to the presupposita 
which shape and ground the interpretation of that experience. It is true that Vollenhoven expressed 
discomfort with the terminology of ‘transcendental (‘transcendentaal’) and ‘transcendent’ (Vollenhoven, 
‘Enkele grondlijnen der kentheorie (26b)’: 386-391). However, he himself also states later that religion 
‘points over and above the cosmos’ (‘boven den kosmos uitwijst’), i.e., is transcendent in character 
(Vollenhoven, Isagôgè Philosophiae (32) (1932): §72; see Tol, Philosophy: 483 whose translation of the 
phrase I follow) and speaks of the ‘point of orientation’ (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §17, p. 18). 
Similarly Dooyeweerd seems at times (not least in formulating his ‘Second Way’) to play off the 
‘transcendent’ against the ‘transcendental’ (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.37-38 (not in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, 
‘Cornelius van Til and the Transcendental Critique of Theoretical Thought’: 75; see also 2.2), but he also 
affirms their interdependence (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.88 (not in W.d.W.)). Dooyeweerd is not himself 
consistent in his use of the terms, and occasionally uses ‘transcendental’ when the term ‘transcendent’ 
might be appropriate instead (see for example Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.230-259; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 
2.303-330). 
249






 and, third at the presupposita which link the Christian 
basis with one’s understanding of the world.251 Throughout, I shall analyse the extent to 
which their positions converge or are complementary, and explore how their respective 
insights can be drawn upon in a way which is true to the Reformational vision of the 
triune engagement with the world, as outlined by Kuyper.
252
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 Chapter Four. 
251
 Chapter Five. 
252





Chapter Three: Transcendental Location – the Conditions of Experience 
 
As indicated at the end of the previous chapter, I shall address the question of what I 
shall call ‘transcendental location’ of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s systematic 
philosophies, in other words, the necessary conditions which structure all human 
experience. In Chapter Six, I shall call these necessary conditions the ‘transcendentals’, 
but in this chapter I shall be engaging with the Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s 
presentation of their systematic responses to this question.   
 
I shall approach this in two steps. In the first step I shall address the ‘modalities’ – the 
mutually irreducible ways of being and knowing.
253
 I shall present the list of these 
modalities upon which the two philosophers largely came to agree. The second step is to 
look at the conditions for experience (what in Chapter Six I shall call the 
‘transcendentals’): the ontological and epistemological basic features (which as we shall 
see are called ‘determinations’ or ‘transcendental dimensions’ respectively by the two 
philosophers) within which modal diversity is ‘refracted’ (to use Dooyeweerd’s 
metaphor). Here as we shall see, the situation is somewhat more complex, since each of 
the two thinkers has a different point of entry and emphasis, giving rise to strengths and 
weakness in their respective presentations, but also offering seeming 
incommensurabilities with one another. But I shall look at each philosopher’s 
systematic account as far as possible in its own terms in order to make a critical 
comparison, so as later, in Chapter Six, to come to a constructive view of how their 
systematics are related within the wider context of their respective philosophies.  
 
I shall begin, then, with the more straightforward matter of the modalities 
(‘straightforward’ in the sense that the two philosophers are largely agreed on their 
identification and ordering). As I have argued in the previous chapter, the ‘discovery’ of 
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 Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd use various terms for these aspects, but for the purpose of consistency, I 
shall use the word ‘modality’ to translate what Dooyeweerd calls ‘wetskring’ and which is variously 
translated ‘aspect’ or ‘modal aspect’. The strangeness of this word signals that it refers to something 
technically precise in Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven’s philosophy, which ‘aspect’ does not, and it is 
simpler than ‘modal aspect’ or ‘modal function’. It also indicates that what is being referred to is not a 
property, but a distinctive ‘way of being in the world’, or perhaps in terms of Dooyeweerd’s ‘Being’ of 




the modalities came about as result of the intense examination by the brothers-in-law of 
the thought of the two neo-Kantian schools, the Marburg and the Baden, dominant at 
the time. Each of these neo-Kantian schools presented its own challenges and stimuli, 
but, in broad terms, they raised the question of reductionism in a hard and soft form 
respectively.  
  
From a Reformational perspective, the neo-Kantian philosophers of the Marburg school, 
notably Herman Cohen (1842-1918)
 
and Paul Gerhard Natorp (1854-1924), represent a 
hard form of reductionism.
 
According to Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, Cohen and 
Natorp attempt to reduce even sensory perception (which Kant himself saw as graspable 
only by ‘intuition’) to logical analysis conducted by ‘pure thought alone’ (‘im reinen 
Denken allein’).254 But attempts to reduce all other features of reality to thought, and, 
more specifically to analytical thought (which takes its character from considerations of 
logic) result in antinomies. Before embarking on logical analysis, it is necessary to 
experience that which is analysed; logic cannot itself provide the content for logical 
analysis. Moreover, logic cannot itself account for aspects of the world such as beauty 
and justice. These latter involve non-logical – but not illogical – considerations. As 
Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd both point out, a similar result awaits any project seeking 
to understand the world as a whole, which takes as its point of departure one aspect or a 
selection of aspects. Such projects include attempts to describe the world purely in 
physico-chemical terms or attempts to understand human relationships purely in 
biological terms. Any attempt to reduce the description of the world to one form of 
explanation cannot do justice to the many-sided diversity of everyday experience; any 
attempt to construct society on the basis of any one form of explanation risks 
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 Cohen: Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek : 86, 279-280; Dooyeweerd, W.d.W: 1.12, 40-42, 190, 376, 
496, 2.110, 275, 317; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.10 (n. 1), 17, 74-76, 91, 530; 2.167, 343; Hermann Cohen, 
Logik der reinen Erkenntnis (1914): 126 (quoted by Strauss, Begrip en Idee: 170 (n. 132)); Natorp: 
Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 279-280; Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.69-72, 114-116, 317; 3.25, 31; 
Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.204 (not in W.d.W.); 2.91-92, 95, 171-173, 387; 3.35, 46, 51-52. As will be seen (in 
Chapters Five and Six), ‘intuition’ will be used in a somewhat different way in this thesis from Kant’s 
usage (where it is the organising of sense experience), or indeed, as we have previously seen, that of 
Descartes (where it is axiomatic reasoning). Russell and Whitehead: See also attempts like those of 
Bertrand Russell (1872 -1970) and Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) in the Anglo-American 




undermining that society. As in the story of Midas, if all things are turned to gold, they 
become lifeless.
 255  
 
The Baden school of neo-Kantianism by contrast, represents a soft form of 
reductionism. Both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd engage extensively with Wilhelm 
Dilthey (1833-1911), Wilhelm Windelband (1846-1915), Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936), 
Maximilian (‘Max’) Carl Emil Weber (1864-1920) and Theodore Litt (1880-1962) – all 
of whom variously posit a duality between causal explanations, appropriate to the 
natural sciences, and ‘understanding’ (‘Verstehen’), appropriate to the ‘human 
sciences’. 256 Broadly speaking, a soft reductionistic approach such as that of the Baden 
school marks out parallel forms of discourse, each of which is purported to be an 
adequate description of reality. For example, human relations are described primarily in 
physical or biological terms, while mental considerations are accorded a semi-
autonomous status. Even modified forms of reductionism such as this run into the 
problem of the translation or mapping from one form of discourse to another. Moreover, 
the dualities between the different forms of discourse created raise new difficulties. 
These dualities give rise to the question: how can parallel forms of discourse provide 
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 Dooyeweerd mentions the dominance of ‘isms’ each of which absolutise one or other aspect of 
concrete experience (Dooyeweerd, De Beteekenis: 67; Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.28-9 (not in N.C.); 
Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.46-49 (not in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en Bezinning: 37, 39-41; 
Dooyeweerd, Roots: 37-38, 40-43). Roy Clouser gives a number of examples of theories which attempt 
different form of reduction, which gain explanatory power at the cost of narrowing the number of aspects 
of concrete experience which are taken into account (Clouser, Myth 2nd edn.: 131-183; see also Strauss, 
P.D.D.: 5-8).  
256
 Dilthey: Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 109-110; Vollenhoven, Gastcolleges: 23; Dooyeweerd, 
W.d.W.: 1.16, 27, 82, 84, 143 (n. 1), 165, 434, 469, 507; 2.16, 26, 146-147, 166, 212, 281, 452, 475, 520 
(n. 1); 3.464; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.19, 29, 205-206, 209 (n. 2); 2.225-226, 230 (n. 1), 254-256, 282, 349, 
391, 545, 585; 3.520-521. See Theodore Plantinga, ‘Dilthey’s Philosophy of the History of Philosophy’ 
(1979). Windelband: Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek : 439-440; Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.85 (n. 1), 155 
(n. 1), 175 (n. 1), 238, 239 (n. 1), 296, 310, 313, 405 (n. 3), 416-417, 431-432,437, 497, 502; 2.178, 436 
(n. 1); 3.14-15; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.121, 194-195, 198, 212, 220 (n. 1), 224, 280-281, 332, 346, 349, 
437 (n. 3), 449-450, 464, 531-532, 539 (n. 1); 2.201, 239, 503 (n. 1), 505; 3.35. Rickert: Vollenhoven, 
W. Woordenboek: 353-354; Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.17-18, 34 (n. 1), 35-36, 62, 69, 85, 88, 93-119, 123, 
437, 496, 511; 2.148-149, 205, 351-352; 3.28-31, 81, 362, 385; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.14-15, 22-24, 97, 
104, 120-125, 129-138, 144-155, 212, 470, 530; 2.201-218, 230 (n. 1), 254, 421-422: 3.46, 49-51, 113, 
162, 409, 428. Weber: Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 436; Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.185; 2.150 (n. 1), 
220-221; 3.20, 183-184, 187, 202-203, 278, 295, 307, 338-339, 361, 472, 545; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.212 
(not in W.d.W.), 270; 2.209 (n. 1), 292-293; 3.41, 82, 171,176,183, 247-248, 251, 330, 346, 357, 386, 
408, 413, 527, 571 (n. 1). Litt: Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek : 232; Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.43, 88, 90, 
103-118, 122-124, 133-134; 2.166, 426; 3.184-194, 195-196, 234, 238 (n. 1), 240-241; Dooyeweerd, 










Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd argue that while the more extreme forms of reductionism 
achieve their consistency at the cost of distortion, the less extreme forms collapse into 
incoherence.
258
 For example, one’s understanding of the world cannot fully be based on 
physical relation, that is, relations concerning the exchange and conversion of physical 
energy. Physical relations alone (or biological, psychological, cultural-formative 
relations etc.) cannot adequately exemplify for us relations of justice, beauty, love or 
faith to mention just a few. Any attempt to exclude these latter from the picture gives 
one an impoverished and distorted worldview. However, even any of the latter taken on 
their own cannot provide one with a full and balanced picture either.  
 
As an alternative approach, both philosophers start with experience in its rich and 
irreducible diversity in this respect; Vollenhoven speaks of ‘non-scientific’ experience 
while Dooyeweerd speaks of ‘naïve’ experience. Non-scientific or naïve experience 
involves encounters with whole persons or things, engagement in specific relationships, 
and participation in actual events.
 259
 When one drinks from a crafted crystal wineglass, 
one does not experience it separately as a container that holds liquid, as one that has 
economic value, and yet again as a beautiful object.
260
 Naïve experience involves the 
encounter with all reality at once in its irreducible diversity yet indissoluble 
‘coherence’. It is ‘pre-theoretical’ in that it seeks no explicit analysis of reality’s norms 
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 Indeed, it is the inadequacy of the Baden neo-Kantian school’s soft reductionistic dualism between 
causal factuality and ethical value (brought to the fore in Dooyeweerd’s debate with Scholten in April 
1922 Henderson, Illuminating Law: 40) which may well have served as the catalyst for the crystallisation 
(‘discovery’) of the modalities (probably) in the summer of that year, as I have argued (see Chapter Two).  
258
 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §31, pp. 25-27; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.46-49. For a more recent critiques of 
the reductionist approach from a Dooyeweerdian perspective in terms of a number of case studies in 
mathematics, physics and psychology, see Clouser, Myth 2nd edn.: 127-183; and Jonathan P. Chaplin, 
Herman Dooyeweerd: Christian Philosopher of State and Civil Society (2011): 61.  
259
 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§148, 193, pp. 109,134; Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.91-92; Dooyeweerd, 
N.C.: 1.127-128. Dooyeweerd takes the notion of the givenness of that which is presented to one from 
Husserl’s phenomenological approach (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.451-463; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.529-532). 
Unlike Husserl, for Dooyeweerd, the palpability of one’s naïve experience is not dependent on the 
phenomenological self-interpretation of the transcendental ego. According to Dooyeweerd, Husserl 
supposes that one can logically formalise the totality concept in so doing pass beyond the modal diversity 
of the latter (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.73 (not in W.d.W.); see also 2.560-561 (n. 1; not in W.d.W.)). 
260






 Naïve experience does not exclude analysis; but this must be 
distinguished from ‘scientific’ or ‘theoretical’ analysis.262 In naïve 
experience, analytical thought governed by the norms of logic is integrated 
implicitly (Dooyeweerd calls it ‘enstatically’263) in day-to-day engagement 
with the world. 
 
‘Scientific’ (Vollenhoven) or ‘theoretical’ (Dooyeweerd) thought, by 
contrast, seeks the explicit differentiation of the different aspects of the 
world through epochè (the process of modal abstraction or theoretical 
analysis).
264
 Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven came to identify fifteen 
modalities, the mutually irreducible ways of being and knowing, from 
‘higher’ to ‘lower’, or from ‘later’ to ‘earlier’,265 are:  
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 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 3.1 ff.; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.3 ff. It is important to note here that Dooyeweerd 
distinguishes one’s pre-theoretical appropriation of experience from the attempt of what he calls ‘naïve 
realism’ to treat naïve experience as a theoretical category.  
262
 See Dooyeweerd, ‘R.K. en A-R.S.’ ; Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.40-42; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.74-76. 
Dooyeweerd is himself reacting against the Marburg neo-Kantians with their reduction of naïve 
experience to the all-encompassing analytical activity of the knowing súbject.  
263
 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.7-9: 2.402 (‘slechts-instellende denkhouding’ – ‘solely enstatic intellectual 
attitude’), 410, 414; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.5-7; 2.470, 474-475, 479. See 5.2.2 footnote. 
264
 Dooyeweerd points out that this term had a central function in Husserl’s thought, although he claims 
he is using it not in the Husserlian sense of an isolated section of intentional consciousness for the 
purpose of investigation, but rather, as he put it ‘an abstraction from the temporal continuity in the cosmic 
coherence of meaning’ (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2: 24-26, 402 (n. 1); Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.213 (not in 
W.d.W.); 2.28-29, 73-75 (not in W.d.W.), 468-469 (n. 1, not in W.d.W.), 549; Russell, Husserl: 57-58 
(Russell points out that it is necessary in this regard to distinguish eidetic, philosophical and 
transcendental epochè – the comparison here is with ‘transcendental epochè’)). ‘Temporal continuity’ for 
Dooyeweerd is the ordering of the modalities (see 3.2.3). Dooyeweerd argues that his procedure is exactly 
the reverse of that of Husserl: while the latter requires the methodological elimination of the naïve 
attitude and the transcendental-phenomenological ‘reduction’ of the world to an intentional-objective 
correlate to the absolute transcendental ego, Dooyeweerd seeks to recognize the diversity of naïve 
experience in the very irreducible diversity of the modalities (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.73 (not in W.d.W.)).  
265
 The identification and ordering of the modalities is open-ended and subject to continual correction and 
elaboration (see Strauss, P.D.D.: 77-79). The principle behind it is that no one sort of relation is capable 
of providing one with a fully adequate description of the world. The two philosophers largely agree on the 
identification and ordering of the modalities, even though they jointly revised these over the years, and 
their followers have attempted many revision – for example at different times, they came to distinguish 
the kinetic from the physical (Strauss, P.D.D.: 88). D.F.M. Strauss argues that the ‘numerical’ modality 
should be called ‘quantitative’ because that is one of the ways the world is and which is then apprehended 
by the human mind in nuerical or arithmetic terms (Strauss, P.D.D.: 82-87). Vollenhoven tends to speak 
of the numerical (quantitative) modality as the ‘lowest’ modality with the pistical (faith) as the ‘highest’ 






















Each modality has what Dooyeweerd calls a ‘cosmonomic’ side, which comprises the 
laws or norms specific to each of the modalities; and a ‘factual’ side, which comprises 
what Vollenhoven calls ‘subjèct’ or ‘subjècts’ – that  who or which is governed by these 
laws or norms.
267
 For example, quantitative theoretical concepts are governed by 
quantitative ‘logic’, spatial concepts by spatial ‘logic’ and so on. ‘Laws’ (which have  
                                                 
266 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§31, 55, 25-25, 37, 49; Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2 passim; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2 passim.  
267 ‘Cosmonomic’ indicates both laws proper – i.e., pertaining to what applies of necessity: quantity, space, kinesis, 
energy or biosis or analysis, and norms – i.e., pertaining to what ought to apply: analytical, cultural, symbolic, social, 
economic, aesthetic, ethical or certitudinal (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.175-180; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.237-24; 
Vollenhoven, ‘Getuigen (59d)’: /2, p. 138; see Strauss, P.D.D.: 41, 82-102, 258-259, 298). How this applies in the 
two thinkers’ respective philosophical positions is far less clear and somewhat controversial. Vollenhoven explicitly 
rejects the distinction between the cosmonomic and factual side and instead he sees the law as mediating between 
God and cosmos (Vollenhoven, ‘Divergentierapport I (53)’: 113-115; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen rondom de tijd 
(63b)’: 184; see 4.1). Strauss argues that the differences between the accounts presented by the two philosophers are 
more terminological than substantive, since while Vollenhoven speaks of the law as ‘above’ the temporal order and 
the Dooyeweerd of the cosmonomic ‘side’, both share the notion of being ‘subjèct’, i.e., ‘under’ the law (Strauss, 
P.D.D.: 76-77, 447-449; see also 4.1). Moreover, while Dooyeweerd makes this distinction, there are questions about 
Dooyeweerd’s consistency in applying it  (Strauss, P.D.D.: 446-449). However, although Vollenhoven rejects the 
distinction as stated, and although there are ambiguities in the way Dooyeweerd sets it out, it is still a useful and 
necessary distinction for the purposes of exposition. Not only it is helpful in a straightforward account of the 
modalities (holding in tension the distinction between ‘potential’ and ‘actual’ with respect to the laws, ‘is’ and 
‘ought’ with respect to the norms), it also illuminates Dooyeweerd’s and Vollenhoven’s differing presentations. 
Moreover, as we shall see, while formally Vollenhoven rejects Dooyeweerd’s distinction between the cosmonomic 
side and the factual side, there is a way in which that distinction is crucial to his (Vollenhoven’s) own systematics. As 
I shall argue (3.1.1 and 3.1.2), Vollenhoven implicitly incorporates the distinction systematically by the correlation of 
the thus-so and this-that connections or ‘determinations’ (see Appendix One). Dooyeweerd’s distinction between the 
cosmonomic and the factual sides of created reality should not be confused with that between naïve experience and 
theoretical thought. Naïve experience is equally subject to laws or norms, even if these are not explicitly 
differentiated according to the modalities; while theoretical thought investigates both the laws and norms and the law 




their force independent of human implementation) pertain only from the numerical 
modality up to the logical modality. From there, they require human mediation; they are 
no longer laws which apply independently of being grasped by human subjectivity. 
They are now ‘norms’, requiring human mediation to be ‘positivised’, i.e., brought into 
actual operation. For norms to apply in the analytical modality they must be grasped by 
human beings functioning as the analytical súbject. From the cultural-formative 
modality onwards they need human formative activity in order to come into force.
268
 
For each modality, therefore, there is a specific type of law- or norm-conformity. The 
first modality is governed by arithmetical laws, the second by spatial laws, and so on. 
Further, each modality has a characteristic nucleus of meaning which makes it 
irreducible to other modalities: the laws of number and space and their distinctive 
subject matter are mutually irreducible. Those of a kinetic kind are distinct from the 
numerical and spatial, and their ‘meaning kernels’ are quantity, space, movement and so 
forth. So the key factors subsumed under a modal law can be rigorously isolated.
269
 
Each kind of theoretical concept is governed by the ‘logic’ appropriate to its 
modality,
270 
and the full, rich totality of experience cannot be reduced to the 
explanations or descriptions of any one modality. Each modality refers to every other 
modality ‘analogously’.271 This is the specifically Reformational sense of ‘analogy’, 
namely the way in which a concept specific to one modality refers to (‘has an analogy 
                                                 
268
 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.175-177; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.237-239; Dooyeweerd, ‘Norm en Feit’, 
Themis 93 (E) (1932): 182; Strauss, P.D.D.: 258-259, 288-289, 297-298, 315-318, 382-383, 389-390, 
526-532, 613. 
269
 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.5, 36-37; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1: 3-4; Dooyeweerd, ‘De vier religieuze 
grondthema’s’: 7. These modalities are identified according to what D.F.M. Strauss calls ‘a 
transcendental-empirical approach’, which takes full account of the multi-faceted character of human 
experience (D.F.M. Strauss, Reintegrating Social Theory: Reflecting upon Human Society and the 
Discipline of Sociology (2006): 111-119; Strauss, P.D.D.: 231, 234, 291, 319, 435). The term seems to 
have originated from Dooyeweerd’s successor, the philosopher of law, H.J. Hommes and the philosopher 
of science, M.D. Stafleu (H.J. van Eikema Hommes, Encyclopedie der rechtswetenschap: Hoofdlijnen 
der rechtssociologie en de materiële indeling van publiek- en privaatrecht (1975/1983): 41-42; Strauss, 
Begrip en Idee: 86. I am grateful to R.A. Nijhoff for this point). The identification of these modalities is 
an empirical task governed by the appropriate theoretical rigour. And yet, while the identification of the 
modalities is an empirical and theoretical task, that there are such pluralities is a pre-cognitive insight 
grounded on a presuppositum of an over-arching Coherence (which, as we shall see in 5.2.2, I argue, pace 
Dooyeweerd, should be capitalised in order to indicate that it is a transcendent Idea).  
270
 I am using ‘logic’ here not in the strict sense (i.e., as an analytical concept) but analogically (see 
Vollenhoven, ‘Philosophia systematica II (27ms)’: §40; Tol, Philosophy: 403-444).  
271
 Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvinisme contra Neo-Kantianisme’: 68-70; Dooyeweerd, De Beteekenis: 64, 109 (n. 
102); Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.5-6; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.3-4; Kraay, ‘Successive 2’. This the point of Roy 
Clouser’s ‘thought experiment’ whereby he shows the impossibility of descriptions in terms of any one 




with’) a concept specific to another modality. 272 Analogies indicate the coherence of 
that modality with all the other modalities (this is the ‘sphere universality’ of each 
modality). Analogies can be either ‘antecipations’ (referring ‘forward’ to), or 
‘retrocipations’ (referring ‘back’ to) the other modalities. 273 For example, a number 
series (in the numerical modality) antecipates points on a line (in the spatial modality) 
while the points on the line retrocipate the numerical series. In a similar way, the spatial 
antecipates the kinetic, the kinetic the physical (energetic), the physical the biotic, the 
biotic the psychic (sensory), the psychic the analytical, and so on until the pistic (the 
modality of faith or certitude).
274
 Every kind of concept abstracted from the expressions 
of the different kinds of relation
275
 needs to be enunciated with an awareness not only of 
the specific ‘logic’ appropriate to the modality in question, but also with a sense of the 
analogies (antecipations and retrocipations) which that concept has with the other 
modalities. For example, the concept of ‘development’ retrocipates the biotic concept of 
growth, and antecipates the social concept of complexity. Because it involves the 
tracing of analogies across the modalities, theoretical thought cannot find its foundation 
within any one modality alone and so the exponents of any ‘special science’ (i.e., any 
modally-specific discipline) must recognise that it cannot provide the sole basis for 
itself and need to recognise its dependence on all the other modalities as the one which 
is the primary focus for that ‘special science’. 
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 For both philosophers, ‘analogy’ is not a bridging of the temporal and the eternal (or a bridge between 
the created order and God) but a bridging of the different sorts of discourse within the temporal or created 
order (i.e., with respect to the modalities). Dooyeweerd first set this out in his inaugural lecture of 1926 
(Dooyeweerd, De Beteekenis: 69, 109 (n. 102)). Kraay points that only a few months earlier, Dooyeweerd 
had dismissed analogy as ‘conflicting with the postulate of critical purity (Dooyeweerd, ‘Calvinisme 
contra Neo-Kantianisme’: 56; Kraay, ‘Successive 2’: 8). However, in this it is important to see the 
difference between the ‘scholastic’ (eternal/temporal) and Reformational (trans-modal) uses of analogy.  
273
 ‘Ante’ (Latin for ‘before’) signifies that a conceptual element clustered around the ‘meaning nucleus’ 
of a modality ‘goes before’ the modality to which it points, while ‘retrocipation’ (‘retro’ being Latin for 
‘backwards’) indicates the same in reverse. Here, in order to signal the distinctively technical sense of the 
‘antecipation’, I shall follow Vollenhoven’s (largely) preferred spelling (Vollenhoven, ‘Plato’s realisme 
(63a)’, P.R. 18 (1963): /128, p. 137; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen rondom de tijd (63b)’: 173,181,193; 
Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd (68b)’: 203), taken up by Strauss (Strauss, P.D.D.: passim), 
including, for the sake of consistency, for both philosophers (even though Dooyeweerd, and sometimes 
Vollenhoven, uses the spelling ‘anticipation’).  
274
 See Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.56-57; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.75; D.F.M. Strauss, ‘The Order of Modal 
Aspects’ (2000): 2-3; D.F.M. Strauss, ‘The Best Known but Least Understood Part of Dooyeweerd’s 
Philosophy’ in Journal for Christian Scholarship (2006); Strauss, Reintegrating: 8; Strauss, P. D. D: 157-
170. 
275
 As we shall see, Vollenhoven tends to characterise the expressions of the modalities as functions of 
individuals (3.1.1), while, I shall argue, the characteristic expression of the modalities for Dooyeweerd, 




Thus Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd ‘discovered’ their modal theory in response to the 
hard and soft reductionism they found in the Marburg and Baden neo-Kantian schools 
respectively – the hard and sofr reductionism of these two schools respectively 
representative of Western philosophy as a whole. Positively stated, modal theory is both 
a pluralistic yet coherent account of the world – a working out of Kuyper’s vision of 
‘sovereignty in every sphere’ across the whole created order. There is a considerable 
degree of agreement between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd about the modalities and 





But there is much less agreement between the two philosophers about the other crucial 
feature of their philosophical systematics, which Vollenhoven calls the 
‘determinations’,277 and which Dooyeweerd calls the ‘transcendental dimensions in the 
experiential horizon’ (or ‘transcendental dimensions’ for short).278 While the modalities 
are ways of being and knowing, the transcendentals are the basic ontological and 
epistemological framework in terms of which the modalities are identified.
279
 There is 
no direct match between Vollenhoven’s and Dooyeweerd’s account of this basic 
framework, and the proposed resolution of the discrepancies that arise will have to wait 
until the final chapter, when I shall attempt to take account of these divergences and 
build on them in a constructive and mutually corrective way. 
 
In the meantime, except as specifically indicated, I shall follow the structure of their 
own presentations, noting as we go the internal difficulties of each, and comparing their 
systematic approaches to illuminate their strengths and weaknesses so as to view both in 
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 The main one being, as we have seen, to do with what Dooyeweerd calls the ‘historical modality’ and 
what Vollenhoven prefers to call the ‘formative’ modality (see 2.2). 
277
 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§28-45, pp. 24-32 (‘bepaaldheden’ is translated variously as 
‘determinant’ and ‘determination’). 
278
 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 3.53 (‘transcendentale dimensies in den apriorischen horizon der 
ervaringswerkelijkheid’); Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.77.  
279




3.1  Vollenhoven: the ‘Determinations’ of Created Reality 
 
In his Isagôgè, his basic philosophical teaching syllabus, Vollenhoven calls the first two 
‘determinations’ the ‘thus-so’ and the ‘this-that’. The thus-so determination refers to the 
functions of individuals, while the this-that deals with individuals in relationship with 
one another. Alongside these, there is also implicitly a third determination. Vollenhoven 
calls this the ‘genetic connection’; but for the purpose of this presentation, since I 
consider it alongside the ‘thus-so’ and the ‘this-that’ ‘determinations’, I shall call it the 
‘genetic determination’. This denotes the flow of time. I shall examine the question: to 
what extent do these three determinations provide a satisfactory ontological and 






3.1.1 The Thus-So (‘Modal’) Determination 
 
The first determination, then, in Vollenhoven’s systematic account in the Isagôgè is the 
‘thus-so determination’: a ‘vertical’ ordering of laws and norms, with later functions 
building on lower ones.
281
 These modal laws and norms govern what Vollenhoven calls 
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 He mentions the first two ‘ground-connections’ (‘grondverbanden’) in his Het Calvinisme en de 
reformatie van de wijsbegeerte: connections between or among things on the one hand, and connections 
between or among the functions of things on the other.  In his Introduction, he calls these the second and 
first determinations (Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 53; Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§27-84 ). In his 
Isagôgè Vollenhoven presents what he calls ‘[D]irection’ as his third determinant (Vollenhoven, 
Introduction: §§17, 19, 22-23, 25, 27-31, 33-38, 41, 42, 45, 47, 85-86, pp. 18, 19, 21-33, 56-57). 
However, ‘Direction’ is not a structural connection but a person’s orientation either towards or away from 
God (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§86-93, 114-140, pp. 56-62, 75-106). In the Reformational 
philosophical tradition Direction, as basic religious orientation, needs to be distinguished from Structure, 
the creational order itself (I shall capitalize ‘Structure’ as the correlative of ‘Direction’; see Strauss, 
P.D.D.: 41-44, 259, 454 (n. 1), 462; also Albert M. Wolters, Creation Regained: A Biblical Basis for a 
Reformational Worldview (1985): 49-56, 72-95). The need to distinguish Structure and Direction in this 
way is brought out clearly by Vollenhoven’s close colleague, Klaas Popma, who distinguishes between, 
on the one hand, the ‘structure-Idea’ (‘de structuur-Idee’) encompassing the ‘modal’, individual and 
temporal ‘moments’, and, on the other hand, ‘religion’ (Klaas J. Popma, Inleiding in de Wijsbegeerte 
(1956) – ‘momenten’, ‘religie’). I shall capitalise ‘Direction’ in the special use which Vollenhoven uses 
with regard to transcendent orientation in order to distinguish it from the ‘direction’ which, as we shall 
are the constituents for Vollenhoven of ‘interrelations’ (‘samenhangen’) between individuals 
(Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§77-135, pp. 77-100). ‘Direction’ will be dealt with in the following 
chapter, as it concerns religious orientation (see 4.1.2).  
281
 Vollenhoven tends to see the functions arranged ‘vertically’ so that he speaks of them being ‘lower’ or 
‘higher’, while, as we shall see, Dooyeweerd tends to speak of the functions are ‘earlier’ and ‘higher’ in 




‘unities of subjèction’ or ‘subjèct units’ (‘subjèctseenheden’); to avoid this somewhat 
cumbersome terminology, I shall call them ‘individuals’ – a term which Vollenhoven 
uses himself, albeit less frequently.
282
 These individuals may be numbers, spatial 




An individual is given a unique identity by the creative fiat of God. For Vollenhoven, 
the diversity of individuals cannot be seen purely in terms of either the provision of a 
list of characteristics, qua Hobbes;
284
 nor, as in Leibniz’s principle of ‘identity of 
indiscernibles’, can the possession of a ‘property’ uniquely distinguish one individual 
from all others.
285
 So what finally makes an individual unique is not a list of properties 
or characteristics.
286
 Vollenhoven holds, rather, that each individual is constituted by an 
‘idea’, known only to God.287 In everyday, ‘non-scientific’ experience one encounters 
individuals as wholes. All things have an internal unity; they are not collections of 




                                                 
282
 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§36-45, 47, pp. 29-33. See Anthony Tol’s explanation of the terminology 
(Tol, ‘Foreword’: xxi).  
283
 Vollenhoven does speak of number ‘3’ as an individual, but strictly the individual is this number ‘3’ as 
it is counted or written physically on the page (Introduction: §36, pp. 27-8; §45, p. 32).  
284
 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §182, p. 128. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Vollenhoven sees Hobbes as a 
nominalist who holds that there are no universals only individuals, so that concept and name are identified 
(Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 186).  
285
 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §182, p. 128; Vollenhoven, ‘Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)’: §19, p. 74 
(Hoofdlijnen: 30-31); Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 226-227; see Kok, Vollenhoven: 102-103. 
286
 Vollenhoven, Introduction. The early Vollenhoven had a conception of an individual as a substance to 
which properties attach (Kok, Vollenhoven: 67-68, 225), a notion that he was to reject in his later thinking 
(see 2.1).  
287
 Vollenhoven, ‘Levens-eenheid (55ms)’: 122-124; Vollenhoven, ‘Getuigen (59d)’ : /3, p. 138. In his 
thesis of 1918, Vollenhoven states that the ‘essence’ of things is ideational (‘ideëel’), and he emphasises 
that this ideationality is extra-mental i.e., it is not purely a mental construct even though it is a noetic 
appropriation of an ontic given (Vollenhoven, W.W.Th.S. (18a): 229, 411, 429, 440; Vollenhoven, ‘Hegel 
(21c)’: 79, 81 (n. 71), 85, 86 (n. 74); Tol, Philosophy: 112, 144-146, 181, 205-206). According to Tol, 
Vollenhoven did not use the term ‘idea’ after 1923 because of its association with Greek [ante rem – 
J.G.A.I.] thought (Tol, Philosophy: 452; see Vollenhoven, ‘De visie op den Middelaar bij Kuyper en bij 
ons (1952k)’: 86). The faculty according to which individuals are known by a human being is that of 
perception, which is for him not merely a psychic (i.e., sensory) act, but also an analytic grasping of an 
individual (and indeed an act involving all the other modalities). Perception (‘waarneming’) is always 
synchronous with that which is perceived. It is exercised in tandem with recollection and expectation 
(Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§164-169, pp. 116-120). Here a way may be found for making sense of 
Vollenhoven’s account of concept forming, which for him, as we have seen, is focused on individuals 
rather than the relations or the modalities governing those relations. If one reads Vollenhoven’s account 
of ‘concept forming’ as equivalent to what Dooyeweerd calls ‘naïve concept forming’ (i.e., focused on 
individuals and events) rather than as being equivalent to Dooyeweerd’s theoretical concept forming, the 
two accounts can be reconciled. 
288Vollenhoven, ‘Levens-eenheid (55ms)’: 123-124 (‘doorgestructureerd’); Tol, ‘Time’: 102. For 






From a ‘scientific’ attitude (to use Vollenhoven’s term), analysing an individual means 
distinguishing that individual’s functions according to the modalities.289 An individual 
functions arithmetically as a single entity bound by arithmetical laws; it is located 
spatially and bound by spatial laws, and so on. With respect to each modality, the 
individual functions either actively or passively (i.e., as súbject or object).
290
 Some 
functions are presupposed by others (‘retrocipations’), or are themselves the 
‘presuppositions’291 (‘antecipations’) for others. The modalities on which other 
modalities depend are called ‘substrates’ for those which they antecipate; those which 
stand on them are called ‘superstrates’. Thus, the modality of number is the substrate of 
spatiality (and the spatial modality the superstrate of number) – the concept of spatial 




This complex of laws and norms constituted by the thus-so determination can only 
come into force when individuals actually function in relationship with one another. 
Laws and norms can only apply if there are entities to which they can apply.
293 
This 
actual functioning of one individual in relationship with one another is the ‘this-that’ 
determination, to which I now turn.  
 
                                                                                                                                               
This is especially true of the human being, for whom individuality is centred on the ‘heart’ or ‘soul’, 
which is pre-functional (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§92-93, 113-114, 121, pp. 61-62, 73-77, 82-83; 
Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd (68b)’: 205; see 4.1.2).  
289
 However, pace Friesen, Vollenhoven’s position cannot properly be characterised as systematically 
treating the modalities as properties of things (Friesen, ‘Dooyeweerd versus Vollenhoven’: 120). It is true 
that Vollenhoven does speak in one or two isolated instances of ‘properties’ (‘eigenschappen’), where for 
him, they are the accrual of characteristics by an individual over time (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§3, 
43, pp. 25, 30). Functions (i.e., the functions appropriate to the different modalities) differ from properties 
in that they are the ‘how’ of an individual over time (i.e., the range and kind of actions open to that 
individual).  
290
 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§30-35, 42-69, 81-84, 103, 105, 163, 164, 168, 201, 210, 212, pp. 25-27, 
29-51, 55- 56, 66-67, 116-117, 119, 137, 140-141. Vollenhoven sees the polarity of active and passive 
functioning within a particular modality expressed within the súbject-object relation which links two 
actual individuals. However (pace Dooyeweerd), he warns against conflating the active-passive polarity 
of the thus-so connection, i.e., its modal functioning, with the súbject-object of the this-that connection, 
i.e., its individual interrelation (‘Problemen rondom de tijd’ (63b): 194). 
291
 Vollenhoven’s use of ‘presupposition’ here needs to be distinguished from my use of the term 
‘presuppositum’ in Chapter Five. Here Vollenhoven is using the term with respect to the ordering of the 
modalities: as one modality ‘founds’ a higher modality, just as a higher modality ‘leads’ a lower one, not, 
as I shall use the term ‘presuppositum’ in Chapter Five, as a necessary pre-requisite for the process of 
systematic thought as a whole.  
292
 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§55-63, pp. 36-45; Strauss, P.D.D.: 87. 
293




3.1.2 The This-That (‘Individual’) Determination 
 
While the thus-so determination describes how an individual functions with respect to 
modal aspects, the ‘this-that’ determination concerns the relationships which individuals 
form with one another in specific contexts. The this-that determination is about the 
actuality of individuals in relationship, while the thus-so determination is about the laws 
and norms which govern that factuality. As Vollenhoven says, there is a ‘determination 
of law’ (the thus-so determination) which correlates with a ‘determination of being 
subjèct’ (the this-that determination).294 The two determinations are correlative with one 
another, but are not reducible to one another. 
 
 It is in the context of the factuality of individuals as ‘subjècts’ that relations come into 
being. Vollenhoven sees relations as being constructed by God out of the combinations 
of the functions of the individuals concerned. Relations for Vollenhoven are first known 
in pre-theoretical experience as the ‘horizontal’ connections between actual individuals. 
If the relata function at the same modal level, e.g., two human beings in relationship, the 
complex is called a ‘súbject-súbject relation’. If on the other hand one relatum functions 
at a higher modal level than another this is called a ‘súbject-object relation’. An 
example of the latter is a relationship of a human being and a plant, with the plant 
functioning as subjèct up to the biotic modality, and variously as sensory, social, 
economic, legal, ethical and pistical (faith) object to human súbject.
295 
Individuals are 
                                                 
294
 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§34-42, pp. 27-30. 
295
 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§52, 65-66, pp. 35, 45-47; Vollenhoven, ‘Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)’: 
§§2, 45 pp. 62, 98-99 (Hoofdlijnen: 16, 59-60); ‘Problemen rondom de tijd’ (63b): 177-178). For 
Vollenhoven, ‘súbject-object relations’ correlate to the active and passive polarities of the different law-
spheres – as marked out in terms of the thus-so connection (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§51-84, 100-
107, pp. 34-56, 64-68). In order to determine whether these individuals are súbjects or objects as they are 
brought into contact with one another, it is necessary to see what ‘realm’ they belong to (Vollenhoven, 
Introduction: §§22, 23, 84, 94, 96-99, 104-107, 109, 122, 180, 185, pp. 21-22, 56, 62-64, 67-69, 83-8, 
127-128; Vollenhoven, ‘Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)’: §45, p. 59 (Hoofdlijnen: 16, 59-60)). Vollenhoven 
sees a number of realms (‘rijken’) each identified by the highest modality or ‘leading function’ (‘leidende 
functie’) according to which the members of those realms function (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§97- 98, 
104-109, pp. 63-64). For Vollenhoven there are the physical, plant, animal and human realms 
(Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§95-98, 104-109, pp. 62-64, 67-69). Accordingly, for Vollenhoven, 
‘súbjects’ are those which belong to the same realm, while ‘objects’ are those which belong to a lower 
realm from that of the súbject or súbjects to which they have been brought into relation. For this reason, 
Vollenhoven did not accept Dooyeweerd’s contention that there can be numerical, spatial or kinematic 
objects, since none of those modalities define distinct kingdoms, even though (in C.R.W: 31-32) he had 
himself briefly seemed to accept that these constitute kingdoms (a point I owe to Dr Christopher 
Gousmett). In his later thinking he holds that only the modalities from the physical-energetic modality on 





‘directed’296 ‘horizontally’ (from one individual to another).297 Vollenhoven uses the 
illustration of travelling from Amsterdam to Haarlem and back again. Here there is one 
inter-relation, but two (relational) directions: one direction is from Amsterdam to 
Haarlem, the other from Haarlem to Amsterdam.
298
 These directions can either be those 
towards another individual (‘inter-individual’) or those towards elements in the make-
up of a specific individual (‘intra-individual’). In the former case, one individual builds 
up a relationship with another (e.g., two people carrying a burden together);
 299
 in the 
latter case two parts of a whole build up a relationship with one another, e.g., the 
relationship between a cat’s tongue and its fur, as it licks its fur; or between a person’s 
head and their hands, as they put their head in their hands.
300
 In general, one can only 
know relations, says Vollenhoven, by identifying the individuals that they connect, and, 
implicitly, the context within which this takes place.
301
 Relations, for Vollenhoven, only 
exist as divinely determined constructions bringing together the respective directions of 





Here some wider philosophical background is necessary if one is to understand and 
evaluate Vollenhoven’s position on relations. Vollenhoven himself cites Bertrand 
Russell (1872-1970), who identifies three different ways in which relations can be seen: 
                                                                                                                                               
distinctive kingdom (the ‘mineral’), as does the biotic (the ‘vegetable’), and so on (Vollenhoven, 
‘Problemen rondom de tijd’ (63b): 177-178; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd (68b)’: 204-205). 
296
 I adopt the convention of (relational) ‘direction’ this with a lower-case ‘d’ to distinguish it from 
(religious) ‘Direction’ (see footnote in 3.1).  
297
 Vollenhoven, ‘Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)’: §55, p. 105 (Hoofdlijnen: 67). Vollenhoven, 
Introduction: §72, pp. 51-52. In his thinking of 1926, he links relation with ‘entiary connection’ 
(Vollenhoven, ‘Kentheorie en natuurwetenschap (26d)’: 57(‘wezensverband’), printed with a translation 
in Kok, Vollenhoven: 358-359). In his Het Calvinisme en de Reformatie van Wijsbegeerte, he speak of the 
‘connections’ (‘verbanden’) which there are in the cosmos, including intra- and inter-individual 
connections (Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 32-37).  
298
 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§71-72, pp. 51-52; Vollenhoven, ‘Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)’: §55, pp. 
104-105 (Hoofdlijnen: 67).  
299
 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §79, p. 54. 
300
 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §76, p. 53. 
301
 Vollenhoven, ‘Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)’: §55, pp. 104-105  (Hoofdlijnen: 66-67 ).  
302
 Vollenhoven, ‘Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)’: §45, p. 98 (Hoofdlijnen: 59). However, he does allow 
that universal relations can exist independently of one’s thinking of them, but only as they relate to 
individuals. This is true even of animals. He gives an example of a dog which burns its paw on the fire, 
and therefore is afraid not only of the particular fire which burned its paw, but of all fires ( Vollenhoven, 
‘Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)’: §45, p. 98  (Hoofdlijnen: 60)). Individuals ‘possess’ relations 
(Vollenhoven, Introduction:§80, pp. 54-55), although at the same time, he also states that an individual 
without relations (a ‘Ding an Sich’) does not exist (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §71, p. 51). As we shall 
see, these constructions accrue over the course of time. Dooyeweerd’s position will be discussed later in 





The first is the ‘monist’ view such as was held by Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) and later 
by ‘neo-Idealist’ thinkers such as Bernard Bosanquet (1843-1923), and Francis Herbert 
Bradley (1846-1924). In the case of monism, the problem of the independence or 
universality of relations does not arise, as all individuals are simply parts of a greater 




The second view identified by Russell is the ‘internalist’ or ‘monadistic’ view, in which 
relations are seen merely as properties of the constituent relata rather than having a 
universal and common status not bound to the specific individuals concerned. This is 
the view associated most notably with Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and was 
later expounded by Rudolph Hermann Lotze (1871-1881). Those who hold a monadistic 
view resort to different devices in order to account for the apparent ‘universality’ of 
relations. Notable amongst these is Leibniz’s notion of ‘harmonia prestabilita’ (‘pre-
established harmony’), whereby God is held to ensure the universal harmonisation of 
the separate internal arrangements of the ‘monads’ giving the appearance that they are 
related and can affect one another. But what appears to be shared is the result of 
complex divine engineering – there is nothing ‘external’ (having an ontic status distinct 
from the relata themselves). Relations from a pure monadistic view are thus complexes 




The third view is the ‘externalist’ view such as held by Russell himself. In this view, 
relations have a status independent of the relata that they connect – in other words, 
relations are not merely composites of the functioning of the constituent relata, but have 
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 Spinoza: Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 391-393. Bosanquet: Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 69. 
Bradley: Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 69-70. 
304
 Vollenhoven, W.W.Th.S. (18a): 281-282, 346; Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 238. Leibniz: 
Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 225-227. Lotze: Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 238. 
305
 Tol, ‘Foreword’: xxiv. Bertrand Russell rejected Leibniz’s internalist position in his Lent Term 
lectures of 1899 at Cambridge (Bertrand Russell, A critical exposition of the philosophy of Leibniz with 
an appendix of leading passages (1937); I. Grattan-Guinness, The Search for Mathematical Roots 1870-
1940 (2000): 286-287). In drawing on Russell’s analysis of the different views of relations, I am indebted 
to the discussion by Anthony Tol (Tol, Philosophy: 104-108), who in turn takes it from Vollenhoven’s 
own engagement in his doctoral thesis with Russell’s analysis (Vollenhoven, W.W.Th.S. (18a): 241-338; 




Of these positions, as we have seen, Vollenhoven, in the writing of his doctoral thesis, 
holds to a fully-fledged monadistic position.
306
 However, while he modified this 
position, as we have seen, he never entirely abandoned it. Vollenhoven moved from the 
intra-individual conception of classical monadism in which relations are seen as pre-
determined within each monad to what I shall call a ‘modified monadism’ in which 
relations are seen as inter-individual constructions over time. In his mature thought, 
Vollenhoven does not envisage the possibility of there being monadic individuals 
existing in isolation from one another. Individuals are, for Vollenhoven, always located 
in a temporally-defined context, and that for him means individuals-in-relation. But at 
the same time, he has a shortfall in his account of the universality of relations since for 
him they do not have distinct ontic status – in Russell’s sense, they are not fully 
‘external’. Not only does this undermine the notion of relationships, since these can be 
seen merely as tailored to (and reflective of) the concerns and interests of the 
individuals involved. It is also corrosive of universal values such as truth, justice, 
beauty and goodness, as well as the intelligibility of the created order. If what is true for 
one person is not, or at best only seemingly true, for another person, or is merely 
constructed or the product of local custom, then the universality which gives force to 




The fragility of Vollenhoven’s account of relations contrasts with the robustness of his 
account of the individuals out of whom or out of which those relations are constructed. 
In order to account for the construction of these relations, there needs to be a conception 
time as the process, in terms of which these relations come into being or are 
constructed. Interrelations only come into existence when positivised between 
individuals as súbjects or objects in relationship over time. He calls this conception of 





                                                 
306
 Tol, Philosophy: 110-119. See 2.1. 
307
 Leibniz himself turns this problem on its head by arguing from ‘eternal truths’ to the necessity for a 
divine mind, the supreme monad, in which they exist. As Eric Voeglin points out, the only way that the 
monadic position can hold to universal truth is to assert the universal imperium of each monad (Eric 




3.1.3 The Genetic Determination 
 
Vollenhoven calls the third element in his account of the necessary conditions of 
experience the ‘genetic connection’. For the purpose of this presentation,  I shall call it 
the ‘genetic determination’, meaning the process of time from the past to the present to 
the future.
308
 It is purely to do with ‘becoming’: things come into existence, continue in 
existence, change, and go out of existence. Although he does not accord the genetic 





Just as individuals come into being and go out of being (the genetic determination), so 
relationships between them are created and destroyed. The genetic determination draws 
the thus-so and this-that determinations together, and the correlation between the two 
determinations is expressed over time. This correlation needs to be seen in both ontic 
(extra-mental) and noetic (intra-mental) terms. 
 
                                                 
308Vollenhoven uses the term ‘genetic’ without any biological connotations. Here I am indebted to the 
seminal paper by Anthony Tol (Tol, ‘Time’; and his introductory remarks in Vollenhoven, ‘Plato’s 
realisme (63a, slotgedeelte)’ (1992): 153-154).  
309
 Already in his 1918 dissertation, Vollenhoven speaks of the ‘characteristic existence of successive 
self-development’ (‘een eigen, successief zich ontwikkelend bestaan’) which belongs to the essence of 
things, which, for Vollenhoven’s then still somewhat scholastic conception, sufficiently distinguishes 
them from the modification of God’s mind. It is also part of his wider contention in his thesis that time 
needs to be understood as succession, over against the Kantian view of time as a form of intuition, 
correlative with space (Vollenhoven, W.W.Th.S. (18a): 345 (cited by Kok, Vollenhoven: 13)). In 1938, he 
speaks of three schemas of differences, which includes earlier and later (‘vroeger en later’ = ‘genetic’) 
alongside the ‘here and there’ and the ‘higher and lower’ determinations – the latter two corresponding in 
effect to the ‘‘this-that’ and the ‘thus-so’ determinations (Vollenhoven, ‘Realisme en nominalisme (38v)’: 
72 (hier en ginds’; and ‘hooger en lager’ – I am indebted to a personal communication from Anthony Tol, 
21 Apr. 2006, alerting me to this reference)). In his later thought, he sees creation, including the human 
self, as temporal and subject to change. Indeed the lifeline of the human self should not be accorded an 
elevated, supra-temporal status as if human beings can somehow escape their historical location and 
identity (see 2.1 and 4.1.2). Rather, the purpose for one’s lives is unfolded through events (Vollenhoven, 
‘Problemen van de tijd (68b)’: 185; Tol, ‘Time’: 117). Time has a key systematic importance in the 
Isagôgè. The highly internalised way in which time is understood in the strongly monadistic 
epistemology of his thesis is externalised in the Isagôgè: one knows things in a temporally successive 
way because that is how individuals develop in relation to one another, independently of one’s knowing. 
It was because of this externalist view of temporality that he was unhappy with Dooyeweerd’s account of 
‘cosmic time’, the supra-temporal heart, and his designation of the ‘cultural-formative’ modality as 
‘historical’. While it is true that, for example in the Isagôgè, he followed Dooyeweerd’s usage 
(Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§ 48, 55, 66, 171, 208, 209, 210, pp. 33, 36-37, 49, 121, 139-140), he was 
not happy with this and retrospectively expressed his reservations to this effect (Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen 




In ontic terms, the genetic determination concerns the unfolding of individuals in actual 
time, the inter-relations between them (‘inter-individual connections’), and the inter-
relations within them (‘intra-individual connections’).310 New individuals, and new 
inter-relations between or among them, come into being, develop their individual 
character over time, and cease to exist. Vollenhoven speaks of ‘life lines’ which express 
the change and development of each individual over time.
311
 Individuals are not only 
related to one another at a specific time or moment (‘contemporaneous312 inter-
individual’); inter-individual, intra-individual, súbject-súbject, or súbject-object 
interrelations (‘samenhangen’) are formed through time. The ‘successive intra-
individual’ connections describes the case when an individual at one moment is related 
to itself or to an aspect of itself at another moment – an example would be one’s genetic 
connection to one’s younger or older self.  ‘Successive inter-individual’ connection 
concerns a causal link between one individual at one moment and another individual at 





The ontic reality of the genetic determination (i.e., temporal unfolding) is mirrored 
noetically (i.e., in the unfolding of human knowing).
314
 One remembers the past and 
                                                 
310
 Vollenhoven, ‘Levens-eenheid (55ms)’: 130-131; Vollenhoven, ‘Getuigen (59d)’: /1-2, p. 138; 
Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen rondom de tijd (63b)’: 172, 194; Vollenhoven, ‘Conservatisme en 
progressiviteit in de wijsbegeerte (59a)’: /42-43, p. 311; Vollenhoven, ‘Conservatism and 
Progressiveness’: /42-43, pp. 15-16. 
311
 Vollenhoven, ‘Getuigen (59d)’: /2, 138 (‘levenslijnen’); Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen rondom de tijd 
(63b)’: 185. A ‘younger thing’ evolves out of one or more previously existing things, so that whereas the 
constituents were previously interrelated in an inter-individual manner, now they take on an intra-
individual interrelation (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §100, pp. 64-65). This can involve two individuals 
joining to become a new individual, for example two army regiments can merge to become one; or when 
an individual takes on a constituent of another, for example a plank of wood can be taken from a tree to 
become part of a fence; or when two or more individuals each contribute constituents of what then 
becomes a new individual, as in the case of biological reproduction (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§102-
103, pp. 65-66, my examples).  
312
 I prefer to translate ‘contemporeel’ or ‘contemporele’ as ‘contemporaneous’ to avoid the ambiguity of 
the English ‘contemporary’ which John Kok uses in his translation (Vollenhoven, Introduction: 78-80, 
82, 88, 157-159, 163, 165, pp. 54-56, 59, 111-112, 116-117).  
313
 Introduction: §§29, 34-49, 65-66, 71, 79-80 pp. 24, 27-34, 45-49, 54-55. My examples. In his Isagôgè 
of 1930, Vollenhoven speaks of the way in which súbjects can either make objects patent (for example if 
an animal makes an edible object into food by eating it), or by actualising it as an object in a certain 
respect (for example if gold, or other suitable material, is minted and so made into money) (§§ 64-67). 
This was dropped in the 1932 Isagôgè, but the notion that different interrelations (be it súbject to súbject, 
or súbject to object) are actualised over time remain – even though Vollenhoven seems to have dropped 
the notion of rendering latent features patent (for example see Introduction: §210, pp. 139-140). 
314
 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §48, p. 33; Vollenhoven, ‘Het geloof, zijn aard, zijn structuur en zijn 





anticipates the future, and both are not collapsible into the present perception of what is 
the case.
315
 For Vollenhoven, time is an irreducibly successive flow of ‘moments’.316 
The ‘contemporaneous’, the inter-relation of individuals at a given time, is not reducible 
to the ‘successive’, the succession of temporal moments.317 There is an actual past, 
present and future which cannot adequately be accounted for except in terms of a 
succession of actual events.
 318 Thus for Vollenhoven the flow of time is ‘much more’ 
than the constituent individuals in relationship at a given time – although this view is 
not at first apparent from the formal presentation of the Isagôgè.
319
 This ‘much more’ is 
the sheer eventful actuality of time. To use a metaphor from drama: the play is not 
merely the sum of the individual actors and their roles – it has a plot as well. This plot is 
accounted for by the genetic determination as a necessary condition of experience. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
<http://www.aspecten.org/vollenhoven/50d.htm>: 70-77; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen rondom de tijd 
(63b)’: 183-184; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd (68b)’: 201-209. Humanity develops as a súbject 
and object in the process of knowing, i.e., both as knower and as that which is known (Vollenhoven, 
Introduction: §§177-179, pp. 125-126). This is true of God’s special revelation of the Word of God in its 
unfolding (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§120-134, 173, 180, pp. 80-135, 122-123, 127-128),
 
in the life of 
the Christian (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §135, pp. 100-101), in the life of the church (Vollenhoven, 
Introduction: §136, pp. 101-102), but also in the cosmos as a whole (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§47-
48).  
315
 Perception can be stretched into the past as recollection (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §164, pp. 117-
118), and into the future as expectation (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §168, pp. 119-120). Vollenhoven 
argues that there are significant differences between perception and recollection which prevents them 
from being mutually interchangeable or mutually reducible, since recollection is not necessarily the 
bringing to mind a previous perception (although it can be); but is rather a recollection of a previous 
action. A perception in a past event concerns relations with other individuals, whereas the recollection of 
that perception is the bringing to mind of past memories within the consciousness of the individual 
concerned (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§164-165, pp. 116-117). Similarly, expectation depends on 
recollection and, directly or indirectly, on perception, but it too cannot be reduced to perception or 
recollection, since it is possible to expect someone or something of which one has no recollection, or of 
whom or which there is no history of past perception (Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§168, pp. 119-120).  
316
 In this respect, Vollenhoven may have been influenced by Bergson (see 2.1). 
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 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§ 77-80, 88, 164-165, 168, pp. 53-55, 59, 116-117. 
318
 Here Vollenhoven is, in effect, affirming the ‘A series’, the existence of which was specifically denied 
by the British Idealist philosopher, J.M.E. McTaggart (1866-1923), who argues that the determination of 
time in any sense of past-present and future, which he called the ‘A-series’, is not possible in any absolute 
sense, since all A-series statements can be re-formulated in terms of earlier and later, which he called the 
‘B-series’ (J.M.E. McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’ (1993)). McTaggart’s error in this influential 
article is to treat events as ‘substances’ – or ‘compound substances’ (McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of 
Time’: 26), and to treat ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ as ‘properties’ of those ‘substances’ (McTaggart, 
‘The Unreality of Time’: 31-33). This is pointed out by Arthur N. Prior (Arthur N. Prior, ‘Changes in 
Events and Changes in Things’ (1993): 36, 43. See also Arnold B. Levison, ‘Events and Time’s Flow’, 
Mind N.S. 96 (1987): 348-350) and obliquely recognised by D. H. Mellor when he points out that events 
and things need to be distinguished (D.H. Mellor, Real Time (1981): 127-132. See also D.H. Mellor, Real 
Time II (1998) (quoted in L. Nathan Oaklander, The Ontology of Time (2004): 178-181). 
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The genetic determination, or time as eventfulness (i.e., as opposed to order, or pure 
duration), is crucial for Vollenhoven’s ontology and epistemology. As we have seen, it 
is through the view of relationships over time that Vollenhoven modifies his earlier 
(classical) monadism. In this modified monadistic account, he holds that relationships 
are externalised, even if they are not finally fully accounted for as ‘external’ in Russell’s 
sense. The genetic determination also allows Vollenhoven to account for the unfolding 
of individual ‘lifelines’.320 Indeed, in the overall character of his thought Vollenhoven is 
a genetic (or in terms of his own basic ground-types, ‘cosmological-cosmogonic’) 
thinker. In this respect, Vollenhoven presents a contrast with Dooyeweerd, as we shall 




3.1.4 Review of Vollenhoven’s Account of the Determinations 
 
Like Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven inherits the Kuyperian vision of the sovereignty of the 
triune God in and through the work of creation. I shall look at the framework which 
Vollenhoven sets out in the light of this vision, looking in turn at individuality, 
relationality and time.  
 
With respect to individuality Vollenhoven systematically describes two determinations: 
the thus-so is about the way in which the functions which govern an individual are 
arranged up the modal scale; the ‘this-that’ accounts for specific individuals in relation 
and the context in which they are related. In this way, the two determinations are 
correlative with one another, or mutually dependent. In the distinction between the thus-
so and the this-that, he provides an account of individuality which is both law- or norm-
governed (with respect to the thus-so) and has factual existence in the context of 
subject-subject and subject-object relationships (with respect to the this-that). Further, 
Vollenhoven provides us with a robust account of individuals in relation, and, indeed, 
for Vollenhoven, individuals are always to be considered in relation and never in 
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 See above in this section. 
321
 See 3.2.3. In the notes he made in 1973, for his final, but uncompleted, article, he identifies himself in 
his way, in the line of a ‘cosmogonic-cosmological’, ‘pneumatistic interactionist’ line of, amongst others, 
of Gregory of Nazianzus (330-389 or 390; Bril and Boonstra, ed., S. Kaarten: 104, 231(krt#33c); Bril, 
ed., Laatste : 112; see Klapwijk, ‘Calvin and Neo-Calvinism on Non-Christian Philosophy’: 60-61), and 





isolation from one another. It is these individuals in relation who are the subjècts 




With respect to relationality, Vollenhoven has a problem in accounting for the 
universality of relations, since relations for him do not have their own ontic status, but 
arise from the composite of the directions of the individuals themselves. The relations 
which link these individuals are, as we have seen, constructed over time from the 
‘directions’ of those individuals.323 This ‘modified monadism’ (as I have called it) is 
dependent on his account of the third element, which I have argued functions as his 
third determination – that of time. 
 
With respect to time, Vollenhoven, with his account of the genetic determination, 
provides an account of the temporal process that has a robust narrativity and 
eventfulness (both of the temporal process itself with the coming into being of new 




Having examined Vollenhoven’s account of the transcendental location of a Christian 
philosophy. I shall now turn to Dooyeweerd’s ontological and epistemological 
framework with the same questions. 
 
 
3.2 Dooyeweerd: the ‘Transcendental Dimensions’ of Created Reality 
 
In this section I shall aim to show that, despite certain problems and lacunae that I shall 
identify, Dooyeweerd’s account of the necessary conditions of experience breaks 
important new ground in philosophical thinking in the light of the Kuyperian 
Reformational vision; moreover, his systematic philosophical account is complementary 
to Vollenhoven’s. 
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For Dooyeweerd there are three ‘transcendental dimensions’ in what he calls the 
‘experiential horizon’.325 Each of these ‘transcendental dimensions’ provides a different 
point of entry for our experience of and reflection upon the world. I shall look at each of 




3.2.1 The Relational (‘Modal’) Dimension 
 
The first transcendental dimension for Dooyeweerd is what he calls the ‘modal 
horizon’.327 For Dooyeweerd, the modalities are distinguished first of all by a 
consideration of the different kinds of relation (where Vollenhoven distinguishes the 
modalities first of all as the functions of individuals). In the first instance these concern 
the irreducible kinds of relation that there are. I shall therefore call it the ‘relational’ 
dimension.
328
 This transcendental dimension concerns the different kinds of relation. 
Dooyeweerd’s discussion of this transcendental dimension is complex, but the critical 





In the case of naïve experience, the modalities are not explicitly differentiated from one 
another: there is no explicit identification of the laws/norms governing quantity, space 
… faith and the relations appropriate to each. The process of naïve concept-forming 
takes tacit cognisance of all the modalities intuitively, without distinguishing them 
explicitly. In the naïve concept-forming process, attention is focused on individuals and 
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 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 3.53-54; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.76-77.  
326
 Here I follow Dooyeweerd’s own intended order of presentation in W.d.W./N.C., i.e. the second 
volume (i.e., the first after the introductory volume) is about the modalities (which for Dooyeweerd are, I 
argue, relations in the first instance), while the third is about ‘individuality structures’. Dooyeweerd was 
intending to write a fourth volume about time, but instead wrote a series of articles in Philosophia 
Reformata in the later 1930s. Nevertheless, despite the lack of the fourth volume of the W.d.W., 
Dooyeweerd’s order of presentation is, therefore: (1) ‘modalities’ (for Dooyeweerd this concerns 
relationality in the first instance), (2) ‘individuality structures’ and (3) ‘cosmic time’ – an order I 
endeavour to follow in Chapter Three in my presentation of Dooyeweerd’s account. Thus, if we bear in 
mind this intention, Dooyeweerd’s order of presentation is (1) ‘modalities’ (which for Dooyeweerd are 
concerned, in the first instance, with the different kinds of relations and the laws and norms governing 
them); (2) ‘individuality structures’ and (3) ‘cosmic time’.  
327
 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 3.53; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.77. 
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 As we have seen (at the beginning of this chapter), an explicit focus on the modalities is characteristic 
of the theoretical attitude in general and not just about relations (as we shall see, modal analysis can be 
applied to individuals, through the modal identification of the diversity of functions, as well as events, 
through the modal analysis of the different aspects of time). 
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events and not on relations themselves – although, on analysis, relations provide the 
implicit framework within which such concepts are formed. One’s experience of 
relations in naïve concept forming is tacit: one’s attention is not focused on the relations 
per se, but only the individuals and events that are presented to one.
 330
 This does not 
mean that in the naïve attitude one is necessarily ignorant, or even unaware, of modally 
defined relations and classifications; it implies only that this is not the focus. The use of 
an abacus depends on the existence and tacit knowledge of numerical/quantitative 
relations and the laws of number or quantity that govern them. But the attention of the 
person using the abacus, engaged in that way in naïve concept forming, is not focused 
on these, but rather, on the action of counting the beads and on the beads themselves.
331
 
Or again, if a person goes into a shop to buy a cigar, he or she is interested in the cigar 
and what the act of purchasing it involves, not in disentangling all the different relations 
involved in that transaction. In this naïve process of concept forming, one’s attention is 
directed to the thing (the cigar) and the event (the act of purchasing it).
332
 Thus, in the 
naïve attitude, thus, one assigns ‘properties’ to ‘things’ (i.e. individuals) or events. 
However, Dooyeweerd denies that it is appropriate to carry over the procedures 
appropriate to the naïve process of concept-forming to those of theoretical concept-
forming. Before proceeding to Dooyeweerd’s account of what he considers the 
appropriate approach to theoretical concept-forming , we need to look at what he calls 
the ‘scholastic’ approach to concept forming, and why he considers that approach 
problematical. 
 
The scholastic approach uses the procedures of ‘genus proximum’ and ‘differentia 
specifica’ to form concepts by a process of abstraction. This process of abstraction 
allows a kind of entity to be identified by its properties – properties common to all 
entities of that kind.
333
 Through this process, the entity can be described with ever 
greater exactitude. In this way, one finds concepts which correspond to the reality of the 
thing so designated (the process of ‘adequatio intellectus et rei’).334 This procedure 
results in three possible positions: ‘ante rem’, in which the properties are held to exist 
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 Dooyeweerd says ‘individual things’ (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.41 (not in W.d.W.)).  
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 Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en Bezinning: 43; Dooyeweerd, Roots: 44; Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 
14.  
332
 Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 15 .  
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 Strauss, P.D.D.: 25, 347. 
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eternally prior to experience; ‘in re’, according to which the properties of a thing are 
held exist in that thing itself; and ‘post rem’, according to which the properties of a 
thing are held to be purely creations of the mind which are then attached to the things 
which are experienced by convention.
335
 All three positions give the ‘properties’, which 
arise in the discourse of the naïve process of concept forming, a theoretical status – 
indeed a quasi-ontic status – even if, as in nominalism, those properties only exist in the 
mind.
336
 Dooyeweerd argues that all three positions arise from the attempt to establish 
an adequate relation between the conceptual form in the understanding with the 
essential form of being (‘ousia’), and it is on this basis that the attempt is then made to 
isolate what those ‘properties’ might be (be they ante rem, in re or post rem). But this 
procedure is misconceived.
337
 While naïvely, one may observe that ‘the rose is red’, it is 
wrong to reify a ‘property’ of ‘redness’ as a quasi thing – be it a pre-existent thing (ante 
rem), something which individuals posses (in re), or a mental object (post rem).
338
 All 
three ‘scholastic’ approaches involve the illegitimate transfer of procedures from the 
naïve attitude to the process of theoretical concept-forming. The procedures appropriate 
to naïve and theoretical concept-forming must be clearly differentiated if erroneous 
procedures of theoretical concept-forming are to be avoided. 
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 See Dooyeweerd, ‘R.K. en A.R.S.’ ; Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.317-321, 491; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.386-
389, 559; Dooyeweerd, R. & S 2: 293-297; Dooyeweerd, ‘Der Idee der Individualiteits-structuur 2’: 1-4; 
see Strauss, Reintegrating: 92. 
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 Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.42-43. 
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 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.303, 319-321, 348, 499-500, 500-501; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.367-369, 389, 
419, 559, 566, 571; Strauss, P.D.D.: 176-178, 370-379, 4421-442). Dooyeweerd describes how the 
different forms of metaphysical realism are founded on the notion of a lex aeterna located in Divine 
reason. This lex aeterna, he argues, is the absolutisation of the analytical modality (see Dooyeweerd, 
‘R.K. en A.R.S.’; Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.317-321, 491; Dooyeweerd, N.C: 2.386-389, 559; 
Dooyeweerd, R. & S 2: 293-297; Dooyeweerd, ‘Der Idee der Individualiteits-structuur 2’: 1-4; Strauss, 
Reintegrating: 92). The rejection of either ante rem or in re realism must not be construed as the rejection 
of any extra-mental reality. On the contrary, Dooyeweerd affirms that we can indeed truly know and have 
direct experience of individuals, relations and events (Strauss, P.D.D.: 25, 347). Further, this procedure 
needs to be distinguished from another sense in which ‘properties’ can be used, namely, in the sense of 
specified or unspecified functions of individuals as they governed by modal norms or laws. Here the 
functions are seen in terms of the relations that govern a specific type of individuals. The ‘properties’ in 
this case are not to be seen as ‘things’ or ‘universals’ which attach or do not attach to an individual bearer 
of those ‘properties’, as in ‘naïve realism’ (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.43 (not in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, In the 
Twilight: 17), but as the more specific application of a framework of relations to a limited class of entities 
(see Strauss, P.D.D.: 143, 517). I am grateful to D.F.M. Strauss for drawing this to my attention (Strauss, 
personal communication, 24 Jan. 2010). 
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 Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.41-42 (not in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, ‘Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.’ 211; 
Dooyeweerd, ‘De transcendentale critiek van het wijsgerig denken ... Avondland’: 9; Dooyeweerd, In the 
Twilight: 16; Dooyeweerd, R. & S 2: 293-297; Dooyeweerd, ‘Der Idee der Individualiteits-structuur 2’: 1-




So, Dooyeweerd distinguishes the ‘naïve concept forming process’ from the ‘theoretical 
concept forming process’.339 Theoretical concept forming is not properly about the 
abstraction of properties. It involves identifying and understanding the different kinds of 
relation explicitly in the light of the modalities rather than having them remain implicit, 
as in the naïve attitude.
340
 ‘Redness’, properly considered from a theoretical attitude, is a 
sensory relation that links the rose with a normal human observer.
341
 This relation and 
other relations are subject to certain sensory laws (in this case) or norms (in the case of 
the analytical and later modalities). These relations are universal – not ‘universals’. 
They are links between or among individuals (albeit links with an ‘external’ status – 
unlike the case with Vollenhoven),
 342
 but are not to be thought of as ‘things’ (they are 
not ‘properties’ in the scholastic sense). The relation between observer ‘O1’ and rose 
‘R1’, within the appropriately defined set of conditions (for example to a normally 
sighted observer in normal daylight), pertains to all possible or imaginary human or 
quasi-human observers ‘x’ for all possible or imaginary roses ‘y’.343 If one is going to 
make theoretical claims, one needs to pay explicit attention to the modal distinguishing 
of the different kinds of relation, so that each kind of relation can be analysed 
appropriately and rigorously in heuristic isolation from the others (as has been described 
in the introduction to this chapter). For Dooyeweerd, the relations between individuals 
(or as he puts it, ‘individuality structures’) are ‘indifferent’ to the particularity of the 
respective relata. It is universal relations abstracted from each of the modalities that are 
being considered in theoretical concept forming, not the whole gamut of individual 
characteristics of the relata.
344
 The relation can either be that of súbjects to súbjects, or 
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 Dooyeweerd begins the passage by asking the first transcendental question concerning theoretical 
thought, (‘what do we abstract in the antithetic attitude of theoretic thought from the structures of 
empirical reality as these structures are given in naïve experience? And how is abstraction possible?’). In 
order to illuminate his answer, he immediately contrasts it with what happens in ‘naïve concept forming’ 
(Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.41; 2.434 (Dooyeweerd’s italics; neither in W.d.W.)).  
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 Theoretical concepts are specific to a modality (albeit referring to all the other modalities analogically 
according to the principle of modal universality). By contrast, naïve concepts are the intuitive recognition 
of certain relations by taking into account the individuals they link together at certain times. 
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 As explained above, for the purpose of clarity, I shall use Vollenhoven’s orthographic distinction 
between ‘súbject’ (as that which is the active relatum in a given relationship) and ‘subjèct’ (as that which 
is subjected to God’s law).  
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Encyclopedia Introduction: 195.  
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W.d.W.’ 211; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 195. For Dooyeweerd (unlike Vollenhoven), the 
relata (be they súbject–súbject or súbject-object) are placeholders in all instances for all individuals 





of súbjects to objects. Súbjects (as relata) are bound universally to their objects, or to 
other súbjects, in terms of the appropriate law or norm. For example, if R1 appears red 
to O1, and if all the relevant considerations apply in the case of O2 as of O1, then the 
same relation should pertain between R1 and O2, or for R2 and O2, or R2 and O1. This 
then is also true for observers O3 and O4, etc., and roses R3 and R4 etc. The concept 
‘red’ describes these universal relations. In general, concepts are a description of the 
universal relation defined in terms of the norms or norms which govern a specific 
modality – in this case, the laws which govern the psychic (or sensory) modality and the 
specific kind of relation governed by those laws.
345
 
                                                                                                                                               
as opposed to the idea of this legal object which refers to the trans-modal description of a specific 
individual (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.337-339; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.405-406).  
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 Dooyeweerd, De Beteekenis: 64. There is a problem in Dooyeweerd, in that he tends to stress the laws 
or norms which govern a modality (the ‘cosmonomic side’) at the expense of the relations so governed 
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W.d.W.: 2.301 (my emphasis in bold); Strauss, personal communication, 24 Jan. 2010). This is contested 
by Hendrik Geertsema, who argues that in the text cited by Strauss, Dooyeweerd continues to develop the 
account of the súbject object relation with respect to both the cosmonomic and factual sides 
(Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.306 ff.; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.370. Geertsema, verbal comments, 6 Feb. 2010). 
However, Strauss argues that in later versions of Dooyeweerd’s Encyclopedia of the Science of Law 
modal súbject-object (or súbject-súbject) relations are factual albeit bound by the appropriate norm or law 
(Strauss, P.D.D.: 76-77). Indeed, as Strauss points out, the use of the phrase ‘factual side’ is already 
found in A New Critique (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.96 (see also N.C.: 1.28, 174)). In particular, in what he 
calls ‘s[ú]bjective right’, Dooyeweerd identifies a juridical factual relation between a specified juridical 
súbject and a specific juridical object – and this factual súbject-object relation is distinct from the relevant 
juridical norm (expressed in terms of a competence or obligation) by which that relation is governed or in 
terms of which that súbjective right is exercised (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.333-342; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 
2.402-413; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap 3 (1961): 169-234; Paul Marshall, 
‘Dooyeweerd’s Empirical Theory of Rights’ (1985): 130-137; Strauss, P.D.D.: 388 -389). Already in A 
New Critique, Dooyeweerd heuristically isolates factual juridical súbject-object relations as legal 
universals which pertain independently of the individuals which happen to occupy the respective poles. In 
the context of the juridical (law) modality, a specific súbjective right is does not depend upon the whole 
individuality structure of the bearer of that súbjective right, but only in the fact that that individual 
occupies the súbject-pole in a specific juridical relation. Similarly, the juridical object-pole of the relation 
can be occupied by a bearer in a way which is ‘blind’ to the non-juridical characteristics of any possible 
bearer of the role of juridical object (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.405). In other words, the factual súbject and 
object (or súbject and súbject) relata should not be seen as specific factual individuals but rather as 
bearers of universal roles. In this way, factual juridical relations can be seen truly universal. Moreover, 
the juridical modality has multiple analogies with those modalities which precede and follow it, so that 
juridical súbject-object relations need to be seen within a larger trans-modal coherence, not in isolation 
from the other modalities (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.57-58; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.75-76; Dooyeweerd, 
Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap ‘Inleiding’: 109-145; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedie van de 





Dooyeweerd’s way of accounting for relations in universal terms is thus an important 
corrective to the residual (or what I have called ‘modified’) monadism of Vollenhoven. 
In recognising the universality of relations as the basis for theoretical concept-forming 
he avoids having to posit universal properties (be these ante rem, in re or post rem). At 
the same time he avoids the danger of a relativistic historicism, which sees these truth 
and value in terms of a specific place and time, a problem unresolved in Vollenhoven’s 
systematics.  
 
It was only after he has considered the modalities in terms of relations that Dooyeweerd 
addresses the second of his transcendental dimensions, that of individuality, or, as he 
puts it, ‘individuality-structures’. 
 
3.2.2 The Transcendental Dimension of ‘Individuality Structures’ 
 
As with relations, individuals can be considered as they are encountered naïvely (seen in 
terms of naïve experience), or analysed theoretically in terms of their modal structure 
(seen in terms of the theoretical attitude). As with relationality, errors arise if these two 
attitudes are confused. 
 
Considered according to the naïve attitude, individuals are known wholes, not merely 
the sum of their perceived characteristics. Dooyeweerd makes it clear that one must 
recognise the individual per se (its ‘thingness’) as something that cannot be enclosed 
within a single modality. He gives examples of the linden tree outside his study window 
and the book he might throw into the fire – in both cases, it is this linden tree and this 
book, each can only finally be pointed to, not described exhaustively.
346
 In naïve 
experience, it is thus whole individuals, not mere sense-data, with whom one is 
acquainted. In the first instance, one perceives individuals through encounters and 
interaction with them.
347
 In the naïve attitude one does not analyse the constitution of an 
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individual, but looks to the context of relations and events within which that individual 
is encountered.
348
 An individual’s ‘temporal unity’, its character, can only be grasped by 
an appeal to the naïve experience of time; it is not possible to account for it purely 
theoretically or in terms of modal analysis.
349
 Here individuality is taken as given, and 
attention is focussed on the relations between and among individuals over time. A dog, 
says Dooyeweerd, does not really perceive the concept of the chair as a theoretical idea 
or as an individuality structure. For the dog, the chair is merely something to lie on, not 





Problems arise when this naïve experience of an individual is treated as a theoretical 
construct, theorising about it as a ‘substance’ or making it a metaphysical principle such 
as the principium individuationis. The ‘type-concept’ cannot truly represent a specific 
individual. All it can do is generalise about individuals as typical of a certain kind of 
law-conformity. We know individuals not by concepts in terms of any one modality, but 
by what Dooyeweerd calls ‘ideas’ (trans-conceptual knowledge). The idea of a chair as 
an individual thing groups all these aspects together and allows us to speak of this or 
that chair. The idea of a thing is irreducibly ostensive rather than descriptive, and 




                                                                                                                                               
N.C.: 2.470), although strictly this should be the ‘naïve idea of a thing’ (see Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.76, and 
below), since, as has been argued above, an individual can only be grasped epistemically only finally as a 
(concept-transcending) idea, and can never fully be reduced to any conceptual formulation. To use 
Bertrand Russell’s distinction (albeit not in the way he himself uses it), individuals are only finally 
capable of being known by acquaintance (i.e., ostensively), rather than by description (see Bertrand 
Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (1964): 44-59, 108-109). 
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 Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.41-42 (not in W.d.W.).  
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Humanistische Staatsleer: 109; and Dooyeweerd, Crisis in Humanist Political Theory: 94.  
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 For Dooyeweerd’s rejection of the notion of ‘substance’ and the principium individuationis see 1.1. 
Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.354 (n. 1), 3.105-107; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.387 (n. 1); 3.135-136; Dooyeweerd, 
R. & S 2: 243-246; Strauss, Begrip en Idee: 177-178, 203. Here I distinguish between an ‘idea’ (lower-
case), the representation of an individual, and an ‘Idea’ as an overarching, organising principle (Strauss, 
Begrip en Idee: 6-19,196-197; see 5.2). Unlike Plato, Aristotle recognises that the individual is not 
susceptible to conceptual grasp in terms of ‘universal formula’ (‘λόγος τοῦ καθόλου’– Aristotle, 
‘Metaphysica’ (2001): 7.9, 1035 b-1036 a 1031, p. 1797). However, as Strauss points for Aristotle, 
knowledge is exclusively identified with conceptual knowledge – as Aristotle puts it, knowledge of 
‘form’ rather than ‘matter’ (Aristotle, ‘Metaphysica’: Bk. 3, Chs. 4 & 5, // 999a-1003a, pp. 723-731) and 
matter can at most be known in negative terms. Aristotle then falls back on the notions of substance 
(defined in conceptual terms) to characterise individuals, even though Aristotle wrestles with the notion 






In the theoretical attitude, in contrast to the naïve attitude, one pays attention to the 
functional structure of the individual. Here an individual is seen in terms of its 
‘individuality-structure’: the structure of modal laws and norms expressed in the 
diversity of that individual’s functions.352 Unlike Vollenhoven, as we shall see, 
Dooyeweerd does not start with concrete individuals and their functions; instead he 
begins with modal relations, and then sees these as being individualised.
353
 As he puts 
it, ‘an individuality-structure individualises the modal functions and groups them 
together in a typical way within the cadre of an individual whole’.354 Further, 
Dooyeweerd tends rather to characterise individuals in terms of the laws and norms that 
govern their functioning rather in terms of their actual functioning. This is a somewhat 
conceptual approach that focuses more on what individuals must or should be rather 
than what they are. Accordingly, he identifies different kinds of ‘typical’ structures: 
‘radical types’ which delimit the mineral, vegetable and animal realms; ‘geno-types’ 
which mark out general types of individuals; and ‘pheno-types’ for specific 
instantiations of these.
355
 More generally, Dooyeweerd speaks of ‘individuality 
                                                                                                                                               
Ch. 3,// 1030a1020-1028, p. 1797). Strauss himself argues for argues of a duality of ‘concept’ and ‘idea’, 
and concludes: ‘The temporal identity of individual entities expresses itself in the modal diversity of 
aspects and can only be approximated in a regulative sense in a transcendental idea referring to the 
meaning-coherence in which every individual entity is embedded’ (Strauss, Begrip en Idee: 202-203). 
Moreover, as Strauss describes, ideas about individuals can be ‘stretched’ to different contexts through 
the use of metaphor, and so one’s perception of individuals is part of a much wider web of meaning and 
significance (Strauss, Reintegrating: 9, 14-15; Strauss, P.D.D.: 152-157). 
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Strauss, Reintegrating: 111, 126).  
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 Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.423-424 (not in W.d.W.). J. Glenn Friesen in his interpretation of Dooyeweerd 
denies the existence of individuals as such, only structured combinations of the modalities (J. Glenn 
Friesen, ‘95 Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd’, P.R. 74 (2009): 82, 84-86). To identify an individual solely 
in terms of one or more of their modal functions is what Strauss, following Dooyeweerd, calls 
‘functionalism’ (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.488; 3.9-12, 174, 176; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.559;3.24-28, 197, 
239; Dooyeweerd, Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer : 101-112; Dooyeweerd, Crisis in Humanist 
Political Theory: 89-97; Dooyeweerd, ‘Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.’ 215; see Strauss, P.D.D.: 409 (n. 
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Encyclopedia Introduction: 205-206; for two different views see Friesen, ‘95 Theses’: 85;  and Strauss, 
P.D.D.: 449-453). Jonathan Chaplin has drawn attention to the question of the status of ‘societal forms’ 
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be seen as exclusively the latter: they should be seen as a response to divine law-making, not a 
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society and the state: the neo-Calvinist political theory of Herman Dooyeweerd (1894-1977)’ (Ph.D. 





structures’ as functioning as ‘typical structures’, but it remains unclear whether 
Dooyeweerd’s account of ‘typical structures’ is prescriptive or descriptive. The 
confusion caused by Dooyeweerd’s tendency to describe individuals as ‘individuality 
structures’ can be seen in Dooyeweerd’s original term ‘individual structures’ which 
conflates ‘structures’ (the complex of functions each of which is conceptually 
describable) and individuals (which are irreducible to conceptual description).
356
 But 
even in his later account, there is a lack of clarity in Dooyeweerd as to whether 
‘individuality structures’ belong to the cosmonomic (‘structures for’) or to the factual 
side (‘structures of’) of the created order. On the whole, however, Dooyeweerd tends to 
see individuality structures as ‘structures for’, i.e., as complexes of law and norms 
governing the functioning of individuals. So we see that while Dooyeweerd questions 
whether it is possible in principle to approach individuality conceptually, yet he himself 




The somewhat over-conceptual character of Dooyeweerd’s account should not hide its 
possibilities, especially when combined with the complementary insights of 
Vollenhoven, as we shall see. Dooyeweerd recognises that the individual is finally 
unknowable in purely conceptual terms. There is a double tendency in Dooyeweerd to 
overconceptualise individuals: firstly to see the individuals in terms of their component 
functions, and then to see those functions in terms of the laws and norms which govern 
those functions – hence Dooyeweerd’s tendency to speak of ‘individuality-structures’ 
rather than individuals.
358
 This problem haunts the third of his transcendental 






                                                                                                                                               
N.C.: 3.172-4 (not in W.d.W.)).  
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 Dooyeweerd, Crisis der Humanistische Staatsleer: 111-185; Dooyeweerd, Crisis in Humanist Political 
Theory: 96-162). This can also be seen in the early version of his teaching syllabus in the philosophy of 
law (Dooyeweerd, Dictaat encyclopaedie der rechtswetenschap (undated), from the mid 1930s). 
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 Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.418 (not in W.d.W.)). As D.F.M. Strauss points out, they should not be conflated 
because this does not properly allow for factual universality as well as for factual individuality (Strauss, 
P.D.D.: 446-458). However, Dooyeweerd’s position, with its ambiguity with respect to the cosmonomic 
and factual sides, is defended by Hendrik Geertsema (Hendrik G. Geertsema, ‘Emergent Evolution? 
Klapwijk and Dooyeweerd’, P.R. 76 (2011): 63).  
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3.2.3 The Transcendental Dimension of Time and the Question of ‘Cosmic Time’ 
 
The third transcendental dimension for Dooyeweerd is that of time. Presenting and 
assessing Dooyeweerd’s account presents considerable difficulties, because, as we shall 
see, there are systematic problems with his account of ‘cosmic time’, which, I shall 
argue, is a hybrid notion conflating, in effect, the dimensions of relationality and 
individuality. However I shall also contend that Dooyeweerd’s account of time does not 
begin or end with the more problematical notion of ‘cosmic time’, and that there is 
considerable potential in his (more limited and undeveloped) account of time as it is 
naïvely experienced and analysed theoretically – an account, which, I shall argue, can 
stand on its own feet without recourse to the notion of ‘cosmic time’ and the systematic 
difficulties which the latter involves. I shall begin therefore, as I have done in the case 
of the transcendental dimensions of relationality and individuality, with Dooyeweerd’s 





With respect to the naïve attitude, Dooyeweerd is clear that the naïve grasp of time is 
necessary for the theoretical reflection upon time – but not reducible to it. In the naïve 
experience of time, one implicitly grasps events as wholes.
360
 In doing so, one’s 
consciousness is primarily directed to individuals and relations, and only indirectly to 
the events themselves: ‘I hasten to my work and look at my watch’.361 One sees in this 
example that one’s attention is directed to one’s watch and one’s workplace as well as 
one’s relation to each. Within the naïve attitude, for Dooyeweerd, time is experienced as 
a whole (i.e., without making modal distinctions) in the form of ‘concrete events’, 
which together make up concrete history’, which he describes as ‘the great process of 
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 For an explanation of the naïve and theoretical attitudes, see 3.2 Introduction.  
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distinguish between ‘things’ and events. For example in Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.41-42 (not in W.d.W.). 
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are the ‘dynamical element of the universe’ (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.21 (not in W.d.W.); see A.N. 
Whitehead, Process and Reality (1929)).  
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 Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.33 (not in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 32; Dooyeweerd, 




becoming which must continue in all the aspects of temporal reality’.362 One example of 
this is a tree that germinates, grows and perishes in time.
363
 He also gives an account of 





Within the theoretical attitude, by contrast, the different aspects of time are revealed in 
their diverse modal forms; for each of the different modalities there is a specific kind of 
time. Physical time measures physico-chemical reactions or clock time; biotic time 
measures biological growth; psychic time is about one’s sense of time or ‘durée’. The 
same goes for each of the modalities.
365
 Dooyeweerd develops his most rigorous 
theoretical account of time in relation to the juridical or legal modality, his own special 
sphere of study. Here, he develops what he describes as the relation between ‘coming 
into being and going out of being’.366 This juridical causality includes not only the 
coming into being or going out of existence of specific legal facts (for example 
someone’s ownership of a piece of property); it also includes the distinctive and 
irreducible linking of two events on the basis of legal considerations. The railway 
signalman who neglects to operate a switch to move an approaching train from one 
track to another has not done anything physically. But on the basis of the juridical 
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 Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap ‘Inleiding’: 8; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia 
Introduction: 140; Dooyeweerd, ‘Criteria’: 214; Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en Bezinning: 60 (‘concrete 
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 Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.112 (not in W.d.W.); see Dooyeweerd, R. & S 2: Part 2, pp. 132-185. 
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Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap ‘Inleiding’: 12-13; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia 
Introduction: 29-32. 
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 Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap 3: 98, 101-102, 107-111, 170-172. 
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 Dooyeweerd, Dictaat encyclopaedie: 54; Dooyeweerd, ‘De modale structuur van het juridisch 
oorzakelijkheidsverband’, Mededelingen der Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, 
Afd. Letterkunde Nieuwe reeks, deel 13 (1950): 37; Dooyeweerd, ‘The Modal Structure of the Juridical 
Causal Nexus’ (1997): 61; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap ‘Inleiding’: 67; 
Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 117; Strauss, P.D.D.: 24, 281). While Dooyeweerd develops his 
account of juridical causality, it is possible to apply the same procedure in other modalities. For example, 
it is possible to speak of moral facts (i.e., the relation between a moral súbject and a moral súbject or 
object) coming into being and of moral causality. For example one has a certain duty of care for one’s 
neighbour, and one’s neglect of his or her welfare in some relevant way, even if one does not physically 





Dooyeweerd attempts to draw the naïve and the theoretical accounts of time together in 
a wide-ranging account of temporal unfolding, which he calls ‘the opening process’. He 
describes how the different modalities are successively revealed and distinguished from 
one another, as society becomes more complex. This can take different forms. First, 
there is a process of ‘differentiation’ across the modalities, with the different sorts of 
relations being distinguished from one another over time. He calls this ‘the external 
opening process’. This is complemented by the internal opening process or 
‘individualisation’: an individual, whether human or non-human, endures through time; 
its individuality-structure – the structured diversity of diverse functions which that 
individual exercises – is opened up over the course of that duration.368  
 
For an example of the opening process, we can return to the linden tree in front of 
Dooyeweerd’s study-window. Dooyeweerd says that the internal opening process of this 
specific tree cannot be guaranteed by its leading biotical function, since that function 
relates to the individual whole and its typical internal structure. In particular, the 
‘intrinsic destination’ (‘bestemmingsfunctie’) of a thing must be distinguished from its 
‘external teleology’ (‘doel-begrip’); the external teleology has to do with the tree’s 
external function and lies outside the tree’s internal structure. The external purpose of 
the tree, and specifically its biotical leading function, cannot exhaust what the tree is 
and how we encounter it in naïve experience; but it is an important guide to the 
unfolding of the internal opening process. As a living thing, one can expect it to grow. If 
one learns more about the specific characteristics of linden trees, one can anticipate in 
greater detail what is likely to happen to this particular individual. This ‘intrinsic 
destination’ (‘bestemming’) is the basis for the ‘internal thing causality’,369 and applies 
to social structures as well.
370
 The supreme example of the opening process is the case 
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 Dooyeweerd, ‘Criteria’: 224-227.  
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 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 3.34-44; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.54-63; Dooyeweerd is careful once again to 
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 Jonathan P. Chaplin, ‘Dooyeweerd’s Notion of Societal Structural Principles’, P.R. 60 (1995): 17; 
Chaplin, Herman Dooyeweerd: 86-89. For example, Dooyeweerd states: ‘In the genetical order 
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typical individuality structures of the latter [my italics]’; and the same thing applies to the genetic order 
of institutional organized communities, founded in the cultural-formative modality, and voluntary 





of human character. Human character is opened up in the diversity of different 
relationships and in the elaboration of a person’s internal structure. Dooyeweerd 
provides the example of the development of a child: feeling precedes logical distinction, 
which in turn precedes language, just as the psychic modality precedes the analytical, 
and the analytical the lingual.
371
 The opening process, opening up the diversity of social 
forms, seems to proceed according to modally defined order, where organically-founded 
relations give rise to culture, language, social forms, economics, law, morality and faith.  
 
So, in Dooyeweerd’s account of the opening process, we see a systematic opening up of 
the modalities. But does Dooyeweerd claim that events or historical development must 
necessarily unfold accordingly to the order of the modalities?
  
In order to answer this 
question we need to go to Dooyeweerd’s account of what he calls ‘cosmic time’. As we 
have seen in the description of the development of his thought, ‘cosmic time’ indicates a 
‘supra-temporal’ view of the ordering of the world. This discerning of ‘supra-temporal’ 
ordering involves, on the one hand, identifying and placing in sequence the laws and 
norms which govern the different kinds of relation, and, on the other, providing a 
characterisation in modally structured terms of the individuals which perdure. To put 
this in ontic terms (i.e., in terms of the way things are), for Dooyeweerd, ‘cosmic time’ 
is, on the one hand, a systematic opening up of the modalities (the ‘cosmic temporal 
order of the modal aspects’ which, as we have seen, Dooyeweerd traces out primarily in 
terms of the different kind of relations – the ‘cosmonomic side’ of ‘cosmic time’), and, 
on the other, the perdurance of individuality structures (the ‘factual’ side of ‘cosmic 
time’). Thus, for Dooyeweerd there is something of an a priori necessity of cosmic 
time, unfolding according the order of the modalities from number or quantity on. This 
seems to surrender the messiness of the factual process to a somewhat over-neat 
conception of what must or should happen.
372
 
                                                                                                                                               
supposed primitive societies are in fact highly complex, so that the process of differentiation does not 
easily fit with the empirical evidence, and, on the other hand that Dooyeweerd unduly enshrined the 
pattern of Western social diversity as the normative pattern for all human social development (Sander 
Griffioen, ‘De Betekenis van Dooyeweerd’s Ontwikkelingsidee’, P.R. 51 (1986): 84-94; McIntire, 
‘Dooyeweerd’s Philosophy of History’: 99-108).  
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 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.:2.488-491; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.28-29 (not in W.d.W.), 33; 2. 3 (‘order’ and 
‘duration’, not in W.d.W), 418 (not in W.d.W.), 557-559; 3.77 (not in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, ‘Het 
tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën 2’: 6; Dooyeweerd, ‘Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.’ 196; 
Dooyeweerd, ‘Criteria’: 214; Strauss, P.D.D.: 77, 206; Seerveld, ‘Historical’: 41-61; McIntire, 





While Dooyeweerd’s account of time or ‘cosmic time’ does have a certain conceptual 
neatness in that the modal ordering does provide us with a clear roadmap about how 
time unfolds (as indeed as we have seen above in Dooyeweerd’s account of the growth 
of a tree, the process of human life, and, on a larger scale in the diversification of 
society), the very conceptual neatness of his account poses a certain problem.
 
In setting 
up the problem in this way, Dooyeweerd conflates cosmic order (the ordering of the 
modalities as the ‘cosmonomic side’ of ‘cosmic time’) with the open-endedness of the 
future, or indeed the eventfulness of past and present in the passage of time towards the 
future. He seems to present a somewhat closed and pre-determined account of time, 
seeing it as a systematic opening up of one kind of relation or individuality function 
after another in strict modal order.
 373
 Nevertheless, as we have seen Dooyeweerd 
himself implicitly recognises the ‘process of becoming’ which cannot simply be 
reduced to the ordering of the modalities; and here, as we shall see, there is a stronger 
resonance with Vollenhoven’s account of time. But first it is necessary to review briefly 
Dooyeweerd’s account of the transcendental determinations overall. 
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 Vollenhoven later explicitly rejects the notion of the ‘modalisation’ (‘modaliseering’) of time that 
Dooyeweerd’s notion of ‘cosmic time’ represents, i.e., the conflation of narrative, or a sequence of events, 
with (or, one might say, the reduction of narrative to) the order of the modalities (Vollenhoven, 
‘Problemen rondom de tijd (63b)’: 173, 175-179; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd (68b)’: 175-177; 
Tol, ‘Time’: 112 (n. 125)). This problem is identified by Hendrik Geertsema. As Geertsema himself 
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Kruyff, ‘Tijd als omsluiting, tijd als ontsluiting: Een ondersoek naar de tijd in de kosmologie, de 
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proposes is that the full potential of every modal unfolding is always there, even if unrealized (Geertsema, 
‘Transcendentale Openheid’: 135, 142-146). Similar solutions are proposed by Dengerink who sees the 
emergence of new structural laws as disclosures of pre-existing possibilities (Dengerink, De Zin van de 
Werkelijkheid: Een Wijsgerige Benadering: 179-183) and also Hart (Hendrik Hart, Understanding Our 
World: An Integral Ontology (1984): 105-107). These ‘solutions’ merely raise the further question of the 
ontic status of these unrealized modal unfoldings. They merely introduce complications which can be 
avoided provided that modal ordering is distinguished clearly from actual time (see footnote above). 
There is the further problem (see below) that the progressive unfolding of one modality after another 
seems to be presented as the normative pattern for all development according to the strict order of ‘cosmic 
time’ (and indeed this is how Dooyeweerd presents it). However the difficulties introduced by his notion 
of ‘cosmic time’ can be avoided by abandoning that notion altogether and by distinguishing 
systematically between modal ordering on the one hand, and actual historical development on the other, 
so as not to pre-judge the issue in this somewhat deterministic way. This will involve the consideration of 
Direction (i.e., the basic orientation of human beings worked out through the positivisation of norms 








3.2.4 The Transcendental Dimensions and the Kinds of Enkapsis 
 
 
Before leaving the considerations of Dooyeweerd’s account of the ‘transcendental 
dimensions’ of created reality, there is a complex notion which he presents to us, which 
as yet I have not yet addressed in this systematic analysis, and which, I shall argue, 
cannot adequately be accounted for in terms of the transcendental dimensions as they 
have been described in the preceding sections. This notion, which we have already 
encountered in the description of Dooyeweerd’s philosophical development, is what he 
calls ‘enkapsis’: specific relationships in terms of which one individual is linked to 
another, and indeed may need the other for its very existence, but in such a way that the 
distinctive individuality structure of each is preserved.
 This results is a new ‘enkaptic 
structural whole’, i.e., an entity with its own individuality and identity distinct from that 





The first of the kinds of enkapsis is ‘external’ or ‘symbiotic’ enkapsis: a higher 
component structure avails itself of the modal functions of the lower structure so that a 
new individual comes into being leaving intact the individuality-structures of the 
individuals whose interaction brings it into being. An example of this is the bird and a 
nest: the bird and the nest each has its own distinctive individuality structure – the bird 
has the ‘psychic’ or sensory modality as its highest súbject function, while the nest has 
as its highest súbject function the biotic modality because of the organic material out of 
which it is made, although it also functions as ‘psychic’ or sensory object to the bird. 
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 Dooyeweerd, ‘Substantiebegrip ... enkaptisch structuurgeheel’: 78-86; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.13-
21,704-713; R & S 3: 10-15. Here Dooyeweerd refers to experiments by Walther Kossel (1888-1956) 
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in conflict with classical mechanistic physics, which denies entiary status to the lattice and only 
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such as set out by Hoenen (Philosophie der organische Natuur (1940): 408 ff.) which attempts to accord 
the lattice the status of ‘composite form’ and regards the atoms as having merely ‘virtual form’ since the 




However, despite these differences in their respective individuality structures, the bird 
and the nest form a new enkaptic structural whole.  
 
The second kind of enkapsis is ‘internal’ or ‘foundational’ enkapsis: an individuality 
structure is dependent on another for its existence, e.g., a sculpture and the marble from 
which that sculpture is made, or a cell and a molecule, or the different individuality 
structures (chemical, biotic and psychic) which govern the functioning of a human 
being, and the ‘act’ (normatively functioning) individuality structure according to which 
the human being functions with freedom and responsibility.  
 
The third kind of enkapsis is ‘correlative’ or ‘environmental’ enkapsis: the relationship 
between an individual and its environment, e.g., the relationship between a living 





In considering the different kinds of enkapsis it needs to be noted that the enkaptic 
structural wholes cannot be treated as universal relations, since enkaptic relationships 
are specific to certain states of affairs; they are only the mutual arrangements of the 
relata themselves; nor can they be treated as individuality structures, since they 
encompass two or more individuality structures; nor, by the same token, can they be 
accounted for in terms of ‘cosmic time’ either on its ‘cosmonomic’ side, which as we 
have seen is not modal ordering, nor on its ‘factual’ side, which, as we have seen, is the 
duration of individuality structures. Modal ordering cannot account for the coming into 
being or interlinkage of individuality structures in specific instances, since, as we have 
seen, the modalities (which for Dooyeweerd are in the first instance kinds of relations) 
are universal features which cannot account for specific circumstances; while the 
duration of individuality structures cannot account for the specific functioning of 
different individuality structures with respect to the same state of affairs. In short, 
enkapsis – a notion which Dooyeweerd himself develops, and which is crucial for his 
account of the specific states of affairs, not least concerning the constitution and 
development of the human person – reveals the systematic incapacity of ‘cosmic time’ 
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All in all, ‘enkapsis’ calls for an entirely different systematics than that which can be 
accommodated in Dooyeweerd’s account of the transcendental dimensions in terms of 
the framework provided by ‘cosmic time’.377 How the different kinds of enkapsis can be 
accommodated will be addressed in Chapter Six. Meanwhile, in the following section, I 




3.2.5 Review of Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Dimensions 
 
In the light of the Kuyperian vision of the integrity of the individual, the plurality of 
relations and the purposiveness of events, certain features of Dooyeweerd’s account can 
be seen to add new and strong insights, but a number of problems remain. 
 
Regarding individuality, while recognising concrete individuals, Dooyeweerd tends to 
treat them primarily in terms of their cosmonomic side, i.e. in terms of ‘individuality 
structures’ (as ‘structures for’): but in doing so, he leaves little room for the recognition 
of individuals as factual entities, even if he begins his discussion with that recognition. 
So his account of individuality structures is somewhat ambiguous, with a tendency to 
over-conceptualisation. 
 
With respect to relationality, his view of the universality of relations supplies a 
corrective to the residual monadism of Vollenhoven, although in his treatment of 
individuality, he tends to over-emphasise the cosmonomic side (laws and norms) at the 
expense of the factual side (conformity to laws and norms). 
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 In Chapter Six, I shall suggest a systematic approach that can account for enkaptic relationships and 
enkaptic structural wholes. Even though ‘enkapsis’ is Dooyeweerd’s term, which ironically, as we shall 
see, systematically accords better with Vollenhoven’s systematic framework than Dooyeweerd’s own. 
377
 In Chapter Six I shall address ways in which the insights of Dooyeweerd’s account of ‘enkapsis’ can 
be developed on a more satisfactory systematic basis in the light of the Kuyperian vision, both drawing on 





When it comes to time, there are systematic difficulties in Dooyeweerd’s position; these 
arise from his notion of ‘cosmic time’. While Dooyeweerd’s account of the time aspects 
and the opening process provides a non-reductionistic account of time, his account of 
‘cosmic time’ amounts to a hybrid notion combining, in effect, relationality (on the 
‘cosmonomic’ side) and individuality (on the ‘factual’) resulting in an a priori tidying 
up of the messiness of genuine eventfulness. For the time being, we simply need to note 
the internal possibilities in Dooyeweerd’s position.  
 
But, having looked ahead, it is now necessary to recapitulate where we have got to now 
with respect to the transcendental location of the two philosophers’ systematic thought 




3.3 An Initial Comparison of Dooyeweerd’s and Vollenhoven’s Accounts 
 
As we compare both philosophers in the light of the Kuyperian vision of the integrity of 
the individual, the plurality of relations and the purposiveness of time, some of their 
respective strengths and weaknesses emerge. 
 
Vollenhoven’s account of individuality is much stronger than Dooyeweerd’s, seeing 
individuals as unique, concrete entities and identifying how they are governed by laws 
and norms.
378
 Vollenhoven focuses on individuals, seen both from the standpoint of the 
diversity of functions (the ‘thus-so’ determination), and from that of relationships 
between linking concrete individuals to one another (the ‘this-that’ determination). 
Vollenhoven complements Dooyeweerd’s account of individuals as individuality 
structures, whether seen as complexes of functional laws and norms (‘structures for’), or 
complexes of individuals’ factual functions (‘structures of’).379  
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There are, however, problems in Vollenhoven’s account of the externality and 
universality of relations. For him, relations do not have their own ontic status, but derive 
from the linking together of the constituent individuals over time – they apply only to a 
specific context or chain of events.
 380
 Relations cannot therefore be seen as having 
universal ontic status beyond the specific coming together of the constituent individuals. 
Dooyeweerd, by contrast, opens the way for a much stronger conception of relations in 
‘external’, i.e., ontically independent, terms, which is important because otherwise 
values are reduced merely to tendencies specific to the individuals concerned, or the 





With respect to time, Vollenhoven’s account supplies a systematic corrective to 
Dooyeweerd’s account. With his conception of the genetic determination Vollenhoven 
provides a way to account for time in a narrative way, detailing the coming into being 
and development of new individuals. This corrects and complements Dooyeweerd’s 
account of ‘cosmic time’, consisting as it does of modal ordering on the one hand, and 
the perdurance of individuals on the other – without the story of what actually happens. 
This allows for the insights of Dooyeweerd’s account of the ‘opening process’ to be 
appreciated without falling into a form of modal determinism, where the process of 
history ‘must’ or ‘ought’ to proceed purely in a pre-ordained modal order. How these 
insights can be brought together in this way will be addressed in Chapter Six. 
 
So far, we have seen how Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd address the necessary 
conditions of experience (what Vollenhoven calls the ‘determinations’ and Dooyeweerd 
the ‘transcendental dimensions’ of the horizon of human experience). The question 
remains: how is it possible to hold the diversity of experience and reflection together in 
a unified view? For both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, holding the diversity of 
experience and reflection together in a unified way is what constitutes the philosophical 
task. Both philosophers hold that this is not a task that can be carried out in isolation 




 As previously indicated (2.2), his tendency to focus unduly on the cosmonomic side is corrected in his 
later thinking, not least in the last versions of his Encyclopaedia of the Science of Law, where he provides 
a robust account of factual juridical súbject-object relations. This is an approach which can be extended to 




from the basic ‘religious’ commitments, i.e., in terms of the worldview of the person 
concerned. Both hold, like Kuyper, that it can only happen as the response of a whole, 
human person to God’s triune action in the world. The question will be addressed in the 






Chapter Four: Transcendent Orientation – the Religious Basis 
 
In the previous chapter I examined Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s different but 
complementary ontologies and epistemologies – their account of what there is in the 
world and how it is known. However, both philosophers agree with Kuyper that 
ontology and epistemology must be underpinned by basic religious commitment. In the 
course of this chapter I shall examine Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s basic religious 
commitments. In further chapters we shall see how these basic religious commitments 
orient their respective philosophical systems, and how both reflect the vision enunciated 
by Kuyper. 
 
As we have seen in Chapter One, Kuyper argued for a Calvinian ‘world and life view’ 
distinct from the alternative ‘world and life views’ (‘worldviews’) of the Greeks and the 
Enlightenment, and indeed from the ‘scholastic’ attempt at a synthesis. According to 
Kuyper, the distinctively Christian worldview is best expressed in the Calvinian 
tradition. Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven take up Kuyper’s stance, and develop it in a 
systematic and thorough way.
382
 Vollenhoven also identifies the ways in which different 
religious foundations shape and structure all thought – and indeed action.383 
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 See Chapter Two. Dooyeweerd’s position is somewhat ambivalent. In the 1920s and at times in the 
1930s he stated unequivocally that the ‘philosophy of the law-Idea’ (‘De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee’) is 
the elaboration of a Calvinistic worldview (Dooyeweerd, ‘In den strijd om een Christelijke staatkunde 1’; 
Dooyeweerd, ‘In den strijd om een Christelijke staatkunde 2’; Dooyeweerd, ‘In den strijd om een 
Christelijke staatkunde (3-m)’; Dooyeweerd, ‘De plight der jongere generatie tegenover Kuyper’s 
geestelijke nalatenschap’, Volhart (1937); see Albert M. Wolters, ‘On the Idea of Worldview and its 
Relation to Philosophy’ (1989): 22, 25 (nn. 28, 29)). However, later, Dooyeweerd rejects the view that 
philosophy is merely the elaboration of a ‘Christian life- and world view’ (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.127; 
Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.158) although crucially, Dooyeweerd indicates that both a ‘life-and-world view’ and 
a philosophy both proceed from the ‘[D]irection’ (‘richting en instelling’) given by the Divine Word-
Revelation (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.92; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.128; Wolters, ‘On the Idea of Worldview 
and its Relation to Philosophy’: 22, 25 (n. 10). I shall return the meaning and importance of Direction, for 
both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, in the course of this chapter.  
383
 In the early 1930s, Vollenhoven explicitly distinguishes between scriptural and un-scriptural ground-
motives, although not in the form later taken by Dooyeweerd (Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 49-67). 
However, it is important to note that the apostate ground-motives which Vollenhoven describes then are 
different from those which Dooyeweerd was later to set out (see 2.2). For Vollenhoven, they are the 
monistic – subdivided into pantheism and pan-cosmism; and the dualistic – subdivided into the partial 
cosmism and partial theism (Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 51-52). This understanding of monism and 
dualism in cosmic terms prevailed until the early 1940s. Anthony Tol comments: ‘It is only in the last 
revision of the Isagôgè, in 1941, that Vollenhoven’s later [more anthropologically-focused rather than 
cosmological – J.G.A.I.] understanding of monism and dualism becomes definitive’ (Tol, Philosophy: 80, 





Dooyeweerd’s position in this regard is not essentially different from Kuyper’s or 
Vollenhoven’s, except that he locates it in the universal conditions of human experience 
rather than in the expression of a specific communal belief, as Kuyper does.
384
 Closely 
following categories developed by Kuyper, Dooyeweerd identifies a series of what he 
calls ‘religious ground-motives’, including the Christian one, which have shaped the 




However, the question of how philosophy relates to theology and religion is a fraught 
and painful one in Reformational philosophical circles. Both philosophers distinguish 
between religion, philosophy, and theology. They use ‘religion’ to refer to the basic 
orientation of the whole person to God or to any putative alternative which may be 
substituted for God, while ‘theology’ refers to the analysis of creedal statements, and 
‘philosophy’ to the comprehensive analytical study of all the modalities (and indeed all 




As we saw in Chapter Two, doubts were raised about the value of theological insight in 
the development of Christian philosophy, following attacks on Dooyeweerd and 
Vollenhoven by their theological colleagues. It may be suspected that the theological 
roots of the two men’s thought were obscured deliberately – partly to avoid the 
polemical assaults to which both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven were subjected and 
partly because of a systematic attempt (especially by Dooyeweerd) to question in 
principle any theological scrutiny of the stated basis of their philosophy. It was also a 
matter of deep debate among the following generation of Reformational philosophers, 
                                                                                                                                               
(1963): 138). However, as we shall see in the following chapter (5.1) this was subsumed into his analysis 
of the ‘ground-types’ which emerge from his ‘consequential problem-historical’ consideration of the 
history of Western philosophy. 
384
 Jacob Klapwijk points out that Dooyeweerd was working in a different philosophical milieu from that 
of Abraham Kuyper. Kuyper had a Romantic ‘expressivist’ vision of life, according to which ‘worldview’ 
reflects the spirit of a community (i.e., the Calvinist community). Klapwijk argues that Dooyeweerd 
moved away from Kuyper’s expressivism towards a more Kantian (or neo-Kantian) one, which focuses 
more at the general conditions of human experience rather than the spirit of specific community However, 
Klapwijk points out that Dooyeweerd is not consistent in this, and that he ‘surreptitiously brings the 
notion of worldview into his idea of “religious ground-motive” ’ (Klapwijk, ‘On Worldviews and 
Philosophy’: 50-52).  
385
 This can be seen in the way Dooyeweerd’s four ground-motives correspond to the four worldviews 
which Kuyper identified: Paganism, Romanism, Modernism and Calvinism ( Kuyper, Lectures : 20-34; 
Klapwijk, ‘On Worldviews and Philosophy’: 52). As pointed out previously (2.2), this is not accidental, 
since Dooyeweerd developed his account of the ground-motives in the late 1930s, at the same time as he 
was studying Kuyper in preparation for the celebrations at the V.U. of centenary of the latter’s birth.  
386




although there is no final consensus.
387
 Vollenhoven was willing and able to defend his 
position against theological opponents (see Chapter Two), while Dooyeweerd rejected 
any theological examination of the expression of religious belief.
388
 The difficulty is 
                                                 
387
 See Klaas J. Popma, De Plaats der Theologie (1946); Klaas J. Popma, ‘Enkele Opmerkingen over het 
Systematisch Karakter van der Theologische Dogmatiek’, P.R. 25 (1960): 64-76; J.P.A. Mekkes, 
Creation, Revelation and Philosophy (2010): 33-39; and Troost, ‘The Relation between the Revelation of 
Creation and Word-revelation’: 27-40). In particular, he denies that the content of religious belief can be 
identified with the subject matter of theological investigation, which he identifies a ‘special science’, i.e., 
a purely theoretical discipline (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.497; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.562-563; Dooyeweerd, 
In the Twilight: 42, 136; see Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘Dooyeweerd: An Appreciation’ (1960s)). 
Dooyeweerd points out difference in this regard with his close colleague, Klaas Popma, who maintains 
that theology is not purely theoretical (Dooyeweerd, ‘Verhouding tussen wijsbegeerte en theologie’: 67-
68 ( n. 64)). 
388
 Here Dooyeweerd rejects all ‘scholastic’ claims about theology as the ‘queen of the sciences’.  
Dooyeweerd identifies three ‘scholastic’ models according to which the ‘scholastic’ understanding of the 
relation between theology and philosophy is expressed. The first is the model of Augustine, who 
identifies Christian doctrine itself as ‘Philosophia Christiana’. Dooyeweerd argues that Augustine’s 
conception represents the synthesis of the contemplation of the eternal forms (as described by Plato) and 
biblical revelation: in the ‘scholastic’ vision, the categories of unchangeability and impassibility are 
imported into the picture of God. This is conflated with the biblical deity, engaged with the world in and 
through time and incarnate in the person of the Son, who suffers and dies before his resurrection and 
ascension. For Augustine, the two pictures of Greek philosophy and of biblical revelation are, in 
Dooyeweerd’s view, held together by sheer assertion (Dooyeweerd,N.C.: 1.177-179 (not in W.d.W.); 
Dooyeweerd, ‘Verhouding tussen wijsbegeerte en theologie’: 2-3, 5-6; Dooyeweerd, R. & S 2: Ch. 8; 
Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 43, 114-115; Dooyeweerd, ‘Philosophie et théologie’, Revue Reformée 9 
(1958): 48-49, 55; Yasunori Ichikawa, ‘Herman Dooyeweerd’s view of theology as science’ (Calvin 
Theological Seminary, Grand Rapids, Mich: 33-35)). The second model is that exemplified by the 
approach of Thomas Aquinas, which sees theology, as derived from biblical revelation, crowning the 
understanding of the world provided by Greek philosophy. In the case of Thomas Aquinas and the 
medieval ‘scholastics’, Augustine’s conception is schematised into a two-tier view of the world. In the 
lower sphere, the world is understood by reason, God-given but otherwise unaided. In the higher sphere, 
content is provided by revelation, including biblical revelation, in a manner complementary to an 
understanding of the world achieved by reason alone. This latter approach is called the analogia entis, the 
extrapolation of the existence of God from a consideration of the nature of the world. Revelation then, 
according to this account of Thomas, supplements what can be known by natural means. Thomas, like 
Augustine, subordinates nature to grace in his schema (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.179-185 (not in W.d.W.); 
Dooyeweerd, ‘Verhouding tussen wijsbegeerte en theologie’: 7-10; R. & S. 2: Ch. 8; Dooyeweerd, In the 
Twilight: 44-45,116-118; Dooyeweerd, ‘Philosophie et théologie’: 49; Ichikawa, ‘Herman Dooyeweerd’s 
view of theology as science’ (36-39; see also 1.2). The third model is that of Karl Barth (1886-1968) who 
sees theology as displacing philosophy as the only true basis for knowledge about God and the world. It 
might seem strange that Dooyeweerd treats Barth as a ‘scholastic’. However, for Dooyeweerd, since 
Barth operates within the grace/nature ground-motive which characterises the scholastic position, he can 
be so classified – although one might, perhaps, call Barth a ‘contradictory’ or ‘dialectical’ scholastic in 
that Barth’s model, as set out in the first volume of his Church Dogmatics, distinguished nature and 
grace, but sets the two in sharp antithesis. Revelation is the unmerited act of God’s grace while natural 
reason is an apostate human project. In practice (and contrary to his own claims), Barth follows an 
eclectic path, within a certain, largely implicit, philosophical framework. Further, Dooyeweerd argues, he 
does not distinguish properly between theology as the knowledge of God in Jesus Christ, and the 
dogmatic science that seeks to systematize Christian revelation. Barth argues that God can be known 
solely by revelation and rejects the analogia entis. In its place he puts forward the analogia fidei, which, 
in effect, mediates one’s direct relationship to God through the theoretical categories of dogmatic 
analysis. In contradiction of his own claim that Christian belief has no point of contact with human 
experience, he effectively absolutises one aspect of human experience: the faith modality (Dooyeweerd, 
N.C.: 1.66; 2.34, 300-302 (not in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, ‘De wetsbeschouwing in Brunner’: 336-340; 





that the problems of various ‘scholastic’ approaches, dependent as they are on a dualism 
between grace and nature, are imported into Christian philosophy. Nevertheless, both 
philosophers clearly describe the triune work of God as the necessary basic religious 
orientation for a Christian philosophy; they describe the human response from the 
‘heart’ to this triune work as the pre-requisite for a systematically Christian approach to 
philosophy. In this they are following Kuyper.  
 
In this chapter, I shall ask two related questions. First, how are Vollenhoven’s and 
Dooyeweerd’s accounts respectively grounded in the Christian vision of God’s triune 
engagement with the world, as we have found it enunciated by Kuyper? Second, how 
does this account shape their respective accounts of the human response?
389
 With 
respect to the first question, the two philosophers give somewhat different accounts of 
God’s triune narrative.390 With respect to the second, they account somewhat differently 
for how this impinges on, and orients, the centre of human life and action, which, 
following Kuyper, both call the ‘heart’: Vollenhoven tends to stress the eternal ‘Law’ in 
this regard, while Dooyeweerd tends to stress the ‘supra-temporality’ of the heart.391 I 
shall outline and compare their respective accounts of the religious basis for a Christian 
philosophy  (both the triune grounding and the human response) with suggested 
resolutions for the problems and divergences in their accounts. 
 
In the next two sections, then, I shall look at how Vollenhoven and then Dooyeweerd 
describe both the transcendent vision (which qua Kuyper should inform a Christian 
philosophy), and its reception by human beings. This will all be seen in the light of the 




                                                                                                                                               
wijsbegeerte der wetsideee en de “Barthianism” ’, P.R. 16 (1951): 156-157  et passim; Dooyeweerd, 
‘Philosophie et théologie’: 49-50, 55; Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 119-120).  
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 See Chapter One.  
390
 See 4.1.1 and 4.2.1. 
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4.1 Vollenhoven: the Trinitarian Covenant with Humanity 
 
So, in examining Vollenhoven’s account of the religious orientation of a Christian 
philosophy, I shall consider, first, the unfolding of the great narrative of the triune work 
in the world and second, what that means to human beings at the centre of their life and 
consciousness. 
 
4.1.1 The Trinitarian Grounding of the Law – the ‘States of Affairs’ 
 
Vollenhoven grounds his philosophical thought in explicitly trinitarian terms. I shall 
look at how he portrays the work of the three Persons in the unfolding of the great 
narrative of God’s dealings with the world in general and, more specifically, humanity. 
As a trained theologian, Vollenhoven is far less reticent than Dooyeweerd, a legal 
scholar,
392
 about expressing himself in explicitly theological ways – although, as we 
shall see, some of the positions he takes are not without difficulties. 
 
The characterization of the roles of the three Persons was affected by the shift, noted 
earlier, from an intra-mental to a cosmic focus.
393
 Early on, Vollenhoven sees the work 
of the Father as the initiator of ‘ideas’ within the structure of thought, with the Son as 
Logos underlying how these ‘ideas’ are assimilated in the process of human knowing, 
and the Spirit applying them in concrete situations.
394
 In his later thinking, the focus 
shifts from the work of the three Persons in the intra-mental process, to the work of God 
in the world as a whole. He speaks of God ‘Creating, Word-revealing and Spirit-
guiding’ (‘Schepping, Logosopenbaring en Geesteleiding’), and he links these concepts 
to the work of the three Persons of the Trinity respectively.
395
 Later, he calls these three 
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 See introduction to this chapter and 4.2. 
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 See 2.1. 
394
 At this stage in the thinking of Vollenhoven, an ‘idea’ is characterised as what Tol describes as a 
‘extra-mental archetype’ or ‘thing-law’ of a given object (Tol, Philosophy: 112; see also pp. 180-211).  
395
 Vollenhoven, Isagôgè Philosophiae (30d) /Vollenhoven, Isagôgè Philosophiae (31f) : §§73-75; 
Vollenhoven, Isagôgè Philosophiae (32) /Vollenhoven, Isagôgè Philosophiae (39h): §§75-78; see Albert 
M. Wolters, ‘Vollenhoven on the “Word of God” ’, Anakainosis (1979): 5, 9 (n. 1). In the Isagôgè of 
1930, Vollenhoven refers explicitly to the Heidelberg Catechism, Answer 25 regarding the Scriptural 
affirmation ‘that these three [P]ersons are the only, true (and eternal) God’ (Vollenhoven, Isagôgè 
Philosophiae (30d): §73 (‘dat deze drie [P]ersonen de enige, waarachtige (en eeuwige) God zijn’); see 




successive stages, ‘[S]tates of [A]ffairs’.396  States of Affairs are the stages in which 
God’s Law is expressed in the created order. Each of these States of Affairs is linked to 
the work of one of the three Persons of the Trinity. This takes the form of a three-stage 
unfolding of the Law by each of the Persons in turn: 
 
First we see the act of creation by the Father: this is God’s secret will, or creation 
command.
397
 The Father takes the leading role in the act of creation. Within that act the 
Father is the Archè of all things and the giver of the initial ‘creation command’ 
(‘scheppingsbevel’) according to which the created order comes into being.398 Once the 
primordial act of creation has been carried out, the diversity of all creatures unfolds 
through the address of God.
399
 The Father names each individual uniquely, so 
constituting the ‘idea’ or ‘structure’ that gives each created thing its unique identity.400  
 
Second, there is the giving of the love command by the Son applicable to humanity in 
general: the work of the Son is to provide the revelation of God’s Law by whose light 
humanity can uncover the structures of creation, including the norms and laws which 
govern human life. This work is focused on revelation and redemption, in his offices as 
Logos and Christ respectively (the two offices are intertwined but distinct). In his 
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 This is a special sense of ‘[S]tates of [A]ffairs’ which I shall capitalise accordingly. Vollenhoven, 
‘Historia Philosophiae (II - I) (41d)’: 11; Vollenhoven, ‘Levens-eenheid (55ms)’: 122-133; Vollenhoven, 
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Philosophiae (31f) §73B = Vollenhoven, Isagôgè Philosophiae (32): §75B ; Vollenhoven, Gastcolleges: 
30; Wolters, ‘Vollenhoven on the “Word of God” ’: 6  (see Kuyper, E Voto Dordraceno: 183-209, 
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Tol, Philosophy: 181-183. 
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 Vollenhoven, Isagôgè Philosophiae (31f): §74A  = Vollenhoven, Isagôgè Philosophiae (32): §76A ; 
Wolters, ‘Vollenhoven on the “Word of God” ’: 6. Wolters points out that here Vollenhoven is following 
the traditional reformed distinction between creatio prima and creatio secunda such as in found in the 
writings of Vollenhoven’s theological teacher, Herman Bavinck (Wolters, ‘Vollenhoven on the “Word of 
God” ’: 9 (n. 2); for Bavinck see 6.1). For God’s speaking, Vollenhoven uses the term ‘Logos-
revelation’(‘Logos-openbaring’) not in the specific sense of the second Person of the Trinity, but in the 
joint speaking of all the Persons (see Vollenhoven, ‘Historia Philosophiae (II - I) (41d)’: 5-6; see also 
Vollenhoven, ‘Levens-eenheid (55ms)’: 124).  
400
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‘Short Survey (56b)’: /2, p. 30; Vollenhoven, ‘Getuigen (59d)’: 138, 140; Vollenhoven, ‘De consequent 
probleemhistorische methode’: 11; K.A. Bril, ed., D. H.Th. Vollenhoven. The Problem-Historical Method 




earliest thinking, Vollenhoven sees the Son, as Logos, providing the basis on which the 
subject and object of knowledge can come into synthesis.
401
 From the 1920s on 
Vollenhoven came to see the Logos as having a cosmic role as the basis for the 
harmony and coherence of all the modalities, rather than an intra-mental role, bringing 
experience and reasoning together.
402
 The Logos is the revelation of the eternally 
begotten Son in the creative act while, at the same time, the representative expression of 
the common creative work of all three Persons.
403
 It is the Son then, as ‘the Christ’ (‘the 
anointed one’), who calls humanity through grace back to the Father.404 As the Christ, 
he replaces the old office-bearer, Adam, and bears the consequences of the judgement 
incurred by Adam’s failure. He does so both as the eternal Son and as a human being. 
Only as God can he reverse the consequences of the failure of Adam as the first office-
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 Here he shifts his view from that which he set out in his doctoral thesis to that which he held from the 
1920s on. In his earliest thinking, the Logos is that which brings norms together with judgement. In this 
sense, the Logos mediates epistemically between the norms called into being by Father, and the 
judgements made through the influence and work of the Holy Spirit (Kok, Vollenhoven: 24; Tol. 
Philosophy: 180-126). Looked at another way, the Logos is the one who norms the working over of 
experience (empirie) by systematic reflection (ratio). This connection should not be seen as a question of 
the Logos setting one’s thinking and the order of the world in parallel (which he sees as naïve realism). 
On the other hand, the Logos should not be seen as an unknown third to which ratio and empirie stand in 
one-to-one relation. Rather the Logos has a regulative role in that it provides the framework which makes 
both empirie and ratio possible (Vollenhoven, W.W.Th.S. (18a): 409-410; cited in Kok, Vollenhoven: 24, 
314-315; and Tol, Philosophy: 185-201). This is not a claim that the Logos provides the content of 
thought (which for Vollenhoven would be too close to the ‘scholastic’ notion of ‘thinking God’s thoughts 
after him’). Vollenhoven rejects ‘logos speculation’, the view that postulates a special connection 
between human thought and the divine Logos (Vollenhoven, De noodzakelijkheid eener christelijke 
logica (32b): 1-2; Vollenhoven, ‘Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)’: §15, p. 70 (Hoofdlijnen: 27); see Tol, 
Philosophy: 197-201, 299 (n. 125)). Vollenhoven’s point seems to be that while sober exegesis does 
identify the Logos in the N.T. with the Word of the Lord in the O.T., to single out a special link between 
this and one’s rational faculty (or analytical function) is to absolutise the latter at the expense of all the 
other faculties and aspects of one’s life. It is wrong to link the Logos purely with the logical. For him it is 
the divine Logos who creates both the created logos (i.e., that which is of a logical nature), and the a-
logical (Vollenhoven, ‘Enkele grondlijnen der kentheorie (26b)’: 388 (‘alogische’)). It important to note 
that ‘non-logical’ is not illogical, only subject-matter to which the distinction logical/illogical does not 
apply as an appropriate designation. 
 
402
 It combines both those elements of a logical, i.e., specific to the logical or analytical modality, and 
non-logical character, i.e., those of other modalities (Vollenhoven, ‘Enkele grondlijnen der kentheorie 
(26b)’: 388-399). 
403
 Vollenhoven argues that the names ‘Son’ and ‘Logos’ need to be distinguished. The first refers to the 
second Person of the Trinity as eternally-begotten, the second to the name of the Son in joint participant 
with the Father and the Holy Spirit in the creative act (Vollenhoven, ‘ “De logos” (38n)’, C.V.C.W. 3 
(1938): 39-41; Vollenhoven, Isagôgè Philosophiae (30d); Vollenhoven, Isagôgè Philosophiae (32): 74-
76; Vollenhoven, Introduction: §§ 117, 136, pp. 78-102). However, he is not consistent in this regard.  
404
 ‘Levens-eenheid’, pp. 124-5; Tol, ‘Time and Change’, p. 102. Strictly-speaking the term ‘Christ’ 
should be ‘the Christ’ (the anglicised Greek rendering of its Hebrew equivalent, ‘the Messiah’ both 
meaning ‘the anointed one’) the office assumed by the eternal Son in the act of redemption. In general, 
apart from where this needs to emphasised, I shall use the more generally used term ‘Christ’ without the 





bearer, and yet it needs to be as fully human that he does so.
405
 The human nature the 
Son assumes is not an abstraction: Jesus of Nazareth is a genuine human individual. 
Vollenhoven argues that the incarnation needs to be understood in terms of the 
‘enhypostatic’ identity of the Son as an individual human being – not in terms of  his 
assumption of an ‘anhypostatic’ (‘impersonal’), pre-given or general human nature.406 It 
is only through this enyhypostatic human being, Jesus of Nazareth as the new office-
bearer, head of the angels as well as the earth, that redemption is possible in that it is 
only through him, as its new federal (i.e., covenantal) head, that humanity truly finds its 
unity with God.
 407
 The incarnate Son is not only the bringer of redemption but also 
reveals the law of love, the characteristic of redeemed humanity.
408
 This has 
implications for the laws or norms appropriate to each modality, including the modality 
of faith.
409
 The Son who is the Logos, the basis of the created order, is present in the 
church as the Christ, the basis for the words and sacraments that shape the church’s 
faith.
410
 Thus, Vollenhoven sees the incarnation of the Son not only as making possible 
the salvation of ‘souls’ or separate individuals,411 but also as the revelation of God’s 




Third, the Holy Spirit puts the decree of the Father as revealed by the Son into effect.
413
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 Introduction, §124, pp. 85-88. 
406
 Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 129-133, and (n. 188); Vollenhoven, ‘Hypostasis-Anhypostasis, vooral bij 
de gnostiek (37n)’, C.V.C.W. 2 (1937): 8-13; Vollenhoven, ‘Anhypostatos? (40a)’: 75-76; Vollenhoven, 
‘De visie op den Middelaar bij Kuyper en bij ons (1952k)’: //6-9, pp. 3-92; Vollenhoven, ‘De visie op den 
Middelaar bij Kuyper en bij ons [2]’: 3- 4; Vollenhoven, Introduction: §124, p. 187; see Sytse U. 
Zuidema, ‘Het verschil in soteriologische waarde, toegekend aan den term “onpersoonlijke menschelijke 
natuur” in de concepties van Kuyper ( – Hepp) and Bavinck ( – Greydanus)’, C.V.D.V. (1938); 
Berkouwer, The Person of Christ: 313-320. Abraham Kuyper had said that Jesus Christ was not an 
individual (Kuyper, Dictaten dogmatiek: 3, ‘Locus de Christo (Pars Primo)’, p. 37). Valentijn Hepp 
argues that the human nature of Christ cannot be distinguished by any specific characteristics (Hepp, 
Dreigende deformatie: 3.49). 
407
 Introduction §140, pp. 105-6; Bril and Boonstra, ed., S. Kaarten: 278-280.  
408
 Mt. 22: 34-40; Vollenhoven, ‘Levens-eenheid (55ms)’: 124-126; Vollenhoven, ‘De consequent 
probleemhistorische methode’: 11-12; Bril, ed., Problem-Historical Method and the History of 
Philosophy: 105-106 and note p. 142. 
409
 Vollenhoven, ‘Getuigen (59d)’: 138. In the first instance, this is worked out with respect to the 
súbject-pole in the post logical-modalities, but there is the wider norm of flourishing which works out in 
all the modalities (see Chapter Four).  
410
 Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a); Vollenhoven, Introduction: §136, pp.101-102.  
411
 See 2.1.2 
412
 Vollenhoven, ‘Plato’s realisme (slotgedeelte)’: 159. 
413
 Vollenhoven, ‘Short Survey (56b)’: /2, p. 30. In his early thinking, he sees this as taking place intra-




This is God’s effective will that realises the creative potential in specific situations:414 In 
creation, the Holy Spirit first broods over the waters, leading to the unfolding of the still 
concealed diversity of the initial creation. Then, and in conjunction with the effecting of 
creation, he brings the revelation of the Logos to human consciousness, believers and 
unbelievers alike. This ‘double work’ (‘dubbele werkzaamheid’) is the ‘genetic 
deployment’ (‘genetische ontplooing’) of the Holy Spirit 415 Alongside this ‘double 
work’ of the Holy Spirit in supporting and carrying through the work of the Father and 
the Son, there is the distinctive work of ‘positivisation’: the application and 
particularisation of God’s Law in specific situations.416 The work of the Holy Spirit 
causes human life to flourish – including the process of biological reproduction and the 
development of culture and civilisation.
417
 For Vollenhoven, the eschatological hope is 
not a move to a supra-temporal realm, as we shall see is the case for Dooyeweerd.
418
 For 
him, rather, the eschaton is unfolded in time and does not involve a transcendence of 
time. He sees a temporal continuity between the present reality and the transformed 
heavens and earth achieved by a combination of the direct action of God in the 
historical process, through the resurrection of Jesus, and humanity’s participation in that 




So we see the sequential character of Vollenhoven’s account: the work of the Father is 
succeeded by that of the Son, and that in turn by the work of the Holy Spirit.
420
 He sees 
the work of the Persons as a successive unfolding, with first the Father as creator, then 
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 Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen rondom de tijd (63b)’: 171-172; Vollenhoven, ‘Conservatisme en 
progressiviteit in de wijsbegeerte (59a)’: /42, p. 311; Tol, ‘Time’: 103; Vollenhoven, ‘Levens-eenheid 
(55ms)’: 122-132; see also Vollenhoven, ‘Historia Philosophiae (II - I) (41d)’: 11. 
415
 Vollenhoven, ‘[Press release; lecture]: “Bergson” (21d)’, De School met den Bijbel 28 (1921); 
Vollenhoven, ‘Iets over het stelsel van Bergson’, Zeeuwsche Kerkbode 33 (1919): 15 (I am grateful to Dr 
John Kok for providing me with his transcription of this manuscript); Tol, Philosophy: 184-185. In the 
versions of the Isagôgè between 1932 and 1939, there is a section entitled, ‘The leading of the Spirit and 
the result of this activity’ (Vollenhoven, Isagôgè Philosophiae (32): §78 ‘Het leiding van de Geest en het 
resultaat van deze activiteit’).  
416
 Vollenhoven, ‘Levens-eenheid (55ms)’: 127-128. Vollenhoven calls these three stages in the unfolding 
of the law as ‘states of affairs’. See also Vollenhoven, ‘De consequent probleemhistorische methode’: 11; 
Bril, ed., Problem-Historical Method and the History of Philosophy.: 106. 
417
 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §121, p. 82 (Vollenhoven refers to Pss. 127 and 128, and also to Dt. 7.13); 
Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd (68b)’: 207-209. 
418
 See 4.1.2. 
419
 Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 6 (Vollenhoven quotes 1 Tim. 3.16, Rom. 6.9 and 1 Cor. 15.33-34).  
420
 Here he closely follows Kuyper, E Voto Dordraceno: 1.193-194, although, as Anthony Tol points out, 
there important differences of emphasis, in that Kuyper tends to see God’s activity as inherent in nature 




the Son as revealer and redeemer, and, finally, the Spirit as the agent of change and the 
realisation of new possibilities. This sequence is not a straightforward identification of 
the Father, Son and Holy Spirit – in each act led by one of the Persons the other two 
Persons have subordinate roles. However, while it is not straightforwardly sequential, it 
is sequential nevertheless, in that the identification of each of the Persons takes place 
primarily, albeit complexly, in the unfolding economy of creation, redemption and 
‘positivisation’. 
 
The way that Vollenhoven presents the work of the three Persons in sequence – albeit a 
complex sequence – raises the question about how the Persons can act jointly without 
losing their distinctions from one another. This is a matter I shall return to in Chapter 
Six.
421
 But, for the moment, it is clear that Vollenhoven sees God’s engagement with 
the world in trinitarian terms. It is thus, in trinitarian terms, that we must consider God’s 
Law and humanity’s religious, (i.e., basic covenantal) response. 
 
4.1.2 The Law of God and the ‘Heart’ 
 
For Vollenhoven, God’s complexly sequential threefold action in the world, which 
constitutes his Law, calls for appropriate reception by humanity. He describes the Law 
as the ‘boundary’ between God and the cosmos. This was a theme for the duration of his 
professorship from his inaugural lecture in 1926 to his valedictory lecture in 1963.
422
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 As will be argued in 6.2 Introduction, Vollenhoven’s identification each of the Persons with successive 
manifestations the work of God is in danger of portraying the Trinity in modalistic terms, where the 
Persons are understood as different expressions of an underlying divine essence. Although the sequence is 
complex in this way, it remains true for Vollenhoven that the engagement of the Persons is sequential 
(Vollenhoven, ‘Levens-eenheid (55ms)’: 122-128). It is noteworthy that Vollenhoven argues that the 
early church considered the Sabellian heresy less dangerous than the Arian one, since the Sabellians at 
least considered the Logos to be divine, whereas the Arians did not (Vollenhoven, ‘Norm en natuurwet 
(51h)’: /5, p. 61). 
422
 Vollenhoven, Logos en ratio: 26, 32; Vollenhoven, ‘Philosophia systematica I (26msA)’: §§1, 37; 
Vollenhoven, ‘Significance, 1 (31g1)’: 392-393; Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 24-25; Vollenhoven, ‘De 
waarheid in de Godsdienst-wijsbegeerte’: 121; Vollenhoven, ‘Historia Philosophiae (II - I) (41d)’ : 
passim; Vollenhoven, Introduction: §13, pp. 15-16; Vollenhoven, ‘Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)’: 82-83 
(Hoofdlijnen: 24-25); Vollenhoven, ‘Divergentierapport I (53)’: 113-114; Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 
79; Vollenhoven, ‘Kort overzicht (65b)’: 2; Vollenhoven, ‘Getuigen (59d)’: 138-139; Vollenhoven, 
‘Plato’s realisme (slotgedeelte)’: 156; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen rondom de tijd (63b)’: 172-173, 184; 
Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen van de tijd (68b)’: 200; Tol, ‘Time’: 101; Tol, Philosophy: 397-422. Tol points 
out that it was Dooyeweerd who used the term ‘law as boundary’ in published work (Dooyeweerd, 




Here I shall argue that this should not be understood either in ontic or noetic terms, but 
rather as ‘religious’ – to use both his and Dooyeweerd’s terminology. 
 
First then, the Law might be seen in noetic terms, providing some sort of supra-modal 
knowledge. The principal instrument which Vollenhoven offers in this regard is the 
principle of the exclusion of antinomies (the ‘principium exclusae antinomiae’), 
according to which the diversity of the law-spheres can be discerned and delineated 
according to a supramodal ‘metalogic’. If one modality can entirely be explained in 
terms of another, it raises the question of the explanatory basis for that other modality; 
for example, if morality can entirely be explained by psychological principles, it leaves 
the question of how psychological principles can be explained. This process leads to an 
infinite regress with each level of explanation requiring a higher, meta-level, and so on. 
And further, the force of such principles specific to a certain modality cannot 
themselves be derived from those principles; for example, psychological principles 
cannot appeal merely to other psychological principles for their basis and justification. 
According to such a procedure, different forms of discourse are shown to be modally 
distinct, each irreducible to one another, but all subject to a higher, supra-modal Law, 
because of the antinomies that would otherwise arise.
423
 However, privileging the 
logical principle of the exclusion of antinomies elevates the analytical modality (in 
which the logical principle of non-contradiction is located) over all the others in a 
reductionistic
424
 and rationalistic way.
425
 Moreover, such a noetic, God’s eye view, 
rendering of Vollenhoven’s account of the Law gives rise to the objection that if the 
Law is supramodal or metalogical, how can it be known, and what meaningful role can 
it play in human life? It seems to posit some special knowledge (i.e., knowledge not 
subject to the laws and norms of number, space etc.), to which humanity can somehow 
have access. This raises the question about how the Law can be spoken of at all. We can 
only know the Law in terms of the different laws and norms appropriate to each of the 
modalities, and it is not clear at all how any kind of supra-modal knowledge of the Law 
                                                 
423
 Vollenhoven, ‘Philosophia systematica I (26msA)’;  Vollenhoven, ‘Significance, 1 (31g1)’: 396; 
Vollenhoven, ‘Philosophia systematica II (27ms)’: §§19, 64; Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 29; 
Vollenhoven, ‘Hoofdlijnen der logica (48f)’: §2B, pp. 61-62(Hoofdlijnen: 16); Tol, Philosophy: 400-405. 
424
 See Chapter Three introduction.  
425
 Whether ‘rationalism’ is read as the overemphasis on the analytical modality, or on laws at the expense 








Second, Vollenhoven’s conception of the Law might be read in ontic terms.427 The 
problem is that to describe the Law in these terms, where the Law is seen as ‘above’ the 
world, makes the Law an intermediary between God and the world. Such a rendering of 
Vollenhoven’s position compromises the directness of God’s engagement with the 
world.
428
 It displaces the role of the Son as mediator of creation, and the role of the 
Holy Spirit as the direct agent of God’s involvement in the day to day unfolding of his 
purposes. Moreover, the Law then becomes a ‘third thing’, neither sovereign nor 
subjèct, neither finite nor infinite – and, indeed, neither creator nor created.429 Up until 
1932, Vollenhoven himself seems to suggest that the God’s sovereignty in willing the 
Law gives the latter an ontic status, and speaks indirectly of God’s relation to the 
cosmos as ‘firm ground’ (‘vaste grond’) or ‘substance’ (‘substantie’).430 But this was 
omitted from his syllabus of 1932, possibly because it could be seen as what he called 
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 This tendency is what Strauss calls Vollenhoven’s ‘quasi-monism’, concentrated as it is on the validity 
of the law, and creation’s subjection to it (Strauss, P. D. D: 204-205; 448-449).  
427
 Vollenhoven, Logos en ratio; beider verhouding in de geschiedenis der westersche kentheorie (26a): 
31. 
428
 J. Glenn Friesen holds Vollenhoven to be claiming that God and the Law are somehow ‘outside’ the 
cosmos (Friesen, ‘Dooyeweerd versus Vollenhoven’: 110; see reply by Tol, Philosophy: 407 (n. 446)). 
However, Vollenhoven is careful to point out that that he is not claiming that God is outside the cosmos – 
if indeed it is possible to speak of God and the world in that way at all – only that all things are subject to 
God (Vollenhoven, ‘Significance, 1 (31g1)’: 392; Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 24-25).  
429
 Michael Morbey has argued that this is the situation with Vollenhoven or those influenced by 
Vollenhoven in this respect (Michael M. Morbey, ‘Vollenhoven, Dooyeweerd and Law – A Rejoinder’, 
Anakainosis 4 (1981): 8-9). Nicholas Wolterstorff argues an analogous position with respect to uncreated 
universals, for which he is critiqued by Hendrik Hart (Nicholas Wolterstorff, On Universals (1970); 
Hendrik Hart, ‘On the Distinction between Creator and Creature: Discussion of a Central Theme in N. 
Wolterstorff’s On Universals’, P.R. 44 (1979)).  
430
 Vollenhoven, ‘Isagôgè Philosophiae Textkritische uitgave’: §§151-152 (1932), pp. 1369-1371; 
Vollenhoven, Isagôgè Philosophiae (32); Tol, Philosophy: 400 (n. 433). The relevant sections (§§151-
152) were among those omitted (from §147 on) from the Isagôgè of September 1932 (Vollenhoven, 
Isagôgè Philosophiae (32) ), and the parallel sections in C. R. W. (Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 49-67).  
431
 See Vollenhoven, ‘The Significance of Calvinism for the Reformation of Philosophy, 2 & 3 (31g2)’, 
The Evangelical Quarterly 4 (1932): 129-160, 398-427; Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 73-199). After 1932 
Vollenhoven quietly drops any description of the Law in terms of substance or firm ground, and thus 
implicitly ceases to accord the Law what might be regarded as a distinctive ontic status. The decisive turn 
in this regard is his deliberate omission of §§151 (latter section), 152 and 153 (beginning) from what he 
called ‘The provisional negative result’ (‘Het voorlopige negatieve resultaat’). The latter comprised 
§§147-164 excised from his Isagôgè of 1932 and replaced by Part 1, Ch. 3 in the C. R. W. (Vollenhoven, 
‘Isagôgè Philosophiae Textkritische uitgave’: 370-371; Vollenhoven, Isagôgè Philosophiae (32): 90 
(published September 1932, which refers readers to C.R.W.); Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 49-67; Tol, 





These two renderings thus cannot provide a satisfactory account of the place or nature 
of the Law and each gives rise to intractable theological and philosophical difficulties. 
However, a third rendering, distinct from both of these (although sometimes seemingly 
held in tandem with them), is possible. Rather than seeing the Law either as a 
supramodal form of knowledge (according to the noetic reading above) or as a supra-
temporal entity (according to the ontic reading), the Law needs to be seen in religious 
terms. ‘Religion’ for Vollenhoven in the orientation of the whole person towards God –  
 this is what both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, following Kuyper, called the ‘heart’ in 
biblical terms.
432
 The heart can be God-directed or apostate,
433
 according to what 
Vollenhoven calls ‘[D]irection’.434 Vollenhoven sees Direction not as a feature of the 
created order itself,
435
 but rather, in the first instance, as humanity’s integral response to 
God’s sovereignty; more broadly, it is the relation of the created order as a whole 
towards, or away from, God. The Direction of the heart is expressed in terms of a 
worldview.
436
 The Christian worldview is an expression, in broad outline, of Christian 
religion. 
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 See 2.2. 
433
 Tol states that from 1939, Vollenhoven tends to drop the terminology of ‘biblical dualism’ of God and 
the world and emphasises instead God’s engagement with the world, impinging in and through the 
constitution of the world, summoning the appropriate human response in the choice between good and 
evil (Tol, ‘Foreword’: xxiii; see Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 40; Vollenhoven, ‘Historia Philosophiae (II - 
I) (41d)’: 4; Vollenhoven, ‘De waarheid in de godsdienst-wijsbegeerte (42l)’, Vox Theologica 13 (1942): 
114; Vollenhoven, ‘Het geloof (50d)’; see also Kok, ‘Vollenhoven and “Scriptural Philosophy” ’: 107, 
110; and John H. Kok, ‘Vollenhoven and Thinking in the Light of Scripture’, Pro Rege 21 (1992): 12).  
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 As mentioned in the last chapter (3.1 introduction), I shall spell distinguish between ‘Direction’, i.e., 
the basic religious orientation of human being, which I shall spell with a capital ‘D’; and ‘direction’ with 
‘d’ in lower-case which, as we have seen (3.1.2) is a component of an ‘interrelation’ between or among 
two or more individuals (Vollenhoven, Isagôgè Philosophiae (32): §94***; Vollenhoven, Introduction: 
§§85-91, 139, pp. 56-61, 104-105; see Tol, ‘Time’: 107). Tol calls Direction a ‘holistic determination of a 
religious nature, affecting a human being’s concrete redemptive living’ (Tol, ‘Foreword’: xxix). 
Vollenhoven seems to have initially taken his notion of ‘[D]irection’ from Driesch’s notion of entelechy, 
although relating it to the ultimate relationship with God and although he is critical of the teleogical 
(Aristotelian) character of Driesch’s conception. This was expressed in a lecture of 1929 published in 
1930 (Vollenhoven, De Eerste vragen der psychologie. (30b) (1930): 20). In the 1931 Isagôgè, 
Vollenhoven says (§77) that this guidance (i.e., of the Holy Spirit) is not something of the creature. The 
determination of Direction is something other than the continuing in existence (‘bestaansverloop’) of that 
which is led. The following year he writes of the sharp opposition between good and evil which both 
resort under the ‘[D]irection of human life’ Isagôgè (1932-1939): §63 = Vollenhoven, Introduction: §92. 
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 I.e., is not about the component make-up (‘Structure’; see 3.1 footnote).  
436
 Vollenhoven speaks in terms of a ‘world and life view’ (Vollenhoven, W. Woordenboek: 78; 
Vollenhoven, ‘Kort overzicht (65b)’: 1; Wolters, ‘On the Idea of Worldview and its Relation to 




Christian religion is a response to God’s revelation of himself in Scripture in and 
through the person of Jesus Christ.
437
 Here the ‘faith’ function has a leading role.438 
Faith refers back to the other modalities and they in turn antecipate faith as its 
respective substrata.
439
 But even though faith (as we have seen, the ‘highest’ of the 
modalities for Vollenhoven) has a leading role with respect to the other modalities, the 
integrity and distinctiveness of each of the latter should be respected, and the faith 
modality opens up the other modalities analogically rather than prescriptively.
 440
 
Moreover, a formal statement of faith, however correct, is not sufficient. As with 
Kuyper and Dooyeweerd,
441
 Vollenhoven sees the process of regeneration 
(palingenesis) as the crucial one. It involves a turning around of the heart – it is effected 
directly by the Word of God as an effectual call (‘vocatio efficax’). Regeneration, or 
palingenesis, has the effect of redirecting the faith (‘pistical’) function to the Word of 
God as expressed in the preached Word, the prediction of Christ’s coming and the two-
edged covenantal promise of grace and judgement.
442 
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 Vollenhoven, Logos en ratio: 26, 32; Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 47; Vollenhoven, ‘Hoofdlijnen der 
logica (48f)’: 82-83; Vollenhoven, ‘Historia Philosophiae (II - I) (41d)’: passim; Vollenhoven, 
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 Faith (as governed by the norms appropriate to the ‘pistic’ or certitudinal modality) is not to be 
confused with underlying religious belief and involves the formulation of concepts which express 
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or other kind of certainty or conviction without any pejorative – or indeed approving, connotation). 
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provide us with a ready-made theological system (Vollenhoven, C.R.W. (33a): 39-40; Vollenhoven, ‘Het 
biblicisme, speciaal van Bengel en Oettinger (36c)’, C.V.C.W. 1 (1936): 12; Vollenhoven, Introduction: 
§§11-15, 125-136, pp. 112-113, 188-198; Vollenhoven, ‘Het geloof (50d)’;  Vollenhoven, ‘Historia 
Philosophiae (II - I) (41d)’: 4; Vollenhoven, ‘Schriftgebruik en wijsbegeerte (53l)’ (1992); Vollenhoven, 
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Dooyeweerd quotes an extract from Vollenhoven’s article in Calvin Forum, 2, 7 (Feb. 1937), 148-149; 
see also Kok, ‘Vollenhoven and “Scriptural Philosophy” ’: 110-111 and Kok, ‘Vollenhoven and Thinking 
in the Light of Scripture’: 14).  
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 Vollenhoven, ‘Vollenhoven’s Laatste Werk’ (1973): 121. Vollenhoven affirms that the faith function 
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of Scripture’: 12-14).  
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other modalities. See the list of the modalities in Chapter Three introduction.  
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 See Chapter One introduction, 2.2 and 4.2.2. 
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This covenantal or religious commitment shapes one’s worldview, and provides the 
framework and context for one’s whole experience.443 Vollenhoven speaks of the 
covenantal relationship (‘unio foederalis’) between humanity and God.444 This 
covenantal relationship concerns the submission of the human creature to God as 
sovereign Creator and Lawgiver.
445
 Each human individual has a lifeline (‘levenslijn’) 
through time that he or she follows coram Deo, conversant with God’s Word and 
guided by the Holy Spirit.
446
 As we shall see, this sequential picture of the human 
response contrasts somewhat with that of Dooyeweerd.
447
 However, before turning to 
Dooyeweerd’s account, I shall briefly sum up Vollenhoven’s position. 
 
4.1.3 The Sequential Character of Vollenhoven’s Account 
 
We have seen how Vollenhoven portrays the triune work of God in the world as 
unfolding successively in three ‘States of Affairs’: first, the Father’s secret decrees; 
second, the Son’s revelation of those decrees; and, third, the Holy Spirit’s application of 
those decrees not only in turning the hearts of believers towards the Father, but also in 
working this out in every function of creaturely existence. Bringing this together with 
the discussion in this section, we see that this triune action needs to be received 
appropriately in human consciousness in ‘religious’ terms, and responded to in every 
area of life. We need, then, to read Vollenhoven in such a way as to see the Law not as a 
special kind of supra-modal knowledge, nor as an entity between God and creation, but 
as God’s covenantal relationship with us in the work of the three Persons. The Law (the 
triune action) appropriately elicits the response of the heart, its Direction, which is then 
expressed in the integrality of everyday experience as well as its ‘scientific’ expression 
as modally-specific analysis. 
                                                                                                                                               
the faith function is not a sufficient response to God’s covenantal call, nor yet an adequate expression of a 
covenantal relationship with God. 
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His account takes a complexly sequential form: through his identification of the three 
Persons in turn with each of the great acts of creation, redemption and transformation he 
sees the work of each of the Persons as successive and cumulative, rather than their 
acting together as Persons-in-relation. This reflects his emphasis of time as process, 
rather than order, and especially his notion of ‘lifelines’: individuals over time. I shall 
return to examine their full systematic implications of this in the final chapter. 
 
Meanwhile, I now turn to the ways in which Dooyeweerd’s account is similar to, or 
differs from, that of Vollenhoven. We shall see to what extent they reflect the vision of 
Kuyper, as set out in Chapter One, and how that vision affects their general 
philosophical systematics. As we shall find, this is a question about which there is great 
contention – not least to do with Dooyeweerd’s notion of the ‘supra-temporal heart’.  
 
 
4.2 Dooyeweerd: the Christian Ground-motive and the ‘Supra-Temporal Heart’ 
 
Prima facie, Dooyeweerd’s account of the religious orientation of a Christian 
philosophy differs sharply from that of Vollenhoven in certain crucial respects, not least 
concerning the question of the ‘supra-temporal heart’. Whilst accepting this, I shall 
argue that despite these divergences, there is an underlying convergence both about the 
centrality of the triune work of God and the need for this to be received, and worked out 
in every area of life by the person as a whole and undivided subjèct. This will make it 
possible to trace ways in which their respective positions are complementary with one 
another. 
 
As I have done with Vollenhoven, so in the case of Dooyeweerd I shall look first at the 
religious basis itself (which Dooyeweerd couches in terms of ‘ground-motives’ – here 
the Christian ground-motive), and then at the human response, focussed on his account 







4.2.1 The Trinitarian Basis of the Christian Religious Ground-motive 
 
As with Vollenhoven, the transcendent orientation of Dooyeweerd’s philosophy arises 
from his vision of God’s work in the world. For Dooyeweerd this involves the 
articulation of what he came to call the Christian religious ‘ground- motive’. For 
Dooyeweerd a religious ground-motive is a basic driver of thought and action. The 
Christian religious ground-motive is contrasted with a number of other ground-motives 
such as the Greek ground-motive of form and matter, the medieval synthesis of nature 
and grace and the Western enlightenment ground-motive of nature and freedom. He 
formulates the Christian ground-motive in its most succinct form as ‘creation, fall, and 
redemption by Jesus Christ in the communion of the Holy Ghost’. Dooyeweerd’s 
formulation of the Christian ground-motive thus has a trinitarian structure, even though 
he does not draw attention to this as Vollenhoven does.
448
 In this section I shall examine 
this trinitarian structure in greater detail to see how adequate it is, in order in later 
chapters to see what the philosophical implications of the adequacy of this structure 
may be. I shall look at how it is unfolded through his account of Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit. 
 
First, with respect to the Father, Dooyeweerd tends to speak of ‘the Origin’ or ‘the 
Archè’, although he also refers to the ‘Father’ by name as well.449 The Father as Origin 
is the source of all meaning – ‘meaning’ for Dooyeweerd comes to be his way of 
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 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.472; Dooyeweerd, N.C: 1.61 (not in W.d.W.), 507; Dooyeweerd, ‘Philosophie 
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articulation of a Christian worldview (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.227-259; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.298-330), 
as does Vollenhoven (see 4.1.2).  
449
 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.268, 297, 469, 495; 3.214, 248, 269; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.61 (not in W.d.W.), 




expressing creaturely dependence upon the Origin.
450
 Humanity is the high point of 
God’s creation, created as ‘image-bearer of his divine Origin’.451 All God’s work of 
creation is concentrated in humanity as the imago Dei – the image of God.452 
Dooyeweerd thus pictures redeemed humanity’s loving dependence on the Father of 




Second, with respect to the Son: just as the Father is the Origin and the Archè of 
creation, so Dooyeweerd sees the Son as its Redeemer. It remains unclear, however, to 
what extent the Son can be seen as co-creator (as in the Kuyperian vision). Unlike 
Kuyper, Dooyeweerd does not clearly articulate the role of the Son as the mediator of 
creation per se, that is, prior to the fall and redemption. He tends to portray Christ’s 
involvement in creation as redemptive and revelatory, as a post facto and subordinate 
one, rather than one exercised jointly from the beginning with the Father.
454
 Through 
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103.13, and Lk. 15).  
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 See 1.2. On occasion, Dooyeweerd does speak of the Son as the ‘creating Word, through which all 
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a wedge in the Christian ground-motive between creation and redemption’ (Dooyeweerd, Roots: 37; 
Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en Bezinning: 37 (‘Want zodra ge de gemene gratie los van de Christus poogt 
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christelijke religie tussen schepping en verlossing . . .’)). Elsewhere, the Son is called the ‘new religious 
root of the temporal cosmos’ (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.471 (‘den tijd transcendeerende religieuze wortel 
der schepping’); Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.506). However, once again, is not clear whether Dooyeweerd 
conceives of Christ in this respect as the mediator of creation (as the wording of the W.d.W. would 
indicate) or as the redeemer of humanity (as the ‘new’ in A New Critique of Theoretical Thought would 
seem to indicate), although the location of both creation and redemption in supra-temporality tends in 
Dooyeweerd to a conflation of these two roles (see D.F.M. Strauss, ‘The Central Religious Community of 
Mankind in the Philosophy of the Cosmonomic Idea’, P.R. 37 (1972): 58-67). On the whole he tends to 
see the Son in purely redemptive terms as distinct from ‘God’ as creator (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.32-33 
(not in N.C. ), 54 (not in N.C.), 64-67, 70-72, 86-87; 2.420-421, 424, 471, 482-484, 491-497, 503-508, 
527; 2.30, 493; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.99-102, 105-106, 123-124; 2.32, 485-486, 489-490, 552-554, 560-
565, 571-575, 593; Dooyeweerd, ‘De wetsbeschouwing in Brunner’: 370, 372; Dooyeweerd, ‘Criteria’: 
227). There is some force to David VanDrunen’s contention that Dooyeweerd grounds common grace not 
(as with Kuyper), in the Son’s mediatorship over creation (see 1.2) but in his role as redeemer (David 
VanDrunen, Natural Law and the Two Kingdoms: A Study in the Development of Reformed Social 
Thought (2010): 360-362; see also Jacob Klapwijk, ‘Antithesis and Common Grace’ (1991): 183). 
However, in warning about the conflation of creation with redemption, VanDrunen falls into the opposite 





Christ we are directed to the true Origin of all things, the Creator of heaven and earth.
455
 
In Christ, the root of life is renewed, not just with respect to the individual human being, 
but also the whole of creation, which Dooyeweerd sees as concentrated in humanity.
456
 
By belonging to Christ, the Christian becomes engaged in a struggle with those 
tendencies which absolutise one or other aspect of the temporal order and which redirect 
it away from God, the Father as Origin.
457
 Following Kuyper, Dooyeweerd suggests that 
through common grace the distortion of sin can be sufficiently corrected not only to 
make everyday life possible, but also to allow for the development of science, culture 
and general prosperity.
458
 The opening-process under the influence of apostate ground-
motives has an ‘inter-modal disharmony’ resulting from the absolutisation of one law-
sphere at the expense of others. He states that the opening-process needs to be guided 
by faith in Christ, in Whom alone is the ‘consummation of meaning’.459 The opening 
process is set against the struggle between the Civitas Dei, that is to say, God’s rule in 
the hearts of redeemed humanity, and the Civitas Terrena, the dominance of apostate 
human tendencies which culminates in the ‘definitive victory’ of Christ’s Kingdom.460 
Thus for Dooyeweerd the Son tends to play an intermediate role: in the first instance 
between the Father as Origin and fallen humanity, and then as head of redeemed 





Third, there is the role of the Holy Spirit. For Dooyeweerd, the Holy Spirit transforms 
the hearts of redeemed humanity it to the pattern of the Son, as they are directed to the 
                                                                                                                                               
Logos with that as the redeeming Christ, and indeed, in the triune work of the transformation of all 
creation.  
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Father in inner rebirth.
462
 As distinct from Kuyper and Vollenhoven, he sees the work of 
the Holy Spirit as an almost entirely interior one, rather than in the cosmos at large, 
although he recognises that the effects of the work of the Holy Spirit, through its effect 
on human action, can have wider significance than merely for the human heart. It is 
through the power of the Holy Spirit and through the dynamic of prayer that the battle 
needs to be waged against the spirit of apostasy in human culture as a whole and in 
modern Western culture in particular. The biblical ground-motive can be embraced and 
worked through in every area of life by building up a community which gives this 
corporate expression.
463
 Nevertheless, because it is largely confined to the hearts of 
redeemed humanity, Dooyeweerd tends to portray the work of the Holy Spirit in the 
world as indirect and posterior to both the work of original creation and that of 
redemption. As the work of Christ is portrayed as subsidiary to that of the Father, so the 
work of the Holy Spirit is portrayed as subsidiary to that of the Son.  
 
So, for Dooyeweerd there is a vision of the unfolding of God’s purposes for humanity, 
descending from the Father as Origin, via the Son as Word or Christ to the hearts of 
redeemed humanity, in communion with the work of the Holy Spirit.  
 
4.2.2 The ‘Supra-Temporal Heart’  
 
For Dooyeweerd, like Vollenhoven, the response to the triune work of God is 
concentrated in the ‘heart’. Like Vollenhoven, he holds the heart to be the centre of 
human existence as seen from a biblical perspective. Unlike Vollenhoven, however, he 
presents an account of the heart in ‘supra-temporal’ terms. This matter is not 
straightforward, and in his overall thinking it is far from clear what he means by it. I 
shall consider three possible renderings of his position. At times he seems to argue for 
each of these three renderings, and indeed at times seems to want to hold them all 
together.
 
I shall show that while he tends to conflate these three renderings, it is possible 
to distinguish them – though not in such a way that one rendering can be hermetically 
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sealed from another. Furthermore, it is impossible to state the question of the nature of 
the ‘heart’ neutrally, since each rendering of the question involves a commitment to one 
or other interpretation of what he means by the ‘heart’ or ‘supra-temporal heart’, and 
implies a judgement on the adequacy of that rendering. What all these renderings of his 
position have in common, however, is that the ‘heart’ is central to humanity’s reception 
of God’s engagement with the world, and the consequent transcendent orientation of 
humanity’s stance vis-à-vis the world.464 
 
The first rendering of Dooyeweerd’s position sees his understanding of the ‘heart’ in 
noetic terms. According to this view, the heart is a ‘supra-theoretical’ (‘boven-
theoretisch’) viewpoint: an ‘Archimedean’ point ‘above’ the diversity of the modalities 
from which the inter-relations between the different modalities (their antecipations and 
retrocipations) can be viewed. He approaches this position with the argument that by its 
nature philosophical thought attempts to grasp the totality of human experience as 
refracted according to the different, mutually irreducible, modalities. But, as we have 
seen,
465
 this cannot be done in terms of any one of the modalities without falling into 
one form of reductive distortion or another. The notion of a knowing subject to which 
all knowledge can be presented is a chimera: such a subject cannot find its own unity 
and is relationally bound with the very subject matter (the Gegenstand) which it seeks 
to grasp.
466
 What is needed, therefore, is an ‘Archimedean point’467 which is not itself 
defined or definable in terms of any of the modalities, but can be found ‘above’ the 
diversity of the modalities from which the inter-relations between the different 
modalities (their antecipations and retrocipations) can be viewed.
468
 From this 
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Archimedean point, the temporal diversity of the created order can be surveyed.
469
 So 
runs Dooyeweerd’s argument. But it runs into serious problems. If the heart is seen as 
rising above modal diversity (for example, the modalities of faith, morality, or law), 
then, at least noetically, it is free of the laws and norms of the modal order.
470
 This 
contravenes Calvin’s dictum: ‘Deus solus legibus solutus est’. 471 In defence of this 
position it might be argued that while the heart is free of the norms and laws appropriate 
to the modalities, it is still subject to the central religious law of love.
472
 But 
Dooyeweerd then creates further difficulties by maintaining that the underlying 
religious beliefs are beyond description and not subject to analysis. For him, the heart, 
and the religious belief located in the heart, are ‘above’ all modally-differentiated 
expression.
473
 But this leaves unanswered the objection that since this law of love, and 
the heart as Archimedean point, cannot be known or expressed, all that remains is an 
inexpressible mystical aspiration. By claiming that this reflects a divine perspective, this 
is at best untestable, and, at worst, in danger of being seen as making quasi-divine 
claims for the human consciousness (albeit the human consciousness redeemed in 
Christ).
 474
 The problems with seeing the ‘heart’ in purely noetic terms leads one to the 
second rendering, that of seeing the heart in terms which are not a matter merely of 
making claims about the possibilities of human knowledge, but about the nature of the 
‘heart’ itself. 
 
The second rendering of Dooyeweerd’s position, then, is the claim that the heart is a 
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supra-temporal entity. Both Peter Steen (critically) and J. Glen Friesen (in advocacy) 
argue that Dooyeweerd conceives of the supra-temporal heart in ontic 
terms.
475
According to this rendering, Dooyeweerd sees humanity as bearing the image 
of God in an intermediary role between God and the rest of the created order.
476
 In order 
to have this intermediary role, the ‘heart’ has somehow to be ‘above’ the temporal 
order, i.e., have a time-transcending status.
477
 Moreover, unlike Vollenhoven, 
Dooyeweerd views the Christian hope, the eschaton, not as something anticipated in the 
future, but as the eternal destiny revealed in the present. It is the intensification, indeed 
the transcending, of temporal experience.
478
 However, his use of the term ‘eternity’ with 
the sense of ‘supra-temporality’ is contestable, as are the claims he makes about the 
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religieus, boventijdelijk’; my translation); Dooyeweerd, Crisis in Humanist Political Theory: 97; 
Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.14, 24, 30-33 (not in N.C.), 46, 55, 57, 60.64, 66, 71, 80,106,132, 407, 415; 2.51, 
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Dooyeweerd, ‘Het tijdsprobleem en zijn antinomieën 2’: 1-5; Dooyeweerd, ‘De leer van de mensch in de 
W.d.W.’ C.V.C.W. 5 (1942): IV and V; Dooyeweerd, The Theory of Man in the Philosophy of the Law-
Idea: Thirty-Two Propositions on Anthropology (1970): IV and V ; Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en 
Bezinning: 34-35; Dooyeweerd, Roots: 35; Dooyeweerd, ‘Der Idee der Individualiteits-structuur 2’: 33 
(‘God’s Oorsprongseenheid, welker beeld zich primair in der geest des mensen uitdrukt’; not in R. & S. 
2)); Dooyeweerd, R. & S 3: Part 2; Dooyeweerd, ‘De taak ener wijsgerige anthropologie en de 
dordlopende vegen to wijsgerige zelfkennis’: 43(‘bovenlichamelijk concentratiepunt’); Dooyeweerd, In 
the Twilight: 42, 188-195; ‘supra-temporal (and the integral) centre of human existence’ (Dooyeweerd, 
Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap ‘Inleiding’ (‘[h]et boventijdelijke (en dus integrale) centrum van 
de menselijke natuur’): 132; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 223; see Fernhout, ‘Man, faith and 
religion’ (73-75; Ouweneel, Leer van de Mens: 261-284, 326-334; Ouweneel, ‘Supratemporality’: 313; 
Blosser, ‘Reconnoitering’: passim; Friesen, ‘Dooyeweerd versus Vollenhoven’: 115-118; M. D. Stafleu, 
‘Some Problems of Time – Some Facts of life’, P.R. 51 (1986): 80-82; Stafleu, ‘Time and History’: 165; 
Steen, Structure: 127-165. However Steen notes that after 1936, Dooyeweerd ‘hardly ever’ refers to the 
religious centre as eternal, and instead uses the term ‘supra-temporal’ (Steen, Structure: 160 
(‘boventijdelijk’)). The term ‘above’ is itself spatial (i.e., a concept qualified by the spatial modality) 
although Dooyeweerd is using it in a concept-transcending-way (Strauss, P.D.D.: 176-182, 199-204, 447-
449). 
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 Dooyeweerd rejects the tendency of those theologians who ‘identify the eschatological aspect of time 
with the historical and reject the supra-temporal sphere of human existence and of divine revelation’ 




‘supra-temporal’ heart on the basis of this interpretation.479 In particular, it can be 
argued that the Hebrew term ‘olam’, the Greek term ‘αἰών’, and the Latin term ‘aevum’ 
should be read not as eternity in the sense of ‘a-temporality’ or ‘supra-temporality’, but 
in the sense of ‘age’.480 There is a danger of falling back into that dualism in which the 
heart occupies a position ‘above’ the diversity of the temporal order.481 In locating the 
heart at a ‘supra-temporal’ remove from human experience, Dooyeweerd presents us 
with a conception of a de-historicised human person, bearing none of the characteristics 
that makes each individual uniquely him or herself.
482
 Most significantly of all, the 
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 ‘God has put eternity [ha olam] in the hearts [of humanity]’(Eccl. 3: 11), and ‘out of the heart are all 
the issues of life’ (Prov. 4: 23) are favourites of Dooyeweerd’s (see Dooyeweerd, W.d.W: 1.80; 
Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.298; Dooyeweerd, ‘Het tijdsprobleem in de W.d.W.’ 181; Dooyeweerd, ‘De leer 
van de mensch in de W.d.W.’ V; Dooyeweerd, Theory of man: V; Dooyeweerd, ‘Schepping en evolutie 
(bespreking van J. Lever, Creatie en evolutie)’: 34, 116-117 (nn. 112-113); Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedie 
van de Rechtswetenschap ‘Inleiding’: 102; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 174). However, 
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“onzichtbare” vorm-substantie met een abstract complex van gevoels- en denkfuncties’); Dooyeweerd, 
Roots: 35).  
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 See J. Guhrt, ‘Time’ in Colin Brown, ed., New International Dictionary of the New Testament: J. 
Guhrt, ‘Time’; also Peter J. Steen, ‘The Problem of Time and Eternity in its Relation to the Nature-Grace 
Ground-motive’ (1979): 136, 142; Peter J. Steen, ‘Review of Okke Jager, Het eeuwige leven, met name in 
verband met de verhouding van tijd en eeuwigheid’ in Westminster Theological Journal (1964): 62-65; 
Klaas J. Popma, Nadenken over de tijd (1965): 246-260, 265-276 (see especially p. 248 where he 
discusses the notion of the ‘supra-temporal heart’ (‘boventijdelijk hart’)). See also F.H. Von Meyenfeldt, 
Het hart (leb, lebab) in het Oude Testament (1950), a thesis at the Vrije Universiteit published in 1950). 
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 Steen indicates that the notion of supra-temporality was rejected by C. A. van Peursen, J. M. Spier, 
Hendrik van Riessen, S. U. Zuidema and K. J. Popma (Steen, Structure: 7, 13, 24, 30, 126, 154). The 
notion of the supra-temporal heart has also been rejected by James Olthuis as dualistic (James Olthuis, 
‘Dooyeweerd on Religion and Faith’ (1985): 21, 33, 34), as also by C. T. McIntire (John Bolt, ‘The 
Legacy of Herman Dooyeweerd’ in Calvin Theological Journal (1986): 88), and Hendrik Hart (Hendrik 
Hart, ‘Problems of Time: An Essay’, P.R. 38 (1973)) and by Hendrik Geertsema on the grounds that it is 
‘anthropocentric’(Geertsema, ‘Dooyeweerd’s Transcendental Critique’: 93, 97; see also Hendrik G. 
Geertsema, ‘Comments on Friesen’s 95 theses on Herman Dooyeweerd’, P.R. 74 (2009); Gerrit Glas, 
‘Ego, Self and the Body. An Assessment of Dooyeweerd’s Philosophical Anthropology’ (1995); Gerrit 
Glas, ‘Is Dooyeweerd a Panentheist? – Comments on Friesen’s “95 Theses on Herman Dooyeweerd” ’, 
P.R. 74 (2009)). Hendrik Hart speaks of a threatening dualism here – or rather a new dualism, since no 
sooner is one dualism (that between those things qualified by the faith modality and the rest) ejected from 
the front door that another (that between the modal and the supra-modal) comes in through the back door 
(Hart, ‘Time’; Fernhout, ‘Man, faith and religion’ (74). As Gerrit Glas points out, further, there is a 
danger of this religious unity being considered as one between centre and periphery (Glas, ‘Ego, Self and 
the Body’: 74-76; see also Steen, Structure: 130-230; and James W. Skillen and Rockne McCarthy, ed., 
Political order and the plural structure of society (1991): 328). 
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 Glas, ‘Ego, Self and the Body’: 75-76. Vollenhoven sees Dooyeweerd as still operating within a 
dualistic anthropological framework in which, as Vollenhoven describes it, the heart is ‘higher’ than the 
‘lower’ mantle of diverse modal functions of which it is the concentration point (Vollenhoven, 
‘Problemen rondom de tijd (63b)’: 184; Vollenhoven, ‘The Consequential Problem-Historical Method’: 
/9, p. 104; Bril and Boonstra, ed., S. Kaarten: 279). Vollenhoven rejects what he takes to be 
Dooyeweerd’s conception of the heart as the ‘supra-temporal concentration point’ (‘Studieconferensie 
1943’: 32-34; Vollenhoven, ‘Divergentierapport I (53)’: 115-117; Vollenhoven, ‘Problemen rondom de 





directness of the relationship of creation as a whole with the Son as Logos, and with the 
primally nurturing Spirit, tends to be obscured in the face of his strong emphasis on the 
supra-temporal heart, even the redeemed human heart as it is found in Christ.
483
 
Humanity is not to be detached from its creational context, otherwise the directness of 
God’s dealings with human being as whole persons, as well as with the rest of creation, 
is attenuated. It is more helpful, therefore, to see the heart not as an entity between God 
and wider creation, but rather as the orientation of humanity, fully located in the 
temporality of the created order, towards God. This is the third rendering to which I 
now turn.  
 
The third rendering of Dooyeweerd’s position is one which he himself enunciates as a 
clarification if not a revision of his previous positions. The heart is not supra-temporal 
knowledge, nor an entity, but rather the orientation of the whole person towards or 
away from God. It is ‘supra-temporal’ not by virtue of special knowledge, or because it 
exists somehow above time. The ‘hearts’ of humanity – that is, each member of 
humanity considered as a whole person – are created to be relationship with God; God 
alone is above all time.
484
 In this sense the heart needs to be seen in religious rather than 
                                                                                                                                               
Bril and Boonstra, ed., S. Kaarten: 278-279; Ouweneel, Leer van de Mens: 346-358; Friesen, 
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 Glas, ‘Ego, Self and the Body’: 75. Lambert Zuidervaart suggests that Dooyeweerd seems to confine 
the possibility of true knowledge to redeemed humanity (Lambert Zuidervaart, ‘After Dooyeweerd: Truth 
in Reformational Philosophy’, 2008, <http://records.icscanada.edu/ir/files/20081007-1.PDF> accessed 25 
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 Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 3.88 (not in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, ‘Schepping en evolutie (bespreking van J. 
Lever, Creatie en evolutie)’: 116. Dooyeweerd describes how the Origin or Archè is encountered and  
how the heart comes to rest in it (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.61, 63 (neither in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, In the 
Twilight: 172  (Dooyeweerd refers to Calvin, Institutes: 1.1.1); Dooyeweerd, ‘Het Oecumenisch-
Reformatorisch Grondmotief van de Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee en de Grondslag der Vrije Universiteit’: 
8). Dooyeweerd’s account here resonates with Augustine’s famous declaration: ‘… Thou madest us for 
Thyself, and our heart is restless, until it repose in Thee’ (Augustine, The Confessions of St Augustine 
(1907): 1.1.1, p. 1;  see Steen, Structure: 60). Strauss argues that Dooyeweerd in 1960 should be read as 
claiming not that it is the central human consciousness which transcends time, only the Direction of that 
consciousness (Dooyeweerd, ‘Van Peursen’s critische vragen bij A New Critique of Theoretical Thought’: 
137; Strauss, P.D.D.: 207-208). Jacob Klapwijk argues for a reconciling formula in the Dooyeweerd-
Vollenhoven controversy in the notion of a ‘ek-centric’ religious anthropology (Klapwijk, ‘Reformational 
Philosophy’: 118-122). Hendrik Geertsema has suggested that the Reformational stance should not be 
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G. Geertsema, ‘Homo Respondens. On the Historical Nature of Human Reason’, P.R. 58 (1993); Hendrik 
G. Geertsema, ‘The Inner Reformation of Philosophy and Science and the Dialogue of Christian Faith 





in noetic or ontic terms.
485
 It is in the heart that humanity receives its basic religious 
orientation or Direction. Direction for Dooyeweerd, as for Vollenhoven, is that which 
underlies the expression of belief in human life and thought, in and through time.
486
 
This can be seen in the way this Direction works out in human life. 
 
There are two ‘main springs’ that operate in human hearts, which orientate the whole 
person religiously. The first is the dynamic of the Holy Spirit re-directing creation, 
through Christ, to the Father as true Origin.
487
 The second is the spirit of apostasy in the 
human heart from the true God. The apostate main spring cannot itself provide anything 
new but only distort creational reality according to the ‘law of sin’: the religious 
misdirection of the human heart towards a pretended rather than the true Origin.
488
 This 
involves the idolising absolutisation of an aspect, or combinations of aspects, of the 
created order.
 
Since for Dooyeweerd, the whole of created reality is refracted through 
the human heart, for him the fall of humanity thus involves the diremption of the 
cosmos as a whole.
489
 These two main springs are located in the ‘central sphere of 
occurrence’ – the unfolding of humanity’s response to God in the struggle between the 
                                                                                                                                               
Thought’ (1995): 24-25). M. D. Stafleu also argues for the recovery of a strand in Dooyeweerd’s thinking 
which sees the reponse to the Origin as occurring within time (Stafleu, ‘Time and History’: 166). 
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 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.13; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.128; Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 137.  
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 Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 45; Dooyeweerd, Vernieuwing en Bezinning: 29; 
Dooyeweerd, Roots: 29). Whether Dooyeweerd moved to hold this third (religious) position and 
abandoned the first two has been contested (Friesen, ‘Why did Dooyeweerd Want to Tear out his Hair?’).  
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 Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedie van de Rechtswetenschap ‘Inleiding’: 21 (n. 22); Dooyeweerd, 
Encyclopedia Introduction: 44 (n. 41).  
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 Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 137. There is a certain ambiguity in Dooyeweerd’s position because he 
also states the fall means that the image of God was ‘wiped out’ (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.6 
(‘uitgewischt’); Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.4. Dooyeweerd refers to John Calvin, Épitre á tous amateurs de 
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which communion with God means. Sin by contrast is characterised by a revolt against the Sovereign 
Archè by absolutising some aspects of the ‘meaning’ (by which Dooyeweerd means creatureliness) to the 
Being of God (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.64-65; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.100; Dooyeweerd, ‘Van Peursen’s 
critische vragen bij A New Critique of Theoretical Thought’: 103; Steen, Structure: 80-81. Steen argues 
that sin for Dooyeweerd involves a loss of meaning, and since meaning is basis of the existence of the 
cosmos for Dooyeweerd (in contrast to the Being of God) this involves a privation of its very existence 
(Dooyeweerd, ‘Van Peursen’s critische vragen bij A New Critique of Theoretical Thought’: 103; Steen, 
Structure: 80-81). See the discussion about ‘Being’ and ‘meaning’ in 2.2 and 5.2.1. 
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 In Der Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee (but not in A New Critique) he states: ‘Our cosmos fell in Adam; all 
the additional creatures in one’s world order were cursed in Adam. According to Scripture!’ 
(Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.65 (‘Onze kosmos viel in Adam: al het in onzen wereldsamenhang gevoegde 
schepsel werd in Adam vervloekt. Naar de Schriften!’); see also Dooyeweerd, ‘Juridisch 
causaliteitsprobleem (A.R.S.)’: 26; Dooyeweerd, ‘De transcendentale critiek van het wijsgerig denken ... 




‘civitas Dei’ and the ‘civitas terrena’, which as Dooyeweerd puts it: ‘takes its issue in 
the history of the world’.490 
 
There is then, for Dooyeweerd, a need for the redemption of human consciousness 
within the temporal process of human experience, as a concentration point which unifies 
the diversity of that experience.
491
 Because it is only in Christ that the true connection 
with the Origin is possible, it is only through ‘religious self-reflection on one’s part with 
Christ’ that one can discern the true and irreducible diversity of the created order, 
refracted into the diverse modalities.
492
 This diversity of meaning relates to the central 
unity of divine law revealed by Christ: to love God and one’s neighbour.493 This is not 
an escape from temporality, but a call to bring about a ‘concrete community of love’ 
through right relationships with one’s neighbour.494 So for the human being to be 
considered in religious terms, he or she cannot be removed from their context, because 
that would make the community necessary for the human being to be considered in 
those religious terms, impossible. But not only is temporality necessary for the 
community which makes religion possible, it is also necessary for human beings 
themselves to be considered as whole persons. This requires an account of human 
character. 
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 Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.32 (Dooyeweerd’s italics), 57 (neither in W.d.W.); Dooyeweerd, In the Twilight: 
172. Accordingly, the Structure (see 3.1 footnote) of creation is itself unaffected by the fall (i.e., no aspect 
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197, 640; see 4.1.2).  
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 Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.175; 2.52-53 (both not in W.d.W.);Fernhout, ‘Man, faith and religion’: 75.  
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 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.421 (‘de religieuze zelfbezinning op ons deelhebben aan Christus’); 
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Dooyeweerd, ‘De leer van de mensch in de W.d.W.’: VI; Dooyeweerd, Theory of man: VI; Fernhout, 
‘Man, faith and religion’: 77. 
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 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.98-100; 3.12; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.60-61 (not in W.d.W.), 506 (in the 
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sided Meaning of Love: Its Significance for Theology’, Ned. Geref. Teologiese Tydskrif 50 (2009).  
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 Dooyeweerd, ‘De wetsbeschouwing in Brunner’: 341-342 (‘concrete liefdegemeenschap’). Here 
Dooyeweerd contrasts this with Brunner’s antithesis of the eternal command of God and the ordinances of 





For Dooyeweerd, human character is the expression of human individuality over time 
through concrete acts. These acts integrally involve the whole gamut of the modalities, 
from quantity through the physical, biotic and sensory modalities to that of faith – this 
bottom up order should not obscure that it is faith which is the leading modality in this 
process.
495
 Dooyeweerd speaks of the ‘genetic process of human life’, where genetic, as 
with Vollenhoven, means the sheer process of becoming. This involves the process of 
the actualization of ‘potentialities already present in the structural principle of human 
bodily existence’.496 In order to account for this ‘structural principle of human 
existence’, we need to draw on the notion of ‘enkapsis’ which as we have seen, 
Dooyeweerd came to enunciate in his later thought.
497
 For Dooyeweerd, the ‘structural 
principle of human existence’ is what he calls an ‘enkaptic interlacement’ of a series of 
individuality structures, with each providing the foundation for the next.
498
 First, there is 
the structure comprising the chemicals which make up the human body; second, the 
biotic structure of the body; third the interlacement of the psychic structure with these 
other structures; and finally, what Dooyeweerd calls the ‘act structure’. This last, the 
exercise of normative intentionality, is bound together with all the others. Each structure 
is successively bound, ‘morphologically’, by the higher one; thus human bodiliness, 
although it has no one modally qualified feature, can be bound by the act structure.
499
 
This view of the human person leaves no room for the human person to have a 
viewpoint separate from that of the interlaced physical, biological, psychic and ‘act’ 
(normative) structures which constitute the human being as an ‘enkaptic structural 
whole’, nor indeed for the positing of an entity somehow linked to but separate from 
that whole – but is consonant with a conception of the human being seen as a religiously 
oriented individual. In other words, the integrated anthropology so described is better 
consonant with the third rendering of the heart described above than the other two 
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renderings. Moreover, the religious character of the human being can only be worked 
out temporally: palingenesis, implies, if not a sudden conversion experience, at least the 
unfolding of the effects of the Spirit’s work in the life of the person concerned and the 
transformation of his or her character.
500
 Noetic or ontic supra-temporality cannot do 
justice to this sense of the transformation of human character in and through time, but 
supra-temporality considered as the Direction of the heart makes perfect sense in this 
regard. 
 
Thus, Dooyeweerd’s account of the heart is not to be seen as the exercise of supra-
temporal knowledge, or as an entity over and above human temporality. Rather, it is the 
locus of the Direction of the whole human person towards or away from God. The 
heart’s Direction, in other words, is the deepest and basic orientation of humanity: God 
calls each human being in the depth of who they are, in the midst of life, and in the 
living community of faith. Instead of seeking to provide a God’s eye view, or claiming a 
supra-temporal status, as a finite human creature all one can do is to encounter the 
Triune God through the transcendent revelation of Scripture and the inner working of 
the Holy Spirit as these are accommodated to the conditions of experience, including 
that of time. Understood in this way, Dooyeweerd’s account of the heart is not 
necessarily incompatible with that of Vollenhoven. The main difference is that of 
emphasis: rather than Vollenhoven’s account of the sequential unfolding of God’s Law 
and the covenantal response to which humanity is called in response, Dooyeweerd’s 
account of God’s self-revelation and humanity’s response is structured in a more 
hierarchical way. 
 
I shall now sum up Dooyeweerd’s account of the religious basis or transcendent 
orientation for a Christian philosophy. 
 
4.2.3 The Hierarchical Structure of Dooyeweerd’s Account 
 
In his account of the Christian ground-Idea Dooyeweerd emphasises the role of the 
Father as Origin, mediated by the Son (seen as redeemer more than co-creator), with the 
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work of the Holy Spirit largely confined to human hearts.
501
 Combined with his 
tendency to portray the ‘heart’ as ‘supra-temporal’, this gives his account a strongly 
hierarchical structure, with temporal diversity at the base. However, there may be more 
common ground with Vollenhoven’s account of the heart than is often asserted; as I 
have argued above, the heart should not be understood in noetic or ontic terms, but like 
Vollenhoven, in religious terms, in terms of Direction. I shall review both in the light of 
the trinitarian vision of Kuyper. 
 
 
4.3 The Triune Economy and the Direction of the Heart 
 
In this chapter we have seen how Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd each set out a Christian 
vision of the world, providing an account both of God’s triune work in the world and of 
human receptivity to that work. In this respect they follow Kuyper and reflect his vision. 
However, at least prima facie, their accounts differ structurally, both from one another 
and from Kuyper. 
 
Kuyper’s vision is that of the covenant among the three Persons as the basis for the 
creation, redemption and transformation of the world. Unlike Vollenhoven, this does 
not view the unfolding of the role of the three Persons as sequential, or even complexly 
sequential; nor is it to be understood primarily in hierarchal terms, as Dooyeweerd does 
with the Father as Origin at the top, via the Son through to the work of the Holy Spirit. 
In Kuyper’s view, although there is a certain sequence and hierarchy in the work of the 
three Persons, they are primarily joint, but distinct, agents in the work of creation, 
redemption and transformation, bound by love among the Persons which is the sole 
ground for their common work. Thus, the world needs to be seen, to use John Calvin’s 
expression, as the ‘theatrum dei gloriae’ (the theatre of God’s glory).502 The world is 
not the extension of God’s being, but it reflects and bears the impress of God’s Triune 
action, in its creation, redemption and transformation and indeed, God’s presence in and 
through his incarnate Son. Thus human beings, as the Triune image-bearers, are 
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dramatis personae in this great task as they are called to present the whole of who they 
are, and to have their minds transformed in their world-and-life-view and philosophy, 
not as an optional extra, but as their appropriate service to their Lord. This does not 
reflect or argue for the explicit knowledge of God as Trinity as revealed in Scripture, 
although it can do; it rather suggests the response to the work of God as Trinity – a 
response which is common to all humanity, albeit suppressed and inchoate, an implicit 
‘sensus trinitatis’.503 Both philosophers implicitly recognise this sensus trinitatis in the 
way they both structure their respective accounts of the God’s self-revelation and the 
human response. Neither Vollenhoven nor Dooyeweerd (despite his disclaimers) avoid 
speaking of God in trinitarian terms as the basis of a Christian philosophy. The question 
is not whether reformational philosophy should have a trinitarian basis, but whether the 
specific account of that trinitarian basis is adequate both with respect to scriptural 





The alternative to a trinitarian approach would be a default via negativa, i.e. a view of 
God as essentially unknowable. However, this does not solve any of the problems about 
speaking of God – it essentially smuggles in a monadic deity through the back door, for 
example in talk of God as ‘originating essence’ or the like. This  is to fall back into a 
substantialist conception of God. Moreover, there is no final via negativa. For example, 
to say that God is ‘above conceptualization’, is not to make no claims about God, but, 
rather, to fall back into a spatial analogy as dominant in one’s faith discourse.505 
 
Meanwhile, the link between this trinitarian vision and the contours of a philosophical 
system needs to be shown more clearly and systematically. In the following chapter, I 
shall show how the presupposita that arise from such a vision are revealed implicitly 
through Vollenhoven’s ‘consequential problem-historical method’ on the one hand, and 
through Dooyeweerd’s Christian ‘ground-Idea’ on the other. 
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Chapter Five: The Link – the Philosophical Presupposita 
 
In Chapter Three, I looked at the ‘transcendental’ question of the necessary conditions 
for experience and how the laws and norms appropriate to the different modalities 
govern them; this is the account of the world which both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd 
provide. In Chapter Four we then examined the ‘transcendent’ question, examining their 
respective accounts of the religious orientation, which constitutes the Direction of the 
heart, in covenantal obedience to God through the joint work of the three Persons in 
creation, redemption and in the process of transformation. Where in the two previous 
chapters I have treated the necessary conditions and religious orientation separately, in 
this chapter I shall seek to show how they are linked as the basis for a comprehensive 
Christian worldview with distinctive implications for systematic philosophy.  
 
Despite their differences in presentation, I shall argue that Vollenhoven and 
Dooyeweerd are both concerned to identify the basic presupposita of philosophical 
thought in general, and those required for a Christian philosophy in particular. I shall 
look at how they did this, and discover how and why they diverge. I shall argue further 
that there is a close fit between the presupposita which they respectively uncover – with 
one exception, which I shall account for. Moreover, I shall point forward to a way of 
developing their common insights; this will be developed in Chapter Six to show how 
their respective accounts, and indeed their systematic divergences, complement one 
another. I shall first look, then, at the presupposita that illuminate Vollenhoven’s 
‘consequential problem-historical method’ and then at the presupposita of 
Dooyeweerd’s ‘Christian ground-Idea’. I shall compare them, noting the respective 
strengths of their insights, but also their lacunae and imbalances, and will attempt to 
show how these two seemingly disparate and incommensurable positions are potentially 





5.1 Presupposita Illuminating Vollenhoven’s Ground-Types 
 
After 1945, Vollenhoven developed the ‘consequential problem-historical method’ 
which absorbed the greater part of his attention from that time on. The complexities of 
his presentation, and the continual corrections to his analysis that from time to time he 
brought to the attention of his colleagues, can easily obscure the underlying rationale. 
Indeed, this is a rationale that Vollenhoven followed largely implicitly rather than 
explicitly, absorbed as he was by the minutiae of his task. Nevertheless, I shall argue 
that the way his analysis developed has considerable systematic implications, which I 
shall attempt to outline. 
 
Vollenhoven’s emphasis on the historical development of philosophical thought led him 
to introduce the notion of ‘time currents’ (‘tijdstromingen’), which situate thinkers in 
specific time periods. Within each time current, Vollenhoven came to identify three 
‘ground-types’: the main types of philosophical thought. These are the ‘theogonic-
cosmogonic’ (the view of God, or the gods, as the origin of the universe); the ‘pure 
cosmological’ (the view the universe in terms of timeless order); and the ‘cosmogono-
cosmological’ (the view of the universe as unfolding process). Each of the ground-types 
is in turn broken down into numerous sub-categories, the shape and character of any 
philosophy being determined according to which of these is dominant and how the 
others are combined. Further, Vollenhoven presents the findings and continual 
refinement of his analysis and categorisation of the different thinkers in descriptive 
terms, rather than as the working out of dominant presuppositions – which, I shall argue 
below, is implicitly what he is doing.
506
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The first caveat is that the Vollenhoven’s procedure is not, and cannot be, a deductive 
one. To provide a deductive account of what Vollenhoven is doing through the process 
of this ‘consequential problem-historical method’ would be inappropriate, since such a 
deductive account could only be provided in terms of one form of discourse, be it 
mathematics, logic, semantics or any other specific discipline. The subject matter of 
Vollenhoven’s study encompasses a whole plurality of different disciplines, although it 
has systematic implications for them all in the way that it circles around and delineates 
the premises at the root of all thought and experience. The character of the analysis 
itself is architectonic, inductive and cumulative, rather than linear, deductive and 
explicit.  
 
The second caveat is that Vollenhoven’s procedure largely remains a somewhat 
methodologically taciturn exercise. While it categorises thinkers, under the ground-
types and sub-types, and situates them in their appropriate time-current, it remains 
largely silent about the assumptions that underlie the method itself. This has to be teased 
out implicitly rather than explicitly. Nevertheless, he does provide characterisations of 
the ‘ground-types’. It will be those characterisations, however briefly stated, and the 
way those characterisations inform its categorisations of the myriad thinkers and the 
periodic development of their thought, which will be at the heart of the 
‘presuppositional’ account of Vollenhoven’s method which will be offered here.  
 
The third caveat is, as we shall see, that Vollenhoven has greatest affinities with the 
‘cosmological-cosmogonic’ and least with the ‘mythological’ character of the 
‘theogonic-cosmogonic’. However, he deals with all the thinkers of his comprehensive 
study on an even-handed basis, and with what has been called, in a general context, 
‘critical solidarity’.507 Despite himself, he recognises the value and, indeed, the 
genuineness of the quest undertaken by each of the myriad thinkers which he examines 
in the process of his studies, from the time of the earliest Greek thinkers to the present 
day. 
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These caveats suggest a certain caution in the reading of Vollenhoven’s ‘consequential 
problem-historical method’. What is being presented is indirect and cumulative rather 
than explicit and deductive. However, the indirect and cumulative character of the 
argument is appropriate to the subject matter. It is as if we have stumbled by night on a 
lost city in the jungle. The contours of that city cannot be visible from the ground since 
the mass of debris and jungle covering obscures the foundations, and the patterns which 
remain of the ruined architecture, are too close to the observer to be identified. Nor can 
they be visible from above – because that would imply that there is a God’s eye view 
from which they can be contemplated (something I have argued against in the previous 
chapter). The contours can only be outlined in the light of strategically placed beacons 
which each and together provide the correct orientation. Gradually, through this 
orientation, the ruined foundations of the city can be uncovered and their contours can 
be identified. I shall argue that the three beacons in this regard are the presupposita of a 
transcendent Origin, of a transcendent Coherence and a transcendent Providence 
respectively – each of which illuminates and orientates one of Vollenhoven’s ‘ground-
types’. Whether these presupposita are the right ones can only be determined by 
whether they adequately illuminate and orientate the ground-types. I shall look, then, in 
turn at each of Vollenhoven’s ‘ground-types’ and the presupposita which, I argue, 
illuminate them. 
 
5.1.1 The Theogonic-Cosmogonic Ground-Type – Origin 
 
Vollenhoven’s first ground-type, the first in the history of Western philosophy, is the 
‘theogonic-cosmogonic’ (‘theogonisch-kosmogonisch’). Vollenhoven has least 
sympathy for this stance and is highly critical of its ‘mythologising’ character. This 
ground-type focuses on the role of the divine (or ‘the gods’) in bringing the universe 
into being. I shall argue that ‘theogonic-cosmogonic’ ground-type is illuminated, 
however murkily, by the presuppositum that there is a transcendent Origin upon which 
– or Whom – all existence depends.508 
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An early representative of this position is Museaus, the legendary disciple of the 
mythical Orpheus, who attempts to describe the divine origins of the world. Hesiod, 
working in the sixth century B.C., is another early representative of this ground-type; 
several different strands of the theogonic-cosmogonic ground-type are represented in 
the Orphic tradition. Later, the ground-type can be seen in Gnosticism, which portrays 
the dependence upon God in a hierarchical way via a chain of intermediate deities. 
Gnosticism, with its vision of the ascent of the human soul from the ‘lower’ material 
realm to the ‘higher’ spiritual one, emphasises the transcendence and unknowability of 




Vollenhoven continues to trace the theogonic-cosmogonic ground-type through the 
course of Western philosophy; through the medieval Jewish Cabbala and, in the 
Christian context, through Jacob Böhme (1575-1624); and then in the modern period, 
somewhat surprisingly, through Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900). The inclusion of 
Nietzsche as ‘theogonic-cosmogonic’ is surprising, especially given Nietzsche’s 
notorious, albeit ironic, remark that ‘God is dead’. Vollenhoven himself does not 
explain his categorisation of Nietzsche in this regard, but especially in his later, 
irrationalist, phases, one can see the expression of Nietzsche’s theogonic-cosmogonic 
tendency in the way he rejects all attempts to discern order in terms of any cosmic 
scheme. Nietzsche seeks to overcome change and affirm the sheer triumph of human 
individuality, first in his assertion of the ‘Übermensch’, free of any external ordering or 
subjection to universal categories, and, second, in the notion of the eternal return, 
staking a claim for the persistence of personality (or at least its conceived persistence) in 
the face of change. In raising the possibility that there might be no ‘God’ (in the sense 
of one given by tradition), or that the god of tradition had died, Nietzsche clears the way 
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for the sheer and naked encounter of the individual with the Origin – sheer in that it is 
direct and unmediated, naked in that it is stripped of tradition. It should be noted, 
though, that through his ‘will to power’ he advocates attempting to find this source in 
oneself. In this he is followed in this quest for self-discovery by Martin Heidegger 
(1889-1976), in the latter’s ‘Nietzschean’ phase from 1933 on. In this latter phase, 
Heidegger embraces Nietzsche’s notion of the ‘eternal return’: God (as ground of Being 
or Beings) and self can only be known and engaged apophatically – there can be no 
final resolution.
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 Here the theogonic-cosmogonic ground-type differs both from the 
pure cosmological ground-type, which finds resolution in structure, and from the 




The theogonic-cosmogonic ground-type implicitly presupposes an unknowable Other or 
Others that constitutes the Origin of the experienced world and lies beyond the horizon 
of human experience. But this presuppositum of Origin, held to the exclusion of all 
other considerations, remains an irrational leap in the dark, having no consideration 
either of the order of the universe, or indeed of its future. The two latter points are 
uncovered in the working out of the two other ground-types, to which I shall now turn. 
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5.1.2 The Pure Cosmological Ground-Type – Coherence 
 
Vollenhoven’s second ground-type, then, concerns ‘pure’ structure – structure 
abstracted from time, as distinct from genetic structure, or process over time. This 
second ground-type is called ‘pure cosmological’ (‘louter kosmologisch’). We see it 
arising implicitly, if not explicitly, from the quest for the basis on which all of created 
reality coheres. The pure cosmological ground-type emphasizes the a-temporal 
structural ordering of all things.
512
 I shall argue that it is illuminated by the 
presuppositum of a transcendent Coherence that provides the basis for the structured 
ordering of all kinds of relation. 
 
For Vollenhoven, the earliest representatives of the pure cosmological ground-type are 
Thales (c. 624-546 B.C.), and Xenophanes (c. 580-c. 478 B.C.). For both these 
philosophers, the basic question is a cosmological one: ‘what is it that constitutes and 
orders the universe?’ For Thales, the answer is one of a single ordering substance. In 
this he is followed by the atomists, Leucippus (450 B.C.) and Democritus (c. 460-371 
B.C.), who ‘suppressed’ the genetic theme of change and brought everything under a 
single qualifying term, eternally persistent ‘atoms’. For Xenophanes, what constitutes 
and orders the universe is a dualism between an eternal reality and the non-transcendent 
and changing permutations of the temporal order. In this he is later followed by 
Parmenides (c. 540-475 B.C.), who sees a dualism between the unitary, unchangeable 
‘being’ known purely by the intellect, and the ‘indicateable’, sensorially observable, 
diversity of experienced phenomena. For all these philosophers, the emphasis is on an a-
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This a-temporal focus can be seen supremely in the ‘monarchian’ schema. The 
monarchian schema sees all reality as a structured ordering of the lower changing 
physical diversity, an ordering conducted by a higher metaphysical unchanging unity. 
There is a dualism (or as Vollenhoven later held, a duality) between the ruler and the 
ruled, with a ruled diversity ontically dependent on a higher unity. Later, Vollenhoven 
sees this as characterising the later Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) at the definitive stage of his 
thought. According to Vollenhoven, the monarchian schema is developed, not least by 
Speusippus (410-339 B.C.), Plato’s nephew and successor at the Academy. 
Speusippus’s work reveals a vertical divergence of time and eternity, with eternity being 
the transcendent, unchanging realm inhabited by the divine and by human souls, and 




The monarchian strand was continued by the neo-Platonist Plotinus (205-270), and was 
to prove highly influential on medieval thinkers. Amongst these are the Muslims 
Averroës (1126-1198) and Avicenna (980-1037), the Jewish Moses Maimonides (1135-
1204), and the Christian Thomas Aquinas (c. 1224-1274). Vollenhoven sees the pure 
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cosmological ground-type in general and the monarchian monist strand in particular as 
being influential through later periods in the thought of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464) 
and, in the contemporary period, in the thought of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). He 




So the pure cosmological ground-type is illuminated by the presuppositum of a timeless 
Coherence which structures the diversity and range of human experience as well as the 
order of the world. It reflects a basic presuppositum of an ordering structure, a basis for 
the coherence of the experienced world which itself overarches and is not reducible to 
any aspect, or set of aspects, of that world. This presuppositum relativises any one 
description of the world or explanation of its operation, and so counteracts the different 
forms of reductionism.
516
 Each reductionistic attempt to delineate the structure of the 
whole on the basis of this or that kind of relation reveals its shortcomings as a 
satisfactory account of the diversity of the whole.  
 
The pure-cosmological ground-type focuses on the structure of the world-order in terms 
of unchanging, eternal principles. In other words, its focus is contemporaneous or 
synchronic, giving weight to structural rather than narrative considerations. It presents 
the view of the universe as a timeless, unchanging, block. By contrast, the third ground-
type, to which I now turn, focuses on the successive or diachronic feature of the world – 
the moment to moment progression of time.  
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5.1.3 The Cosmogono-Cosmological Ground-Type – Providence 
 
So, the third of Vollenhoven’s ground-types is the ‘cosmogonic-cosmological’; he also 
characterises this ground-type as ‘genetic structural’. I shall argue that it reflects a basic 
presuppositum of a transcendent Providence in all things found in and through their 




Cosmogonic-cosmological thought for Vollenhoven is exemplified first in the work of 
Heraclitus (c. 535-c. 480 B.C.), who sees all things as governed by a single principle of 
change. Slightly later, Empedocles (c. 492-432 B.C.), posits a division between on one 
hand a body composed of four basic elements, dominated by the forces of love and 
strife, and an eternal soul on the other. Empedocles is a link to the greatest 
representative of the comogono-cosmological ground-type, Plato (427-347 B.C.), who 
in the different phases of his thought, sees the eternal forms as being worked out and 
exemplified in the material chaos of the cosmos.
518
 Plato’s strand of cosmogonic-
cosmological thought is continued in the medieval period by Bernard of Clairveaux 
(1090-1135), whose dichotomous anthropology is followed in the modern period by 
René Descartes (1596-1650).  
 
A somewhat different strand of cosmogonic-cosmological thinking is represented by 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), who seeks to reconcile the antinomy between ‘scientism’ 
(which gives supremacy to mathematical or logical analysis) and ‘practicalism’ (which 
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gives supremacy to experience). Kant draws the two together in what Vollenhoven calls 
an ‘ennoëtist’ anthropology: this is one in which a lower self within the causal nexus is 
observed by a higher self from a universal vantage point – a point which Kant defines in 
ethical terms. G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) transfers this vision of greater self-realization 
from the forum of epistemology to an account of the unfolding of human history. This is 
painted on a cosmic canvas in the process theology of A.N. Whitehead (1861-1947), 





Vollenhoven places himself within the characteristic outline of this ground-type, but in 
the tradition of ‘pneumatistic interactionism’ (‘pneumatische wisselwerkingstheorie’). 
By this he means a continual inter-flow between human consciousness and human 
physicality. He rejects the characterisation of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ as in the ennoëtist 
anthropology represented by Kant. Rather, he sees things in terms of the unfolding of 
God’s covenantal Providence in and through history, not in any notion of transcending 
history through a metaphysical ascent to a supra-temporal reality. Vollenhoven sees 
himself in this respect in the intellectual line of Gregory of Nazianzus (c. 330-390), 





In Vollenhoven’s account, cosmogonic-cosmological thought emphasises process or 
narrative sequence, rather than hierarchical order. This process is not mere flux: unlike 
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the theogonic-cosmogonic ground-type, it is not a leap into the unknown. But equally, it 
is not merely the unfolding of an existing, protological potential within a basically a-
temporal framework; unlike the ‘pure cosmological’ ground-type it features a genuinely 
future-orientated transformation, i.e. a view seen in the light of a divine Providence, or 
more generally, a view in the the notion of divine Providence has been secularised (as 





5.1.4 The Presupposita Illuminating Vollenhoven’s Ground-Types 
 
In setting out the three ground-types in this later development of the ‘consequential 
problem-historical method’ Vollenhoven reveals the contours of three basic and 
distinctive presupposita which have shaped Western philosophy. To a certain extent his 
‘cosmological-cosmogonic’ preferences come into play in his sensitivity to the time-
current in which each thinker is situated. But his careful categorisation of the thinkers is 
done largely dispassionately and without bias towards one or other ground-type. My 
contention is that in this very taciturnity and self-restraint, Vollenhoven evinces a self-
critical sensitivity to the presupposita which necessarily underlie all thought (even if, 
from his own standpoint, he has preferences for the cosmogonic-cosmological ground-
type, and has least personal affinity to the ‘theogonic-cosmogonic). Implicitly and 
cumulatively, then, Vollenhoven’s ground-types provide a comprehensive survey of the 
philosophical ground and uncover the way in which three basic outlines can be 
discerned within each period of Western thought through the periodically changing 
expressions of thought. These three basic outlines, or ‘ground-types’, are each 
illuminated implicitly by a presuppositum from which each takes it character.  
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The first presuppositum involves a reaching out towards a transcendent Origin (or 
putative Origin) of the cosmos. From a Christian perspective, in the presuppositum of a 
transcendent Origin, one can see an implicit reflection of the work of the Father. For 
Vollenhoven, individuals are first named by their ‘structure’ (i.e., the blueprint of who 
or what they are); the norms are realised concretely in individuals. Through the Father’s 
secret creatorly command, all creatures are ‘thoroughly-structured’ as individuals.522 
This links together this presupposition of a transcendent Origin with Vollenhoven’s 
insight (which we have noted in Chapter Four) about the irreducible character of 




The second presuppositum involves a vision of the coherence (or putative coherence) 
according to which all the diversity of relations in the world fit together in an 
overarching and harmonious architectonic, i.e., the presuppositum of a transcendent 
Coherence. Viewing the presuppositum of a transcendent Order
 524
 from the Kuyperian 
Reformational perspective, one can see the work of the Son (in whom all things hold 
together), his cosmic creational role as the Logos, and equal in divinity with the Father 
and the Holy Spirit. For Vollenhoven, the Son reveals the law of love as the grounding 
of all human relationships, not least in the uncovering of the many different kinds of 




The third presuppositum involves a basic confidence that all things happen for an 
overarching purpose (or a putative purpose), i.e., that there is a transcendent Providence 
(even if that ‘Providence’ is stated in secular terms – be it Progress, Development or 
Evolution). Viewing the presuppositum of a transcendent Providence in and through 
events
526
 from a Christian perspective, one can see reflected the work of the Holy 
Spirit.
527
 For Vollenhoven, this sovereign Purpose reflects the work of the Holy Spirit in 
the world, following through the secret ‘idea’ of each individual given by the Father and 
the law of love revealed in the Son. In the context of human society, the Holy Spirit 
















positivises (i.e., realises the existing potential and application of) new institutional 




The three presupposita which illuminate Vollenhoven’s three ground-types thus provide 
one with a link to the work of the three Persons of the Trinity in the world, on the one 
hand,
529
 and with each of the necessary conditions for experience, on the other. The 
presupposita are transcendent in the sense that each is a prior commitment not itself 
deducible from the evidence at hand. Each presuppositum held in isolation from one 
another lead to different emphases in philosophical thought, on origin, order and 
purpose respectively.  
 
Vollenhoven does not provide any account which draws the three ground-types 
together, and indeed sees them as alternatives rather than elements in an overall 
conception, or what Dooyeweerd calls a ‘ground-Idea’.  Moreover he tends to favour 
the third ground-type. This lack of integration and imbalance will be seen in better 
chiaroscuro in comparison with Dooyeweerd. To do that, I shall now look at 
Dooyeweerd’s account of the presupposita or Ideas, which together for him constitute 
the Christian ground-Idea. 
 
 
5.2 Dooyeweerd’s Account of the Christian Ground-Idea 
 
Dooyeweerd’s account of the Christian ground-Idea and the elements that comprise it 
provides a comparison and, I shall argue, congruence, with the presupposita which 
illuminate the ground-types identified by Vollenhoven. 
 
Dooyeweerd defines and describes what he calls the ‘presupposita’ of philosophical 
thought,
530
 or ‘Ideas’.531 In general terms, presupposita are those pre-theoretical beliefs 
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 Dealt with in Chapter Four. 
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 As we have seen in 2.2, these presupposita played an important role in the construction of the ‘Second 
Way’ of his transcendental critique, which eventually appeared in the English language edition of this 




which are the foundation for any system of thought.
532
 They are ‘presupposita’ in that 
they precede and orientate one’s naïve engagement with the world as a whole, as well as 
the systematic thinking which follows on that engagement.
533
 Dooyeweerd conceives of 
these as the ‘hypothesis’ (my emphasis – that which lies under or provides the basis) of 
theoretical thought, rather than arising out of theoretical thought itself. The presupposita 
cannot themselves be theoretical, or the conclusion of a theoretically based argument, 
since they provide the basis upon which theoretical analysis is subsequently to be done 
– he states that the presupposita ‘cannot be evaded by any philosopher who wishes, 




As we have seen in Chapter Two, from the 1930s on, Dooyeweerd holds that the three 
presupposita of philosophical thought are the Ideas of Origin, coherence and totality 
(the last two for him in lower case because they are subordinate to the former).
535
 He 
argues that these three presupposita are revealed by critical self-reflection to be 
interdependent.
536
 Dooyeweerd links these presupposita to the three steps of his 
‘transcendental critique’ corresponding to three ontic levels: coherence, totality and 
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 I shall argue that while Dooyeweerd presents his argument in steps, 
deductively one from another, it is better understood as a way of coming to an overall 
understanding of the world on the basis of ‘presupposita’ which cannot be argued for 
deductively, but are all equally and distinctively necessary for a true understanding of 
the world.  
 
In this section, I shall, therefore, look at each of the Ideas in turn in order to assess their 
adequacy together as the basis for a systematic philosophy, while matching them with 
the presupposita corresponding to Vollenhoven’s ground-types. In the ‘First Way’ of his 
transcendental critique set out in the Wisbegeerte der Wetsidee (the first, Dutch version 
of his magnum opus), Dooyeweerd starts with the Idea of Origin, and then moves 
through the view of totality, that is, of the cosmos as a whole, to an appreciation of the 
coherent diversity of the created order.
538
 Dooyeweerd later reverses this order for the 
purpose of constructing the ‘Second Way’ (or his transcendental critique proper) in the 
New Critique of Theoretical Thought (the revised, English version of his magnum 
opus), starting with the problems arising from the theoretical apprehension of the 
coherent diversity of the created order, moving to the Idea of totality located in the 
human heart, in order to rest finally in the Idea of the Origin.
539
 (In both cases, as we 
shall see, ‘coherence’ and ‘totality’ are in lower-case, for reasons which will emerge.) 
My argument will be that there is an alternative way of looking at the presupposita as 
neither a top-down hierarchy, as in the First Way, or a bottom-up hierarchy, as in the 
Second Way. I shall seek to show the parallel between the Vollenhoven’s ‘ground-
types’ and Dooyeweerd’s ‘presupposita’ (retrieving as well the Idea of Providence 
central to his thinking of the 1920s). In order to make this clear I shall slightly change 
the order of presentation of Dooyeweerd’s Ideas or presupposita. I turn now to the first 
of Dooyeweerd’s Ideas to be considered here – that of a transcendent Origin. 
                                                 
537
 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.6, 22-33, 36-40, 64; 2.395-410; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.4, 24-25, 28-34, 38-70; 
2.468-473, Dooyeweerd, Dictaat encyclopaedie: 3-50; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedie van de 
Rechtswetenschap ‘Inleiding’: 10-69 ; Dooyeweerd, Encyclopedia Introduction: 26-122; Dooyeweerd, In 
the Twilight: 52. For some of these references, I am grateful to J. Glenn Friesen (Friesen, ‘95 Theses’: 87; 
see 2.2). Dooyeweerd identifies each of the Ideas of the Christian ground-Idea (which for him form the 
three steps of the ‘transcendental critique’) with the three ‘Ideas’ of Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic: 
world, selfhood and Origin (Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.89 (not in W.d.W)). As we have seen in a previous 
footnote, Kant critiques these in his ‘transcendental dialectic’ (Kant, C.P.R.: Transcendental Dialectic, pp. 
208-333).  
538
 W.d.W.: 1.39, 472-473; N.C.:1: 507-508.  
539




5.2.1 The Idea of a Transcendent Origin 
 
Dooyeweerd’s conception of the Origin as an Idea changed less in the course of his 
thinking than his conception of the other two presupposita. However, his elaboration of 
it changed as the systematic context of his thought developed. For Dooyeweerd, 
dependence on the Origin is the true ground for human individuality as it is 
concentrated on the heart, which as we have seen is the religious centre of the human 
person.
540
 More generally, but less clearly for Dooyeweerd, the relation to the Origin is 
the root of all individuality, not just of human persons (and of the human person as a 
whole, not just of the ‘supra-temporal heart’), but of all things.  
 
With respect to the human person, Dooyeweerd takes as his point of departure Calvin’s 
dictum at the beginning of his Institutes of the Christian Religion: all knowledge begins 
with the knowledge of oneself in the light of one’s relation to God.541 God the Origin is 
the source of all things and the ultimate point of reference for the ‘I’.542 The ‘I’ has its 
ex-istence (i.e., its self-transcending point of reference) solely by virtue of its relation to 
the Origin. Only through ‘my’ relation to the Origin am ‘I’ truly myself ex-istently; by 
the same token, ‘I’ recognize that others have wholeness and integrity through their 
distinctive creaturely calling by the Origin. Dooyeweerd argues that the human ego 
derives its identity and Direction from the Origin (or putative origin) upon which it 
places its ultimate dependence. But this ultimate dependence needs to be seen not just as 
applicable to the human ego, but to all individuals. While this dependence can be 
expressed in Christian terms, it need not necessarily be expressed in terms of 
dependence on the Christian God (or, more precisely, the Father of Jesus Christ), or 
even on any god at all. This dependence is above all of a religious nature, that is, it is 
constituted by that which gives every person and thing its ultimate meaning and 
purpose. For Dooyeweerd, echoing Augustine’s Confessions, ‘I’ can find no rest (unity 
and integrity) except as in relation to the Origin, the Creator.
543
 Dooyeweerd avoids the 
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problem of infinite regress of the ‘I’, since there are no further ‘I’s in the face of the 
Origin.
544
 Further, it is in face of the Origin that religious unity of the ‘I’ is 
constituted.
545
 Carefully distancing himself from the notion of the self merely as the 
‘transcendental-logical subject’, which no longer has anything individual in itself,546 as 
well as from the existentialist position, which attempts to find authenticity within the 
temporal order. Dooyeweerd argues further for a notion of ‘self-surrender’ or for the 
inexhaustible ‘ex-istent’ (self-transcending) character of the religious centre, the true 
and finally unknowable ‘I’. This self-surrender should not be seen as an individualistic 
act (according to ‘individualism’ all entities, and above all, the human person are 
regarded as self-creating and self-contained).
547
 It represents, rather, the true ground for 
human individuality (i.e. that each person or entity has a unique identity) – the 
dependence of each individual on the Origin.  
 
It is not just human individuality which arises from the dependence upon the Origin of 
the human heart. What Dooyeweerd calls the ‘meaning-particularity’ (‘zin-
bijzonderheid’) of all individual creatures arises from their dependence upon the 
Origin.
548
 Naïve experience leads one to an implicit sense of the dependence of all 
things, human and non-human alike, upon the Origin, and contains implicitly within it 
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the recognition of its created and ontically dependent status.
549
 The dependence of 
human and non-human individuals upon the Origin answers the claim that any feature in 
creation can itself be seen as the basis upon which all things fundamentally relate to one 
another.  
 
The Idea of the Origin points to a second Idea or presuppositum, that of a transcendent 
coherence (or as I shall argue ‘Coherence’): there is a transcendent basis upon which all 
things relate to one another, and in relation to which all the different kinds of relation 
cohere, without themselves being reducible to one another. I turn now to this second 
Idea or presuppositum. 
 
5.2.2 The Idea of a Transcendent Coherence  
 
The second of Dooyeweerd’s presupposita which I shall look at is the Idea of 
‘coherence’ (lower case for Dooyeweerd), which I shall argue should be treated not as 
subordinate to the Idea of Origin (upper case for Dooyeweerd), but alongside that Idea 
and of equal weight to it (hence it will, I argue, be appropriate to spell it upper case). As 
has been argued in Chapter Three, relations need to be understood as having an ontic 
basis in their own right which is not simply a function of the individuals to which they 
refer and which they connect. There is an irreducible yet coherent diversity of relations 
which both govern and norm (the cosmonomic side) and describe (the factual side) all 




Dooyeweerd’s Idea of ‘coherence’ refers to a basic harmony across the modalities 
without their being reducible to another. He calls this the ‘ontic systasis’: ‘an 
indissoluble inner coherence’ binding all the modalities together.551 The identification 
of the ontic systasis is based on the prior presuppositum of coherence – that law-like 
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regularities can be identified and described, and that they together cohere – even if this 
coherence cannot be (and arguably, should not be) defined and described in terms of a 
single logical structure.
 In other words that coherence or ‘ontic systasis’ links the kinds 
of relation in their (mutually irreducible) modal diversity. It is not, and cannot be, a 
theoretical construct, since, as we have seen above, any attempted theoretical 
construction of a harmony between the different kinds of relation will result in a form of 
reductionism.
552
 It is only when the diversity of different kinds of relations is seen in 
terms of a coherence which transcends any one kind of analysable relation, that a vision 
can be sustained of a harmony between them: the different kinds of relations antecipate 
and retrocipate one another without any kind of relation being reduced to another. 
 
There is a problem in treating ‘coherence’, however, merely as a feature of the way the 
world is, without a transcendent reference point. It was this problem which drove 
Dooyeweerd to attempt to find this transcendent reference point in and around 1930 in 
the ‘supra-temporal heart’, albeit the supra-temporal heart as it is redeemed in Christ. 
However, as we have seen in the previous chapter, this ‘solution’, based on an account 
of the heart as an entity supra-temporally removed from temporal diversity creates its 
own problems – not least that of according the heart semi-divine status. As I have 
argued in the previous chapter, a more satisfactory rendering of the account of the 
human heart is to see it rather in ‘religious’ terms, i.e., in terms of its orientation 
towards or away from God who alone is to be accorded that divine status and ‘supra-
temporality’. 
 
If the philosophical and theological problems arising from any attempt to elevate the 
heart as a supra-modal viewpoint, or a putative entity with supra-temporal status, are to 
be avoided, the question remains: what, or better ‘Who’, is the transcendent point of 
reference for the ontic systasis? The harmony among the different modalities can only 
be achieved in the ordering of the creation by the Logos (the Divine Word).
553
 Just as 
with respect to the work of the Father, there is the Idea of Origin (upper case) as we 
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have seen in the previous section, so with respect to the work of the Son, there is the 
Idea of Coherence alongside and of equal weight with the Idea of Origin (and for this 
reason, it needs also to be in upper case along with the Idea of Origin to indicate its 
equal status in this regard). The Idea of Coherence is thus the presuppositum linking the 
work of the Son and the irreducible yet harmonious diversity of the created order.
554
 
This Idea is thus grounded, as is the Idea of Origin ‘religiously’, i.e., in the basic 
orientation of the human heart and needs to be worked out through the whole-hearted 
love and service of God and one’s fellow creatures, as it has grounded in the new 




However, the Ideas of Origin and Coherence need also to be considered alongside a 
third Idea or presuppositum, missing from those set out in De Wijsbegeerte der 
Wetsidee, but which was an important element in Dooyeweerd’s thinking in the 1920s. I 
shall consider this Idea at this point, because I shall argue that it needs to be considered 
as co-ordinate with the Ideas of Origin and Coherence and, further, that in this respect it 
has a distinctive weight similar to the Ideas of Origin and Coherence. Like the Ideas of 
Origin and Coherence (but, as I shall argue in the following section, unlike the Idea of 
‘totality’), it illuminates a basic feature of the world. 
 
5.2.3 The Idea of Providence and its Eclipse by the Totality-Idea 
 
The third Idea which I shall consider, then, is the Idea of Providence. The feature of the 
world which it illuminates is that the world has a transcendent destination, just as it has 
a transcendent origin: it is purposive and not merely governed by chance. 
 
As we have seen,
556
 in the 1920s, Dooyeweerd saw Providence as having a 
determinative role in the created order. Through God’s sovereign purposes for the 
world, its unity-in-diversity is unfolded and upheld. These purposes are built into God’s 
plan for creation, and at every stage in world history exist both formally, through the 
                                                 
554
 Specifically in this regard, his Ideas of coherence and totality need to be drawn together as the Idea of 
Coherence (upper-case), and that it needs to be given equal weight with the Idea of the Origin (see 5.2.2). 
555
 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.66; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 1.101. 
556




governance of the world, and materially and practically through the predestination of 
God. This predestination is not merely in the election to salvation of individual human 
beings, but also involves a plan for the whole universe according to God’s goodness and 
wisdom. This goodness and wisdom is evidenced by God’s common grace until God’s 
final word, as Judge, will be spoken.
557
 However, even when it plays a foundational role 
in his thinking in the 1920s, Providence is still seen more in structural terms rather than 




In the following decade, Dooyeweerd expressed reservations about the centrality of the 
Idea of Providence in any philosophical account (without denying its importance in 
personal piety).
 He retreated from seeing God’s work in the world to a view of the 
unfolding grasp of the coherence-in-diversity of the world in and through the redeemed 
human heart; there is a shift here from an ontic to a noetic focus as we have seen, for a 
number of reasons set out in Chapter Two.
559
 The Idea of Providence is replaced by the 
Idea of ‘totality’ (lower-case for Dooyeweerd), which he links with notion of a supra-
temporal vantage point from which the diversity of the temporal order can be surveyed 
in a unified way.
560
 Post-1930, he re-defines time as ‘cosmic time’. Accordingly, he 
tends to see time as cosmic order and so does not address the actual work of God in the 
world. Indeed he specifically removes the consideration of God’s providence from the 
proper purview of Christian philosophy, or for that matter, any philosophy.
561
 From 
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then, his account tends to be dominated by the totality-Idea which leads to a much more 
static view of the temporal process. Actual time (the narratable unfolding of events) is 
replaced by the opening process (the unfolding of the modalities as the realisation of 
existing potential in a way already built into the original created order).
562
 History is 
largely seen protologically, i.e., with reference to the beginning; there is little room for 
the breaking in of the future into the present, not least in the resurrection of Jesus. As 





Thus the totality-Idea tends to eclipse the Idea of Providence in his thinking. He is 
prepared to acknowledge God’s secret providence as foundational to the world order in 
a purely formal sense of setting up the law-structures according to which the world is 
governed; but he is not prepared to see the factual unfolding of God’s engagement with 
the created order, either in general or with humanity in particular, as having any 
significance accessible to a Christian philosophy.
564
 The replacement of the Idea of 
Providence by the totality-Idea after 1930 represents a sharp point of divergence 
between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, particularly in that Vollenhoven later implicitly 
uncovers the Idea of Providence in his ‘consequential problem-historical method’.565 It 
is also a departure from the Calvinian Reformational vision, which includes the vision 
of the purposiveness of the work of the Holy Spirit in all of creation; as we have seen in 
the previous chapter, Dooyeweerd seems largely to see the work of the Holy Spirit as 
located within the human heart.
566
 There are, however, hints of a wider perspective in 
his discussion of the working out in history of the struggle between the Civitas Dei and 
the Civitas Terrena and also in his discussion of Kuyper’s notion of common grace.567 
                                                                                                                                               
states that this is ‘hidden from human knowledge and, and therefore not accessible to a Christian 
philosophy’ (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 1.145; Dooyeweerd, N.C: 1.173).  
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But there is nothing comparable with Vollenhoven’s account of the ‘positivising’ role of 
the Holy Spirit in bringing about and making concrete the intention of the Father and 
the revelation of the Son in new situations in the world at large. 
 
We see then that while Providence is a central Idea in Dooyeweerd’s earlier thinking, it 
is largely missing after 1930; but it is none the less necessary if events are not to be seen 





Having touched on the ‘totality-Idea’ in this section to the extent that it displaces 
Providence, I shall now consider whether the ‘Idea of totality’ is properly an Idea, or 
something else.  
 
5.2.4 The ‘Kinds of Use’ of the Totality-Idea as Forms of Intuition 
 
The third of Dooyeweerd’s Ideas or ‘presupposita’ as he set it out in his magnum opus 
of the mid 1930s, De Wijsbegeerte der Wetsidee, is that of ‘totality’ (as with the Idea of 
‘coherence’, Dooyeweerd spells it lower-case).569 While the Ideas Origin, Coherence 
and Providence illuminate the basic features of the world (origin, order and destiny), the 
Idea of totality brings home to us that we are to grasp those features in a holistic way. 
This holistic grasp of the basic features of the world is what Dooyeweerd calls 
‘intuition’.  
 
For both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, intuition lies at the centre of their respective 
epistemologies. Intuition for both philosophers in their mature thinking is neither 
merely an extension of rational analysis on the one hand, nor, on the other hand, is it 
irrational. Rather, as we shall see, it is a bridge notion. According to both philosophers’ 
mature insights, intuition is trans-modal knowledge. It is the grasp of the many-sided 
diversity of relations, individuals and events worked through in the light of the vision of 
the whole or ‘totality’. Dooyeweerd describes ‘totality’ as the process of seeing the 
created order as a whole, or as Dooyeweerd he puts it: ‘the totality of meaning of the 








cosmos’.570 The metaphor which he uses is that of the prism, where the beam of 
undivided ‘white’ light is experienced before it is refracted into the many different 
‘colours’ (i.e., the modalities) as they are found in the harmony yet irreducible diversity 
of temporal experience.
571
 But merely to say this does not yet tell one what form 
intuition takes: is it intuition of individuality functions, kinds of relation or aspects of 
time? Nor does it tell us what the ‘totality’ is: is it the intuitive grasp of whole 
individuals, or of the coherence of different kinds of relations, or whole events? It 
requires greater transcendental specification in the light of the Ideas of Origin, 




Dooyeweerd himself opens up the possibility to a wider conception of ‘totality’ as 
intuition in the list of ‘different kinds of correct and fruitful use of the Idea of totality’ 
he makes in A New Critique.
573
 As we have seen, the Idea of ‘totality’ in itself lacks a 
point of reference and, considered in isolation, tells us nothing about the ontology or 
epistemology of the world. However, the ‘kinds of use’ provide it with a noetic 
character, or rather with a set of noetic characters, and indeed as we shall see below, 
each kind of use can be seen as a form of intuition, illuminated in turn by each of the 
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The first kind of use of the totality-Idea involves the intuitive grasp of individual wholes 
as they are seen as directly dependent upon the Origin (taking together the full sweep of 
all their modally-specific functions into a whole). It is the ‘idea of the whole of a thing 





The second kind of use of the totality-Idea involves the grasp of the ontic systasis (i.e., 
the irreducible but harmonious diversity of the different kinds of relation holding 
together in the modally-differentiated and theoretically irreducible diversity of 
relations): ‘irreducible’ because each kind of relation is marked out by a distinctive 
‘nuclear moment’, i.e., a basic feature which distinguishes those kinds of relation from 
all others; ‘harmonious’ because each kind of relation has analogies with every other 
kind of relation, linked analogously (i.e., by retrocipations or antecipations) with every 
other kind of relation (Dooyeweerd calls ‘modal universality’). According to one 
rendering of his position, post-1930, which was considered in the previous chapter,
576
  
he argues for an ‘Archimedean point’ from which one can rightly apprehend the ontic 
systasis that binds the modalities together. One can do this without reducing that 
systasis to any one modality according to which one seeks to apprehend the world.
577
 
This intuitive grasp can be exercised both in the context of the naïve apprehension of 
the different kinds of relation as well as in the theoretical attitude where they are 
distinguished from one another. With respect to naïve experience, Dooyeweerd speaks 
of the way ‘intuitively’ one takes account of the different modalities without 
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 Through naïve intuition the ontic systasis is 
experienced ‘enstatically’, i.e., implicitly rather than explicitly.579 With respect to 
theoretical analysis, through the intuition of the ontic systasis across the modalities one 
forms a meaning-synthesis. This is the process whereby one grasps the ‘meaning nuclei’ 
(the irreducible cores) of each of the modalities and their mutual harmony and order (the 
‘Idea of the totality of meaning moments in the meaning-modus’.580 Dooyeweerd also 
refers to the ‘Idea [i.e., the intuition – J.G.A.I.] of the integration of human societal 
relations’ (his italics). As we shall see below, this harmonious ordering of the different 
kinds of relation calls for an active human response. Dooyeweerd holds that it is only as 
we live out the reality of what it means to be created in the image of God that one can 
experience the coherence of the different forms of meaning – one is drawn into the 
deeper totality which is the grasp of the harmonious interweaving in life and thought of 




The third kind of use of the totality-Idea involves the grasp of events as wholes: It is 
‘the grasp of … an occurrence.’582 This hints at the notion of time in the form of the 
‘opening process’ of which ‘integration’ is a feature.583 This is least well developed of 
the three uses. However, if the Idea of Providence is restored, this provides a similar 
basis on which events as wholes might be grasped intuitively, and their time-aspects 
analysed through the process of modal differentiation. 
 
‘Totality’ needs to be considered as the way that individuals, the ontic systasis of 
relation, and events as wholes – respectively – are grasped intuitively (i.e., in trans-
modally holistic way) both naïvely and theoretically. This makes sense of the somewhat 
protean character of ‘totality’ in experience and reflection giving rise to the three 
different forms of intuition described above. I now turn to review where this retrieval 
and revision of Dooyeweerd’s Christian ground-Idea takes us. 
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5.2.5 Dooyeweerd’s Christian Ground-Idea – Retrieval and Revision 
  
As I have done with Vollenhoven, I shall review Dooyeweerd’s Christian ground-Idea 
in the light of the Reformational vision enunciated by Kuyper.  
 
First, the Idea of Origin in itself provides a basis for both human and non-human 
created individuality. Here Dooyeweerd is close to Kuyper’s vision of God the Father as 
the one from whom all things take their distinctive uniqueness as individuals, not least 
with his stress on the dependence of all individuals on the Father as the ground of who 
or what they are. 
 
Second, the Idea of Coherence similarly provides a necessary ontic basis for the 
harmony of the different kinds of relation, provided that it is linked with ‘totality’ 
insofar as the latter is seen to function, in effect, as the noetic counterpart (the noetic 
‘synthesis’) of the ontic systasis; both are drawn together in the overarching Idea of 
Coherence (which I have capitalised to indicate that is an Idea of equal weight and 
status alongside that of the Origin). Here again, we see echoes of Kuyper’s affirmation 
of the lordship of the Son over every area of life – and it is the great achievement of 
Dooyeweerd, together with Vollenhoven, to extend the working out of that vision in 
every aspect of the created order. 
 
Third, the Idea of Providence, a key organising principle for Dooyeweerd’s thought in 
the 1920s, is largely displaced from around 1930 on. Here Dooyeweerd shifts 
significantly away from Kuyper’s vision of the purposive work of the Holy Spirit in and 
through the historical process. This needs to be retrieved and placed alongside the Ideas 
of Origin and Coherence if the third element of the Kuyperian Reformational vision is 
to be taken into account. 
 
I shall now briefly compare Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd’s accounts of the 
presuppositions of a Christian philosophy in the light of Kuyper’s Reformational vision 






5.3 The Presuppositions or Ideas in the Light of the Kuyperian Vision 
 
Kuyper’s vision of the work of the triune God provides an integrated and balanced 
account of work of the Father as Origin, of the Son as the basis of the Coherence of the 
diversity of relations, and of the Holy Spirit as the sovereign executant of divine 
Providence. These three elements comprise the Kuyperian vision.  
 
We have seen that, in the case of Vollenhoven, the three ground-types of which his 
‘consequential problem-historical method’ traces out the outline (the theogonic-
cosmogonic, the pure cosmological, and the cosmogonic-cosmological) are illuminated 
by the presuppositions of a transcendent Origin, Coherence and Providence. While 
Vollenhoven does not explicitly enunciate these as presupposita, he shows that 
emphasis on these in turn provides three alternative bases for a systematic view of the 
world. There is a close match between these presuppositions and the elements of the 
Kuyperian Reformational vision, but these presuppositions are not developed as an 
integrated system, only indirectly, and in isolation from one another. Vollenhoven, 
despite his preference for the cosmogonic-cosmological ground-type, and his distaste 
for the theogonic-cosmogonic, provides, in effect, his own ‘transcendental critique’, 
comparable to that of Dooyeweerd.
584
 But, unlike Dooyeweerd’s ‘Second Way’ which 
treats each of the Ideas as steps in a deductive ascent, it is not hierarchical – rather, it 
has an implicit recognition of the distinct and equal basis of the Ideas of Origin, 
Coherence and Providence.
585
 However, Vollenhoven does not capitalise on the 
systematic potential of these insights and does not give us an account of how they are 
structured into a single Christian ground-Idea.  
 
On the other hand, Dooyeweerd does gives us an explicit account of presupposita and 
also provides an argument for the way that they are structured as Christian ground-Ideas 
of Origin, totality and coherence. He does so, however, in strongly hierarchical terms, 
not least in his subordination of the Idea of coherence to that of Origin. Further in his 
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account, the Idea of Providence, central to his appropriation of the Kuyperian vision in 
the 1920s, is eclipsed from around 1930 by the Idea of totality – not itself an Idea, but 
the intuitive grasping of the ontic features of reality in the light of the Ideas. So while 
Dooyeweerd, unlike Vollenhoven, presents an explicit and systematic account of the 
presupposita, I shall argue that he does so at the cost of a certain imbalance and 
distortion of the Ideas.  
 
This leaves the question of how the disparate and seemingly contradictory strands in the 
thinking of the two philosophers can be systematically reconciled. I shall argue that 
their positions are in fact complementary; and in their complementarity, they 
systematically realise Kuyper’s vision for Reformational philosophy. In order to do this, 
I look again at each of the necessary conditions of experience (the transcendentals), as 
they are linked by the Ideas or presupposita in the light of the trinitarian vision 
enunciated by Kuyper; and will then draw them together with the aid of ‘perichoretic’ 





Chapter Six: Conclusion – a Trinitarian and ‘Perichoretic’ Reconstruction 
 
In the course of this thesis I have located the thought of the two philosophers central to 
this study, Dirk Vollenhoven and Herman Dooyeweerd, in the modern Reformational 
tradition founded by Abraham Kuyper. In this chapter, by way of conclusion, I shall 
critically draw the insights of the two philosophers together in the light of the 
Kuyperian vision, and will also provide an indication of the way in which a revised 
philosophical framework is possible, which draws on their strongest insights. 
 
In Chapter One, we have seen how Kuyper sees the work of the three Persons as 
founded on an eternal covenant among them, with the three Persons pictured as working 
together in creation, redemption and in bringing the universe to final glory. This joint 
action is grounded in the distinctive work of each of the three Persons: the work of the 
Father in the call of each creature to distinctive individuality; the work of the Son as 
Lord over every area of life and in whom all relations hold together; and the work of the 
Holy Spirit in working transformatively to bring creation to its final purpose. 
 
In Chapter Two, I looked at the development of the two philosophers’ respective 
philosophical systems. Both worked within the brief of Kuyper’s wide-ranging vision of 
God’s triune engagement with the world and his call to work out the implications of this 
vision philosophically and to realise it practically in every area of life. Together, in 
1922, they made a crucial breakthrough in the ‘discovery’ of the modalities – the 
irreducible ways of being and knowing of the world. Over the course of their joint 
tenure as professors at the V.U. in Amsterdam, they developed this insight in distinctive 
ways, each with their own approach and emphasis.  
 
In Chapter Three, I noted how, with respect to the conditions of experience, 
Dooyeweerd tends to make relationality (for him, the ‘modal’ transcendental 
dimension) his starting point. Then, in turn, relationality (which is what modal ordering 
is primarily about for Dooyeweerd) and individuality (‘individuality-structures’) are 
combined to form the hybrid notion of ‘cosmic time’. This displaces the potentially 




albeit systematically orphaned, in the writing of Dooyeweerd. On the other hand, 
Vollenhoven starts with individuals, both in terms of the individuality functions (the 
‘thus-so’, which for him is the ‘modal’ determination), and individual factuality (the 
‘this-that’ determination as individuals are found in specific súbject-súbject and subject-
object relationships); he provides an account of how relations between and among 
individuals are constructed over time as well as how individuals themselves change and 
develop over time. So while he starts with individuality, it is the implicit third 
determination (the ‘genetic’586) which is systematically central to his ontology and 
epistemology, since it both gives actuality to individuals, and provides a basis on which 
relations are constructed. However, this creates problems in accounting for the 
universality of relations, and opens the door to a historicistic relativism. 
 
In Chapter Four, I dealt with the question of religious orientation. Here I noted the 
sequential character of Vollenhoven’s account of the triune economy and Dooyeweerd’s 
hierarchical account, and the way these are reflected respectively in their accounts of 
human receptivity. Vollenhoven’s covenantal account of the human response over time 
contrasts with Dooyeweerd’s somehow verticalised account of the dependence of 
‘supra-temporal heart’ on the Origin – however the term ‘supra-temporal’ may be 
interpreted. Nevertheless by reading both these accounts in ‘religious’ terms, a much 
closer convergence between their respective positions can be arrived at than might 
appear prima facie. 
 
In Chapter Five, we saw that for both philosophers there is a link between the necessary 
conditions of experience and the religious orientation of the heart: the presupposita or 
Ideas which shape and direct their own systematic philosophies. Indeed, according to 
them, this applies to all systematic philosophical thinking. Identifying this link is not a 
straightforward matter – for different reasons in the case of each philosopher. In the 
case of Vollenhoven, while, as I have argued, the presupposita are central to his 
systematic analysis of the Western philosophy and his ‘consequential problem-historical 
method’ and for the tracing of his ‘ground-types’, they remain largely implicit. 
Moreover, the systematic implications of these insights remain largely unexplored, and, 
unlike Dooyeweerd, the presuppositions are not integrated or structured into an overall 
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Christian ground-Idea. A further problem is Vollenhoven’s emphasis on the third of the 
presupposita – that which stresses process to the detriment of those pertaining to origin 
and order. In the case of Dooyeweerd, the problem is the reverse: origin and order are 
emphasised to the detriment of process (as informed by the Idea of Origin and the 
‘Ideas’ of ‘totality’ and ‘coherence’). The Idea of Providence, systematically central in 
his thinking in the 1920s, is largely eclipsed, from the 1930s on, by his stress on an a-
temporal ‘totality’ – effectively the noetic correlative to the ‘ontic systasis’ according to 
which the different kinds of relation cohere. 
 
Overall, in their accounts of the religious basis, the Ideas and the transcendentals, 
Vollenhoven tends to have sequential structure to his account, while Dooyeweerd tends 
to a hierarchical one.
587
 These divergent patterns to their systematic thinking result in a 
certain incommensurability between their respective philosophical insights – this 
despite their common inheritance of the Kuyperian Reformational vision, and their 
initial joint ‘discovery’ and continuing basic agreement about the number, identification 
and ordering of the modalities. However, there are possibilities for the philosophical 
positions of the two thinkers to be brought together in such a way that their divergences 
are seen to be complementary rather than mutually irreconcilable.
588
 I shall approach 
this in two steps in the two main sections of this chapter, respectively. 
 
In the first section, I shall argue that while indeed there are problems in each of their 
accounts that need to be addressed and corrected, nevertheless, their accounts can be 
shown to be complementary. In order to do this, I shall look at the elements of the 
Kuyperian vision, bringing together their accounts of the necessary conditions of 
experience (i.e., their ontologies and epistemologies, or what I shall call the 
‘transcendentals’), their respective religious orientations and their accounts of the 
philosophical presupposita. As we have seen, the problems and the 
incommensurabilities of their respective positions arise from differences of emphasis – 
indeed, as I argue, over-emphasis – on one or more elements of the Kuyperian vision to 
the detriment of others. 
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In the second section, I shall draw on further trinitarian resources to show the inter-
linkage and to correct the balance of how the elements are considered. In this regard, I 
shall make use of the notion of ‘perichoresis’, as rediscovered by twentieth-century 
theologians, and the methodological insights it contributes, especially the possibility of 
coming to what I shall call ‘descriptive views’: three combinations of the basic elements 
which together allow one to come to a rounded view of the inter-dependence of 
individuality, relationality and time – at once seeing their inter-dependence, but 
avoiding the danger of over-emphasis on one element, or neglect of another. 
 
I shall now proceed accordingly. 
 
 
6.1 A Comparative Evaluation of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd in the Light of the 
Kuyperian Vision 
 
So, in this section, the first of these steps, I shall compare the two philosophers in terms 
of the elements of the Reformational vision enunciated by Kuyper: that of the integrity 
of the individual before God, that of the Lordship of the Son over every area of life, and 
that of the working out of Spirit of God’s purposes for the world. Kuyper’s vision has 
been reinforced by developments in trinitarian thinking during latter half of the 
twentieth century. 
 
In certain ways, these developments followed the clarion call of Karl Barth earlier in the 
century. As we have seen, the Reformed tradition at the V.U. in the early twentieth 
century placed strong emphasis on the Trinity; this is seen in the work of figures such as 
Abraham Kuyper and Herman Bavinck (1854-1921),
 
as well as the leading opponent of 
Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, Valentijn Hepp (1879-1950). Across the Atlantic, this 
was matched by the trinitarian thinking of Cornelius van Til (1895-1957), a close but 
critical associate of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd.
589
 Hepp was succeeded at the V.U. 
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in 1945 until 1973 by Gerrit Berkouwer (1903-1996), who attempted to steer an irenic 
course with respect to Barthianism, on the one hand, and Reformational philosophy, on 
the other. 
 
Berkouwer’s successor at the V.U., Harry M. Kuitert (1924- ), Professor of Theology 
(1967-1989), began directly to oppose the doctrine of the Trinity.
590
 This was part of 
what has been called ‘the eclipse of trinitarian theology’.591 However, even as Kuitert, 
and others, were voicing their strongest opposition to trinitarian thinking, there was a 
notable revival in trinitarian thinking elsewhere. Jürgen Moltmann (1926-), Wolfhart 
Pannenberg (1928-) and Robert Jenson (1930-),
 
Colin Gunton (1941-2003) and T.F. 
Torrance (1913-2007) are Protestant thinkers who have restored the doctrine of the 
Trinity to a central place in the theological map, together with Roman Catholic 
theologian such as Karl Rahner (1904-1984), Hans Urs von Balthasar (1905-1988), and 





Calvin argues that God’s triune nature is: 
 
….a special work to distinguish himself more precisely from idols. For he so 
proclaims himself the sole God as to offer himself to be contemplated clearly in 
three persons. Unless we grasp these, the bare and empty name of God flits about 




Considerations of the Trinity arise firstly out of the encounter with Jesus Christ, as we 
find him witnessed to in Scripture, and through our personal experience. If Jesus is truly 
God, as is claimed in Scripture, most graphically in the Fourth Gospel, but throughout 
the New Testament, there must be a sense in which he is both the same, and yet 
different from the Father who sent him to us, and to whom he teaches us to pray. Then 
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there is the Spirit, whom Jesus promises, who again, is identified with Jesus and yet is 
distinct from him. This is against the background of the extensive use, throughout the 
Old Testament, of terms such as ‘Word’, ‘Spirit’ and ‘Wisdom’.594 
 
As we have seen in Chapter Five, the triune narrative of the creation, redemption and 
transformation of the world by the Father, Son and Holy Spirit acting jointly in each of 
the great acts yields the three Ideas (or presupposita) that together constitute the ground-
Idea of a Christian philosophy. The three presupposita that I have identified serve as 
links between the transcendental elements and transcendent orientation of Vollenhoven 
and Dooyeweerd’s philosophical positions; each Idea implicitly reflects the distinctive 




Each of the Ideas thus corresponds to one of the three necessary conditions or 
‘transcendentals’: individuality, relationality and time.596  
 
I shall look at each of the transcendentals in turn in the light respectively of the work of 
the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and at the Ideas or ‘presupposita’ yielded by the 
response to each: Origin, Coherence and Providence. 
 
6.1.1 Individuality, the Idea of Origin and the Work of the Father 
 
I begin by looking at the two philosophers’ respective positions vis-a-vis the Kuyperian 
Reformational emphasis on the integrity of the individual subject before God the Father. 
Here I shall draw together their accounts of individuality in the light of the work of the 
Father, and the Idea of Origin that that consideration uncovers as a presuppositum of 
philosophical thinking. 
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Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd bring different insights to the question of individuality. 
In their mature thinking, both reject attempts to define individuality in terms of any 
metaphysical notion (e.g., ‘substance’) or metaphysical principle (e.g., in terms of the 
principium individuationis).
597
 Both philosophers see the uniqueness and distinctiveness 
of the individual as a subjèct, i.e., as a whole entity subject to the laws and norms of the 
created order.
598
 Vollenhoven brings together the this-that and the thus-so 
determinations as distinct but correlative (with respect to individuality, equivalent in 
effect to what Dooyeweerd calls the ‘cosmonomic’ and ‘factual’ sides of created 
reality). This provides a systematic philosophical framework to account for the way in 
which the laws or norms governing the functioning of individuals correlate with factual 
individuals in their specific contexts. In this respect he complements Dooyeweerd’s 
account of ‘individuality structures’: without the ambiguity of Dooyeweerd’s account 
and its tendency to over-conceptualism.  
 
Drawing, then, on the insights of both thinkers, we see that an individual is given his, 
her or its unique identity by the creative fiat of the Father (following Vollenhoven), as 
Origin (following Dooyeweerd) which, properly acknowledged, prevents that person or 
thing from being seen as interchangeable with any other. Both Vollenhoven and 
Dooyeweerd acknowledge that an individual cannot finally be known in terms of the 
sum of the different modalities – important as that multi-modal grasp of the individual 
is. This means that an individual needs to be met or encountered and accorded the 
appropriate respect. While it is only human beings who can be conscious of that 
dependence (and indeed, it is in the possibility of that consciousness that one’s 
humanity consists), all individuals as creatures have a dependence upon the Origin that 
constitutes the uniqueness of each individual.
 
Who or what they are is grounded finally 
in their dependence upon the Origin. The transcendent orientation to the Origin thus 
opens us both to the naïve experience of individuals, and it also makes possible the 
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theoretical apprehension of individuals in a non-reductive way. Let us explore this 
somewhat further.  
 
With both philosophers, we need to affirm that for any experience to be possible there 
need to be persons or things to experience; otherwise experience is entirely devoid of 
content. The world cannot be reduced to purely universal descriptions on the one hand, 
or fragmented into sheer particularity on the other.
599
 As Vollenhoven points out, 
individuals are not to be regarded merely as a list of functions or the possessors of a 
certain set of ‘properties’. There needs to be an implicit or explicit sense that the 
individuals of one’s experience need independently to take their uniqueness from their 
total dependence on the Origin, as Dooyeweerd argues; their otherness is not merely a 
function of one’s consciousness of them or the product of one’s conceptual analysis of 
them. It is a question of taking seriously the ‘thisness’ of persons and things – their 
irreducible uniqueness.
600
 How can an individual’s identity, irreducible uniqueness, and, 
indeed, final incomprehensibility, be accounted for in a philosophically satisfactory 
way? Individuality is the sheer, finally indescribable and unconceptualisable who-ness 
or this-ness of persons or things as we encounter them in ‘arms-length’ experience.601 
As we are ourselves individuals, true self-knowledge needs to accord that same status to 





Thus, for both philosophers we see that in ‘pre-scientific’ (Vollenhoven) or ‘naïve’ 
(Dooyeweerd) experience, the Idea of the dependence of individuals upon the Origin 
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illuminates the appreciation and acknowledgement of individuals as finally irreducible 
to any conceptual description of them. In such experience, individuals are known as 
continuous wholes, i.e., for naïve experience to make sense, there needs to be the naïve 
idea of an individual, or, as Vollenhoven puts it: an individual is ‘this’ or ‘that’. The 
perception of a hand, for example, is more than the specification of a given bundle of 
sense data. To pick out this or that sense-datum as relevant to one’s perception of a hand 
requires that one knows first what a hand is and how it is constituted, not necessarily 
‘scientifically’ or ‘theoretically’, but certainly implicitly in a ‘pre-scientific’ or ‘naïve’, 
i.e., in an everyday, way.
603
 A normally functioning human being knows the world not 
as a disordered mass, but as discrete and concrete entities. Even one’s encounter with 
enormous individuals, such as the Sun, or galaxies – or microscopic individuals, such as 
atoms or quarks – needs to be put into middle-sized terms in one’s mind for the purpose 
of apprehending them – for example models of galaxies on the one hand, or of atomic 
and sub-atomic particles on the other. These individuals or putative individuals need 




But, according to Dooyeweerd, one’s account of individuals also needs to be regulated 
by the sense that each individual is directly dependent upon the Origin, and as such has, 
as Vollenhoven points out, a secret identity (or ‘idea’ as Vollenhoven calls it) which 
cannot finally be conceptualised, only received from the Father.
605
 The ‘who-ness’ or 
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the ‘this-ness’ of the individual concerned cannot ever be fully 
comprehended, since each individual finally derives its unique identity and 
calling solely from its dependence upon the transcendent Origin. Thus in 
everyday or naïve experience, one encounters individuals as wholes and 
one must accord them the respect due to them as beings, like us, directly 
dependent upon God. 
 
In addition to its constituting role in naïve experience, the Idea of the 
dependence of individuals upon the Origin also explicitly provides one 
with a transcendent basis for ‘scientific’ or ‘theoretical’ reflection upon 
individuals. Scientific or theoretical ideas (lower case) draw together 
concepts from a diversity of modalities to provide a composite description 
of the individual concerned. One can approximate the idea of an individual 
‘scientifically’ (Vollenhoven) or ‘theoretically’ (Dooyeweerd), i.e., through 
systematic analysis.
606
 Individuals can be identified as falling under 
different typical descriptions, or what Dooyeweerd calls ‘individuality 
structures’ – as Vollenhoven puts it, ‘scientific’ descriptions in terms of the 
‘thus-so’ determination.607 Individuals can be people or things, and 
individuality can also be seen in institutions, organic communities or 
voluntary associations. The theoretical idea of an individual is a description 
of the structure comprising the ordered functions of the individual.
608
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Individuality Functions (listed below as ‘súbject/object’) 
 
pistical (faith):   believer/belief
609
 
ethical:    ethical agent/good deed 
juridical/legal:   legal subject/legal object
610
 
aesthetic:   admirer/aesthetic object
611
 
economic:   trader/commodity 
social:    social actor/custom 










logical/analytical:  analyser/proposition 
psychic/sensory:   sensor/sensation
616
 
biotic:     organism/cell 
physical:    particle/energy-packet 
kinetic:     body in motion/trajectory 
spatial:     extended figure/point
617
 




This theoretical ordering of functions, described by both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, involves the 
identification of the ‘founding’ and ‘leading’ function of that individual. For example, the theoretical idea 
of a plant will take into account how that plant is guided by the biotic function, or what it means to be 
subject to the laws governing biology. For the purpose of analysis, the individual being contemplated is 
isolated from that individual’s context and seen in terms of the laws and norms that govern it, i.e., in 
terms of its individuality-structure. This individuality-structure needs to be seen as a generalised 
approximation of one’s perception of the individual at a given time. However, it cannot finally capture 
fully who or what an individual is – only provide a modally-ordered description. While individuals can be 
described, or approximated to in conceptual terms, this needs continually to be revised in the light of the 
encounter with concrete (and not fully conceptualisable) individuals over time.  
To extend Dooyeweerd’s insights: the Idea of Origin, grounded in the work of the Father, yields the 
recognition of the fact that there are things and persons which are not simply the product of my own 
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mind; indeed, I myself cannot be the product of my own mind since I do not relate to 
the world as a disembodied epiphenomenon, but as one who is a full participant in the 
world. Even if I am dreaming, it is ‘I’ who am the participant. This confirms 
Vollenhoven’s account of the joint rooting of the individual in both their functionality 
and actuality in the calling of the Father, and corrects Dooyeweerd’s tendency (with a 
few exceptions) to see the individual merely in terms of structures ‘individualised’ 
through combinations of (‘modal’) relations. 
 
Apart from being at best only provisionally grasped in naïve experience or theoretically 
through ideas, individuals should not be seen in isolation. The subjection of individuals 
to the Father as Origin can only be exercised in the context of the diversity of their 
relations with other individuals. This leads me to a consideration of the second element 
of the Kuyperian vision: the irreducible diversity of the different kinds of relation under 
the Lordship of the Son, and the presuppositum of Coherence which is uncovered as a 
result of this reflection. 
 
 
6.1.2 Relationality, the Idea of Coherence, and the Work of the Son  
 
The second element of the Kuyperian vision, then, concerns the irreducible plurality of 
society and the world under the Son. Both Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven take up 
Kuyper’s rallying cry of the sovereignty of Christ (i.e., the Son) over every sphere, and 
more generally, the vision of the irreducible plurality of society and the world under 
Christ. Indeed, as I have described, they both extended Kuyper’s vision beyond its 




However, neither Vollenhoven’s view of the Son as primarily fulfiller of the role as the 
revealer of the Law and the leading actor in redemption, nor Dooyeweerd’s view of the 
Son as occupying a subordinate role between the diversity of the temporal order and the 
eternity of the Origin, fully does justice to the joint divinity of the Son along with the 
Father and the Spirit. He is not only to be seen as the revealer of the love command and 
the covenantal office-bearer on behalf of humanity, or as with Dooyeweerd, as the 
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stepping stone to the Origin – although he is both of those.620 Prior to his role as 
redeemer, he is the co-creator of the world with the Father and the Holy Spirit. The Son, 
as Calvin states it, is ‘autotheos’ and ‘aseitas’.621 As Vollenhoven emphasises in his 
rejection of the Son as ‘anhypostatos’, the Son in his incarnation is not a generic 
abstraction but the historically identifiable human being, Jesus Christ – born of Mary in 
Bethlehem, raised in Nazareth, died in Jerusalem under Pontius Pilate, buried in Joseph 
of Arimathea’s tomb, rose again, ascended on the Mount of Olives, and whose return in 
power and glory is expected as he promised.
622
 Through his incarnation, the Son shows 
us what it is to be in relation to our fellow human beings, and indeed how to be in 
proper relation with the world. This means that the work of the Son in redemption needs 
to be seen against the much wider backdrop of the work of creation – not just the Son as 
the root of the new creation, as Dooyeweerd has it, but the Son as co-creator with the 
Father and the Holy Spirit, looking forward to the bringing of creation to the state of its 
final transformation.  
 
The Idea of Coherence is thus grounded in the work of the Son – the basis for the 
trustworthiness and regularity of the irreducible harmony-in-diversity of the many 
different kinds of relation.
623
 It is the work of the Son, in whom all things hold together, 
which illuminates both the naïve grasp of the transmodal harmony of the different 
irreducible kinds of the relation and provides the basis on which the analogies 
(antecipations and retrocipations) can be traced out. The theoretical distinction and 
analysis of those relations in specifically modal terms shapes the appreciation that 
others are interrelated at least in some way; when one calls a rose ‘red’, one can 
generally – at least within the bounds of certain implicitly acknowledged circumstances 
– expect one’s neighbour to do the same. In other words, there are universal connections 
that can implicitly be taken for granted. While confirming Dooyeweerd’s insight 
regarding the universal nature of relations, this corrects Vollenhoven’s tendency to see 
relations as constructed from the ‘directions’ of the respective relata (what I have called 
his ‘modified monadism’).624 
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As have we have noted, the modified monadism of Vollenhoven’s account in which 
relations are treated, effectively, as combinations of the functions of the individuals 
concerned restricts relations to what pertains in a specific context. If relations are 
merely what pertain in a specific context, there is a danger of historicism, where the 
values of truth, goodness and beauty are relativised. Here Dooyeweerd’s account of 
relationality (or what he tends to call the ‘modal’ transcendental dimension) offers a 
corrective to Vollenhoven’s account. For Dooyeweerd, relations are universal in that 
they are ‘blind’ to the specific individuality of the súbjects and objects which they link; 
in this he differs from Vollenhoven, where the súbjects and objects pertain for him 
solely in the this-that determination, not in the thus-so determination.
 625
 This has 
implications for both naïve experience and theoretical reflection, which once again I 
shall look at in turn. 
 
With respect to the naïve experience of relations (or what Dooyeweerd calls the process 
of ‘naïve concept forming’), as we have seen, Vollenhoven does not address relations 
directly, but involves attention to them in the context of the individuals and events 
which they connect. Naïvely we truly experience the reality of relations. One does not 
have to wonder if a ball thrown into the air will fall down again. This does not mean 
that modal differentiation is absent; rather, it is implicit. As we have seen, it is 
‘enstatic’: bound up in the ‘plastic’ continuity of the harmonious inter-relation of the 
modalities which Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd call the ‘ontic systasis’.626  
 
In order to come to a theoretical understanding of relations, it is necessary to distinguish 
the different irreducible kinds of relations for which rigorous descriptions can be 
formulated. The modalities should not be thought of as being refracted supra-
temporally, as Dooyeweerd suggests. Rather, the modalities, in this instance seen in 
terms of the irreducibly different kinds of relations, need to be distinguished (or, to use 
Dooyeweerd’s favourite image of the prism, ‘refracted’) empirically in the light of the 
Idea of Coherence. In the light of the Idea of Coherence, the diversity of relations is 
open to being seen as holding together with one another by a web of analogies – not 
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through the elevation of any sort of relation as itself the organizing principle (as in the case of the many 
‘isms’, each of which seeks to reduce the diversity of relations to one sort of relation); rather all the 
different sorts of relation are viewed together in the light of a transcendent Coherence, not reducible to 
any one sort of relation, but to which they all refer. Then only can we think of all the relations holding 
together without any being reduced to one another. The Idea of Coherence thus provides a non-reductive, 
regulative grounding for the process of theoretical reflection. Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven together 
provide a list of the irreducible kinds of relation: 
                                    Kinds of Relation
627
 
pistical (faith):  trust
628
 













economic:  optimal exchange, stewardship, thrift
634
 





symbolic/lingual:  meaning, significance
637
 






psychic/sensory:  feeling, sensitivity
640
 
biotic:    cellular composition
641
 
physical:   dynamic system
642
 
kinetic:    approaching or receding, speed 
643
 
spatial:    contiguity, comparisons of size or shape
644
 
quantitative:                     more or less than, equal to etc.
645
 
                                                 
627 As pointed out previously, what is important is not the precise description of each of these different relations, or 
indeed the precise identification, number and order of them. Their identification and ordering is open-ended and 
subject to continual and rigorous correction and elaboration. This does not mean that they are purely noetic 
constructions – quite the reverse, their elaboration is corrigible precisely because of their openness to the grain of 
ontic. 
628 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W: 2.227-259; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.298-330. 
629 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W: 2.94-104; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.140-162. 
630 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §31, p. 26. 
631 Jonathan Chaplin argues for ‘tribution’ rather than ‘retribution’ as the core of the juridical modality, which makes 
sense if one sees the characterization of the modalities in creational, i.e., pre-lapsarian rather than post-lapsarian 
terms (Jonathan P. Chaplin, Dooyeweerd’s Theory of Public Justice: A Critical Exposition (1983)).  
632 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §31, p. 26; Dooyeweerd, W.d.W: 2.338-342; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.405-413. 
633 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §31, p. 26; Dooyeweerd, W.d.W: 2.86-90; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.127-129. 
634 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §31, p. 26; Dooyeweerd, W.d.W: 2.84-90; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.66-68, 122-129. 
635 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W: 2. 96; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.140-141 (n. 1), 379 (not in W.d.W). 
636 Vollenhoven, Introduction: §31, p. 26; Dooyeweerd, W.d.W: 2.216; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.282 (not in W.d.W.), 
285. 
637 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W: 2.84-86, 91-94; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.126-127, 137-140. 
638 ‘Beheersende vorming’ (Dooyeweerd, W.d.W.: 2.143; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.203).  
639 Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.118-132 (not in W.d.W.). 
640 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W: 2.310-313; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.371-382. 
641 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W: 2.80-82; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.107-11.  
642 Dooyeweerd, N.C: 2.99-102 (not in W.d.W.). 
643 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W: 2.71-76; Dooyeweerd, N.C: 2.93-103. 
644 Dooyeweerd, W.d.W: 2.65-67, 313-317; Dooyeweerd, N.C.: 2.85-87, 383-386. 







The principle behind the process of distinguishing of the different kinds of 
relation (or as they have been called ‘relation frames’646) is that no one kind 
of relation is capable of providing a fully adequate description of the world 
and is irreducible to any other kind of relation. Only by taking into account 
the full range of these mutually irreducible kinds of relation, and giving 
them their proper consideration, can we truly live and think in a way that 
expresses the richness of the way that God created the world, and, in 
particular, how he provides for the true flourishing of human relations. The 
diversity of relations needs to be seen in turn in the context of other 
relations held together by a great web of analogies (antecipations and 





The work of the Son, the work of the Father, and the response of the human 
person to both, as grounded in the Ideas of Origin and Coherence, need to 
be seen in conjunction with the work of the Holy Spirit, which grounds the 
third Idea for which I have argued in the light of the Kuyperian vision, 
Vollenhoven’s account of the Trinity, and a critical retrieval of 
Dooyeweerd’s position from the 1920s: transcendent Providence.  
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6.1.3 Time, the Idea of Providence, and the Work of the Holy Spirit  
 
So, the third element of Kuyper’s Reformational vision is the purposiveness of the 
historical process through the work of the Holy Spirit, expressed in the Idea of 
Providence. This brings us to the question of time, which is perhaps the point of greatest 
systematic divergence between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd. One way to characterise 
this divergence is between Vollenhoven’s narrative approach (such as with his notion of 
‘lifelines’), and the more structural approach of Dooyeweerd (not least his notion of the 
‘opening process’). To help put this divergence in context, I shall situate it in terms of 
the perennial question that is basic to the writing of history. 
 
Historians attempt to account for the unfolding of time either by narrative chronicle, or 
by an analysis of the structures that underlie historical development – or even, some 
claim, determine it. The first option, that of chronicle, can be opened out artistically to a 
certain extent by extending it into the form of a narrative. This form of historical writing 
has been highly developed in the hands of skilled exponents; but it tends to consider the 
succession of events at the expense of systematic analysis of the deep structure of the 
underlying historical process.
648
 The second option has received its most developed 
exposition in the hands of the Annales School constituted by ‘l’histoire sociale’ (‘social 
history’) or ‘histoire des structures’ (‘structural history’).649 Here historical accounts 
take the form of building up layer on layer of structural elements, moving, as it were, in 
a series of geological strata, from the deeper and longest-term modalities to the 
shallowest and transient. The effect of this, as the reformational philosopher of history, 
M.C. Smit points out, is that ‘man has been surrendered to and made dependent upon 
the stream of history … the individual person has become subservient to the historical 
process’.650 The tension within the practice of historical writing reflects an underlying 
tension in principle between the recognition of diachronicity (the narrative through 
time) and synchronicity (the structures at a given time). As Smit points out, it also tends 
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to deny a full recognition of the individual by prioritising either the narrative (in which 
the individual becomes merely a ‘role player’) or the structure (in which the individual 





What is needed is recognition that there is a narrative that is coherent, but irreducible to 
structural description; there must be room for both the diachronic and the synchronic, as 
well as for the mutual enrichment of both approaches or points of entry. However any 
narrative which is simply a chronicle of the succession of events cannot do this, since, 
as Smit argues above, it will either undercut a genuine recognition of the individuality 
of the participants, or reduce to incomprehensibility the temporal procession from one 
state of affairs to another. Genuine narrativity needs to be consonant with the structural 
connections between the individuals whose story is being presented – but is not 
reducible to those connections. How can a philosophical account of genuine narrative be 
provided in such a way that it is not mere chronicle on the one hand, or a mere reduction 
to the unfolding of a set of structural considerations on the other? This is the basic 
question that confronts all historians: how to resolve the tension between the diachronic 
and the synchronic? Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd both address this question, but from 
opposite points of view. 
 
As we have seen, Vollenhoven has an extensive understanding of the work of the Holy 
Spirit in human society in general and not merely in the human heart – unlike 
Dooyeweerd. More specifically, he sees the work of the Holy Spirit bringing into effect 
what has been decreed by the Father and revealed by the Son, ‘positivising’ the law in 
concrete situations.
652
 The work of the Holy Spirit provides the expectation of the 
eschaton, but it should not be confined to the future; it must also be seen in terms of the 
expression of God’s Providence over history as a whole.653 The Holy Spirit effects 
creation jointly with the Father and, in redemption, makes possible the incarnation, 
work, death, and resurrection of Christ; it brings about both palingenesis (inner 
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religious change and redirection of heart) and the effectual call of all believers.
654
 The 
work of the Holy Spirit establishes a basis for holding that there is a transcendent 
Providence – that there is genuine movement forward. In concrete situations we see the 
leading role of the Holy Spirit, orienting all things to the transcendence of the Father, 
and directing them towards the greater realisation of the Kingdom of the Son.
655
 
Vollenhoven calls this the ‘genetic’ determination: the process of moving from the past 




Reflection on the work of Holy Spirit thus yields the Idea of a Providence which 
transcends any specific narrative. The Idea of Providence holds open the possibility of 
genuine eventfulness, and so provides the grounding for time as a distinct 
transcendental, a necessary condition for experience. This involves the diverse ways in 
which states of affairs (i.e., combinations of individuals in connection with one another) 
lead to one another – or to put it another way, how states of affairs succeed one another. 
There is the need to make sense of events in the light of a larger story.
657
 Here I will 
argue that Dooyeweerd’s account of the ‘totality’ as a ground-Idea needs to be corrected 





Moreover, the Idea of Providence provides a basis to consider and conceive of the 
passing of time or diachronicity. Jürgen Moltmann distinguishes between two 
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conceptions of the future: ‘futurum’ and ‘adventus’. According to Moltmann, the future in the 
sense of futurum is that which is mere extrapolation from the past via the present, whereas 
adventus refers to that which is a genuinely new development, opened up by a the hope in the 
future coming of Jesus, and the promise of cosmic transformation by the Holy Spirit which that 
brings.
659
 In this way, the Idea of Providence gives weight to time as a transcendental in its own 
right, in such as way as to that the passing of time is not seen merely as more of the same – be 
that ‘same’ the universal continuity of relations or the duration of individuals – but, rather, a 
genuine openness to the transformativity of time. This is Vollenhoven’s ‘much more’. This 
‘much more’ grounds both the naïve intuition of events, as well as the ‘scientific’ or 
‘theoretical’ distinction of the different aspects of time, in terms of which events can be 
analysed, according to each of the modalities. 
 
With respect to naïve experience, Vollenhoven describes how individuals come into existence 
and go out of existence. Individuals divide, join up, and bring about new individuals. In all of 
this, the genetic determination involves the individual, either as a whole or in part, in a variety 
of ways.
660
 This is the nature of actual time which we can only experience. Events bring 
individuals together; but events are not to be confused with either relations or individuals – 
events are not the individuals or relations themselves but the changes in the permutations of 
those relations as they link the individuals concerned. If events are no more than individuals and 
relations, nothing actually happens; eventfulness is reduced to inclusion in an ever widening 
hierarchical complex of individuals and relations, resulting in an infinite regress to an all-
encompassing totum simul constructed in terms of a dominant, overarching explanatory 
principle.
661
 Pace Dooyeweerd, the unfolding of events cannot be treated merely as the 
unfolding of the order of the modalities, nor as the perdurance of individuals.
662
   
 
 With respect to the theoretical attitude, both philosophers provide lists of time aspects which 
correspond to each of the modalities.
663
 Each time aspect describes an irreducibly different kind 
of time, as follows:  
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 The situation is confused in the case of Dooyeweerd (albeit not for Vollenhoven), in that according to 
him the time aspects are the modalities – the cosmonomic side of ‘cosmic time’. Nevertheless, 
inconsistently, he himself provides comprehensive lists of the time aspects which are distinct from the 






faith (pistical):           liturgical time,
664
 ‘time of belief’,665 revelation666  
ethical:           ‘right’ time,667 priority of moral obligation668 
juridical/legal:           length of validity,
669
 retribution 





economic:            interest,
672
 rent, profit, wage, economic cycle 

















logical/analytical:        prius et posterius,
680
 





biotic:               growth time, organic development,
683
  
physical:              causal irreversibility,  physical time
684
 
kinetic:              constancy, duration 
spatial:              simultaneity
685
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Once again, as with individuality functions and kinds of relation, the 
identification of the modally distinct kinds of time is provisional upon the 
identification, number and ordering of the modalities. The modalities 
provide the laws and norms which govern each aspect of an event.  
 
Thus we see how the Idea of Providence, resting as it does upon the 
mystery of the work of the Holy Spirit, forbids any attempt to elevate any 
specific kind of explanation, or causal hypothesis, to a position of special 
privilege in this way.
 
It also prevents the reduction of time either to 
relationality or individuality: the actuality of specific events cannot fully be 
captured by the description of all the relations involved, while events 
cannot be seen purely within the world-lens of any individual, or indeed in 
the mere perdurance of individuals over time. As we have seen, 
Vollenhoven argues, there is an actuality of events which is ‘much more’ 
than just the sum total of the individuals and relations concerned. This 
appreciation of the actuality of events complements the tendency in 
Dooyeweerd to present a somewhat over-conceptual account of the 
temporal process, not least in his account of ‘cosmic time’, and reinforces 





6.1.4 The Mutual Correction of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd in the Light of the 
Kuyperian Vision 
 
In the preceding sections, I have been looking at what I shall call, the ‘transcendentals’, 
i.e., the necessary conditions for being and knowing (I shall use this term for both 
thinkers, even though Vollehoven tends to avoid this term and Dooyeweerd tends to use 
the term, ‘transcendental dimensions’) in the light of the work of the three Persons and 
the basic presupposita or Ideas grounded in that threefold work. The transcendentals 
shape their respective accounts of what they call the ‘modalities’, i.e. the different kinds 
of laws and norms (what Dooyeweerd calls the ‘cosmonomic side’ of created reality), 
and what it means for individuals, relations and events (what Dooyeweerd calls the 
‘factual side’ of created reality) to conform to these laws and norms. Vollenhoven and 
Dooyeweerd approach these necessary conditions in different ways.   
 
For Vollenhoven, the point of entry is the transcendental of individuality, i.e. that there 
are individuals and the question to which this recognition gives rise, namely ‘what are 
individuals’. For him the modalities are discerned in the first instance as functions of 
individuals, and, in a reverse procedure to that of Dooyeweerd, sees relations as 
constructed over time from the functions of concrete individuals. The diversity of the 
ways that individuals function exhibits law-conformity and the correlative diversity of 
laws to which they conform. It is that diversity of laws and norms, which Vollenhoven 
designates as the ‘thus-so’ determination.688 In correlation with this, Vollenhoven’s 
account of law conformity is about concrete individuals-in-relations (i.e. ‘this-that’). 
The difficulty in Vollenhoven’s account arises when he attempts a systematic account of 
the relations between or among individuals. For him, these tend to remain the combined 





For Dooyeweerd, the point of entry is relationality, i.e., that there are (universal) 
relations that link individuals and comprise all the connections in the structuring of the 








world. For him, the modalities are discerned in the first instance by examining the 
different, irreducible kinds of relation.
690
 These (relational) modalities are 
‘individualised’ by being seen as functions of individuals, and then grouped in an 
ordered way as ‘individuality structures’. Combined with his tendency to see the 
modalities as the appropriate laws or norms, this results in a somewhat over-conceptual 
account of individuals. It is often unclear whether Dooyeweerd is speaking of the laws 




When their accounts of time are compared, once again Vollenhoven, with his more 
robust account of time as eventfulness, makes it possible to provide an account of 
individuals coming into being, growing and developing, and then going out of being. 
Vollenhoven avoids Dooyeweerd’s conflation of time with modal ordering on the one 
hand, and with individuality structures on the other (Vollenhoven insists that time is 
‘much more’ than this combination) – but ironically, it is Dooyeweerd who supplies the 
missing piece in the puzzle: Dooyeweerd’s account of real relations which make it 
possible to read the modal distinction so uncovered across to the time aspects (just as is 




This mutual correction of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, which I have traced out in the 
three preceding sub-sections, takes account of the three elements of the Kuyperian 
vision: that of individuality grounded on the Idea of Origin in the light of the work of 
the Father; that of relationality grounded on the Idea of Coherence in the light of the 
work of the Son; and that of time grounded on the Idea of Providence in the light of the 
work of the Holy Spirit. We have seen this being worked out for both philosophers with 
respect to the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, as follows: 
 
Firstly, for Vollenhoven, the Father is the one among the Persons of the Trinity who 
calls or names each person or thing as this or that. According to this alternative 
correlation, one’s individuality (marked out by this-that determination) is the direct 
outcome of God’s creational command for each structure – the secret constitution of 










each creature known only to God.
693
 Similarly, for Dooyeweerd, each individual is 




Secondly, with respect to the Son, Vollenhoven describes how, in the call to loving 
obedience, it is the Son who takes the leading role; he models the character of true 
relationships and provides the normative basis for them.
695
 This yields the Idea of 
Coherence according to which, to draw on Dooyeweerd’s insights, the diversity of 




Thirdly, for Vollenhoven the Holy Spirit is linked to the ‘positivisation’ of new states of 
affairs, which Vollenhoven sees as the distinctive work of the Holy Spirit. As we have 
seen, positivisation as temporal unfolding is grounded in the Idea of Providence.
697
 It is 
at this point that we notice a lacuna in Dooyeweerd’s account, since his account of the 
Holy Spirit is largely confined to the latter’s work in human heart, and from 1930 on, 
the Idea of Providence is largely removed from his systematic thinking by his notion of 
‘cosmic time’. Nevertheless, by the retrieval of the Idea of Providence central to his 
thinking in the 1920s one the one hand, and with reference to the ‘great process of 
becoming’ and other indications in his thinking that time is not merely order and 




Thus in the light of the Kuyperian vision of the work of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit 
and the Ideas of Origin, Coherence and Providence which each yields, a basis can be 
found to ensure the distinction of each of the transcendentals of individuality, 
relationality and time, and to accord each of these elements their appropriate weight and 
distinctiveness in their systematic consideration, both of ‘pre-scientific’ (Vollenhoven) 
or ‘naïve’ (Dooyeweerd), or ‘scientific’ (Vollenhoven) or ‘theoretical’ (Dooyeweerd) 
reflection in the light of the Ideas of Origin, Coherence and Providence respectively. 
However, having considered each separately, it is necessary to draw them together in 
such a way as not to lose this distinctive recognition of each of the elements (i.e., each 
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transcendental and the corresponding Idea), but also to draw them together in order to 
put together the whole picture again. In order to do this, I shall draw on the trinitarian 




6.2 A ‘Perichoretic’ Way to see Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd as Complementary 
 
As I have just indicated, in this section I shall argue that this interdependence and 
distinctiveness of the different elements can be suggested by analogy with the trinitarian 
notion of ‘perichoresis’, and that in the light of this analogy, combinations of the 
transcendentals and the corresponding Ideas which illuminate them, can be discerned. 
These combinations provide a way to draw the transcendentals and the corresponding 
Ideas together into a larger picture; they also further provide insights into the way in 
which the systematic divergences between Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd can be 
reconciled.   
 
Perichoresis is not being offered as a solution in any deductive sense, rather as a 
suggestive charaterisation of an approach which can provide an alternative to the 
sequential character of Vollenhoven’s, and the hierarchical character of   Dooyeweerd’s 
presentation  respectively.The perichoretic model is not a simple one, and needs to be 
approached in a thorough and critical way. It needs to show how the triune communion 
can operate in concert at any one time without confusion about the operation of each 
distinct Person, grounding the diversity in the unity and vice versa. There needs to be 
recognition of the equal ultimacy of the unity of the Godhead and the diversity of the 
Persons.  
 
The perichoretic model is by no means foreign to the Calvinian tradition.
699
  Calvin 
argues that the Son and the Spirit are equally active in creation, and that each Person is 
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God in his own right, not successive manifestations of God.
 700
 Calvin quotes Gregory 
of Nazianzus with approval:  
 
I cannot think of the One without immediately being surrounded by the radiance 





The term ‘perichoresis’ describes the indwelling of the Persons of the Trinity one with 
another: each retains its own distinctiveness in their joint ‘economy’ or work in the 
world. ‘Perichoresis’ (‘περιχώρησις’) derives from ‘chora’ (‘χώρα’Greek for ‘space’, 
or ‘chorein’ (‘χωρεῖν’) which means ‘to contain’, ‘make room for’ or ‘to go forward’. It 
was originally a christological notion in which the two natures of Christ are seen in 
relation to one another. The use of the term ‘perichoresis’ with respect to the Trinity 
seems to have originated with Pseudo-Cyril and was later used in the dogmatics of 
Maximus Confessor and John of Damascus.
702
 The perichoretic approach is based on 
                                                                                                                                               
and each in all, and all are one’ (Thomas F. Torrance, The Christian Doctrine of God: One Being, Three 
Persons (2001): 201).  
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the notion of communion and the interplay of distinct Persons in mutual 
interdependence, working lovingly and harmoniously within a common field of 
action.
703 
Thus, this approach gives the work of each of the Persons equal and conjoint 
weight, correcting the distortions that result from over-emphasising the one or the other.  
 
A perichoretic understanding of the Trinity grounds the diversity of the whole in the 
unity and vice-versa. In terms of this picture, each of the Persons is dependent on the 
two others in the divine economy. We see first the Father as he is known as the Origin 
of all things in and through the Son and through the agency and execution of the Holy 
Spirit. All persons and things have their distinctive individuality through the calling of 
the Father, and are named by the Father. This is made known to us in and through the 
Son and is effected by the Holy Spirit. Second, we see the Son, whose unbroken 
relationship with the Father and the Spirit assures us of his continuing transcendence, 
becoming a fully human individual; and through the anointing of the Spirit and 
declaration of the Father becoming ‘the Christ’ (‘the Messiah’ – the anointed one).704 
The many different aspects of the world are bound together harmoniously in the 
relationships made possible in and through the Son. As the Son is the one in whom all 
things hold together, so this allows us to comprehend the diversity of all things without 
reducing them to one another. He is the focus of all things, and yet he frees all things 
fully to fulfil the calling they have from the Father, as they are empowered by the Holy 
Spirit. Third, we see the Spirit sent by the Father and witnessing to the Son – indeed, 
bearing the latter’s identity as the ‘Spirit of Christ’. The Holy Spirit makes all things 
possible according to the will of the Father, as they are transformed according to the 
eschatological measure of the risen Son. This is true not just for each element 
considered separately, but also for the elements seen in combination. In all these 
dynamic interactions, dependence does not constitute a deficit but enables each of their 
distinctive work. Thus perichoresis affirms the joint yet distinctive work of the Persons 
at every point, and the way that this distinctiveness is grounded in their mutuality and 
common divinity. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
Barth’s analogical use of the pattern of “perichoresis” and the relationship between divine action and 
human action in the ecclesiastical context’ (Ph.D. thesis, King’s College London: 172-208).  
703
 See Gunton, The One, The Three and the Many: 152 ff.  
704




The insights gained with respect to our consideration of the distinctiveness and 
mutuality of the perichoretic work of the three Persons can provide an analogical guide 
to the systematic consideration of the transcendentals. I argue that what I am putting 
forward is not a return to the analogia entis for the following reasons: 
 
First, the notion of analogy being used is the reformational one which pertains between 
different modally-defined kinds of discourse – in this case, the concept of perichoresis 




Second, the concept of perichoresis in this context refers to the work of the triune 
Persons, not their being. The three Persons work together and so together realise the 




Third, the basis of God’s relationship with the world is a covenantal not an analogical 
one. In Chapter One, I argue that the Kuperian view presents an alternative to a view of 
God framed in essentially monadic terms as either supreme intellect (in which creation 
is seen as a reflection of God’s mind), or supreme will (in which God is seen as an 
arbitrary potestas absoluta). The perichoretic trinitarian position provides a clear 
alternative to both these positions. The conception of the love among the Persons, and 
the covenant which flows from that avoids both the conception of God as a monadic 





Using the perichoretic analogy, we can see that all three transcendentals are 
complementary, and each is necessary for the full description of a specific state of 
affairs. An individual is only known as the developing character of that individual as 
expressed over time, and in terms of the different kinds of relation that come to light. 
Relations are only known through looking at a concrete individual in actual 
relationships and the way relationships develop over time. Events are known through 
the unfolding of relationships over time, and the development of the character of the 
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individuals concerned. Just as the work of the three Persons needs to be seen as both 
distinctive to each Person, yet mutually dependent between each pair of Persons in turn 
(e.g., the Father sending the Son and the Son revealing the Father, or the Son giving the 
Spirit and the Spirit witnessing to the Son), so each pair of the transcendentals (as I have 
addressed them one by one in the previous section), and the corresponding Ideas which 
open them up, needs to be seen as inter-dependent. 
 
I shall call each of these pairs of epistemically inter-dependent basic features of reality, 
‘descriptive views’. Three combinations are possible: individuals over time, relations 
over time, and, and individuals in relation. Together these three ‘descriptive views’ 
provide a rounded picture of relationships seen from different viewpoints. I shall look at 
each combination of these transcendentals in turn. Each of the ‘descriptive views’ is 
regulated and opened up by the Ideas which ground the respective transcendentals: that 
of individuals over time is regulated jointly by the Ideas of Origin and Providence; that 
of relations over time by the Ideas of Coherence and Providence; and that of individuals 
in relation at a given time by the Ideas of Coherence and Origin. Each of the descriptive 
views provides an axis of analysis and presentation that needs to be complemented by 
both of the other two descriptive views. As we shall see, the axes of Vollenhoven and 
Dooyeweerd’s thought each tends to lie within one of these descriptive views, albeit 
different ones, just as they emphasise the respective transcendentals somewhat 
differently; although they do not do so straightforwardly or exclusively, since the matter 
is complicated by, e.g., Dooyeweerd’s tendency to emphasise the cosmonomic rather 
than the factual side of created reality. Their gravitating to different descriptive views in 
this way helps to explain some of their divergences, and also provides a way to show 
how they can systematically complement one another. 
 
6.2.1 Individuals over Time as Illuminated by the Ideas of Origin and Providence  
 
The first descriptive view, regulated jointly by the Ideas of Origin and Providence, 
involves the coming into being, reconstitution and going out of being of individuals 
(including social wholes) over time; it also embodies the joining and separation of 




over time by tracing how the concreteness of that individual presents itself; ensuring 
that all the features of that individual form a continuous whole. 
 
Vollenhoven tends to gravitate to this descriptive view in that, as we have noted, he 
tends systematically to proceed from consideration of individuality to the states of 
affairs which are built up with respect to, or among, individuals, over time. In this 
regard we can note his account of ‘successive intra-individual connections’ that trace 
out that individual’s ‘life line’ (‘levenslijn’).708 This ‘successive intra-individual’ 
connection provides a narrative for that individual. Through his recognition of the 
‘genetic’ determination as ‘much more’ than relationality and individuality, 
Vollenhoven provides a systematic basis for this.  
 
Dooyeweerd lacks the narrative thread provided by Vollenhoven’s account of 
‘successive intra-individual connections’ and by ‘life lines’, and in the isolated 
instances where he does this (as in the case of the linden tree outside his study window) 
it rapidly becomes a structural account. In the latter regard, he provides an extensive 
account of ‘individuality-structures’, which are both elaborate and highly focussed 
conceptually, with, as we have noted, a tendency to over-emphasise the cosmonomic 
side of individuality at the expense of the factual side. For Dooyeweerd, an individual’s 
development is governed by the internal destination (‘bestemming’) appropriate to its 
individuality structure, e.g., the linden outside his study window has a destination to 
grow from seed to fully-grown tree. Dooyeweerd’s account of the unfolding of the 
internal destination of individuals over time (the ‘internal opening process) is 
complemented by account of ‘internal’ or ‘foundational’ enkapsis.709 In this latter, we 
see the development of individuals over time through the process of ‘enkaptic 
interlacement’ (e.g., changes in the composition of molecules providing the foundation 
at the level of the physical modality for the growth of cells at the level of the biotic 
modality): without losing their own integrity, existing individuals facilitate the coming 
into being of new ones. However, since time, at least in his account of ‘cosmic time’, is 
effectively a hybrid of relationality and individuality, it lacks the systematic resources to 
account for the coming into being, or unfolding of individuals over time. What remains 
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is the cosmonomic description of what individual development must or should be, rather 
than the narrative of their actual development.  
 
For Vollenhoven, as we have seen, all individuals have a unique identity, given by the 
Father, which is unfolded providentially over the course of that individual’s life. Here 
the Idea of Providence forbids any deterministic account of the individual’s life line, 
since it calls a halt to attempting any explanation in terms of any one modality. The Idea 
of Origin, on the other hand, forbids any attempt to reduce one’s account of an 
individual to the sum of the different ways of its functioning, to attempt to explain any 
outcome in terms of the sum of the different ways (distinguished modally) of that 
individual’s functioning at any given time. This together the Ideas of Origin and 
Providence exclude functionalism (the notion that any individual can be explained by 
the sum total of its functions) and determinism (the notion that any set of modally 
refined laws or principles can entirely explain the process from one state of affairs at a 
given time to another at a later time).  
 
Dooyeweerd, on the other hand, has a danger of tending to both functionalism, with his 
emphasis on ‘individuality structures’, and what Vollenhoven calls the ‘modalisation’ of 
time (and I have called ‘modal determinism’), with his tendency to describe his 
‘opening process’ (in this case – the ‘internal’ opening process) in terms of the 
cosmonomic side, i.e., in terms of what must or should happen rather than, as 
Vollenhoven does, provide a narrative of the individual concerned. As we have noted 
also, the Idea of Providence tends to be eclipsed systematically in his philosophical 
thinking after the end of the 1920s, so that he does not provide a strong account of the 
individual’s ‘life line’ in a narrative way as Vollenhoven does, and his account tends to 
be frozen deterministically.  
 
Overall in this descriptive view, then, Vollenhoven’s more robust account of the 
narrative of individuals over time provides a more satisfactory systematic basis for the 
descriptive view regulated by these two Ideas, than does Dooyeweerd’s more 
conceptual account, with its tendency to both functionalism and determinism.
710
 
                                                 
710
 The ‘opening process’ as such need not be seen as being deterministic. The point I am trying to make 





Nevertheless, by bringing together their respective insights, a fuller picture of both the 
narrative of individuals and their structural unfolding can be gained.  
 
As we turn to the second descriptive view, by contrast, we shall see that it more closely 
reflects Dooyeweerd’s account of both ‘cosmic time’ and the ‘opening process’ which 
concerns individuals in relation at a given time, as regulated by the Ideas of Origin and 
Coherence.  
 
6.2.2 Individuals in Relation at a Given Time as Illuminated by the Ideas of Origin and 
Coherence 
 
The second descriptive view involves looking at a network of relationships at a given 
time. Each relation between two individuals has implication for third-parties, and these 
yield further relationships (where a relationship is a relation or set of relations between 
specific individuals). Relationships between or among individuals are also multi-
textured in that they comprise layers of different kinds of relation which form 
complexes of links between or among the individuals involved. As we have seen, this 
descriptive view can be seen in Dooyeweerd’s account of what he calls a ‘correlative’ or 
‘environmental’ enkaptic relationship and which the background network of 




In general, this is the axis to which Dooyeweerd’s thought tends, shaped as it is by the 
Idea of Origin on the one hand, and the Idea of Coherence on the other.
712
 This is the 
view enshrined by Dooyeweerd’s notion of ‘cosmic time’, which has relationality in the 
form of the diversity of the modalities on its ‘cosmonomic side’, and individuality in the 
                                                                                                                                               
‘cosmonomic side’ of ‘cosmic time’) results in. As with his account of individuality, Dooyeweerd tends 
to overemphasise what should be (in terms of modal unfolding) rather than the way things are. This gives 
his account of the historical process something of an a priori emphasis. This is a problem which can be 
corrected by seeing time not in terms of modal ordering on the ‘cosmonomic’ side, and duration on the 




 5.2.2. For both Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd, pace the different schools of neo-Kantians, it is critical 
that the ontic systasis is mind-independent (hence ‘ontic’). The noetic synthesis is the intuitive grasp of 
the ontic systasis – as we have seen this is a position first developed by Vollenhoven (see 2.1). There is 
only one act, not two: the ontic systasis is not an act – it is the mind-independent object of the noetic 
synthesis. Further we have seen, totality is more than the noetic synthesis. It can also be the intuitive 




form of the enduring individuality structures on its ‘factual side’.713 It is also in keeping 
with Vollenhoven’s characterisation of Dooyeweerd as a ‘pure cosmonomic’ thinker, 




By contrast, the axis of Vollenhoven’s thought does not sit as easily within this 
descriptive view, because while he stresses individuals as called into being by the 
Father as creator (i.e., as we have seen, in the light of the Origin), for him, the focus is 
on process rather than structure (i.e., he tends to emphasise Providence rather than 
Coherence). Nevertheless, what Vollenhoven calls ‘contemporaneous inter-individual 
connections’ does capture something of this descriptive view, although, unlike 
Dooyeweerd, Vollenhoven’s account is not primarily a synchronic but a diachronic one 
– for him, the contemporaneous is a moment abstracted from a succession of moments 





In addition to the descriptive views first of individuals over time, and of individuals in 
relation at a given time, illuminated by the Ideas of Origin and Providence, and Origin 
and Coherence respectively, there is a third combination possible which completes the 
full perichoresis, namely that of relations over time as illuminated by the Ideas of 
Coherence and Providence.  
 
6.2.3 Relations over Time as Illuminated by the Ideas of Coherence and Providence 
 
The third descriptive view involves not only the widening and deepening of existing 
relations, but also the discernment of new ones; it correspondingly involves the 
expression of new forms of relations in new combinations, while new structural 
formations express themselves and are recognized in relation to others. This descriptive 










 3.1.3 and 3.2.3. 
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Vollenhoven can partially provide a systematic account of this descriptive view through 
his account of ‘successive inter-individual’ relations, although what he accounts for in 
his way is not so much the relations themselves and the way they are differentiated as 
the construction over time of different arrangements of the (relational) ‘directions’ of 
the individuals concerned.
717
 However, there is a similarity between Vollenhoven’s 
account of ‘successive inter-individual’ relations and Dooyeweerd’s account of 
‘external enkapsis’. 718 
 
Dooyeweerd’s notion of the ‘opening process’ can to a certain extent be seen as a 
working out of this descriptive view. One aspect of this involves a process of 
‘differentiation’ across the modalities: the different kinds of relation are distinguished 
from one another over time.
719
 However we have noted Dooyeweerd’s tendency to a 
certain over-conceptuality and tendency to a certain determinism based on the order of 
the modalities, which prescribes how relations must or should unfold (with perhaps also 
a  European or Western bias) rather than how they actually do in concretely observed 
processes or indeed in all situations and across all cultures. We have also noted, 
nevertheless, that he partially corrects this tendency with respect to the juridical 
modality in his account of juridical causality in which he accounts for the coming into 





                                                                                                                                               
fidelity to societal principles and (2) a life-giving disclosure of society’ (Lambert Zuidervaart, 
‘Unfinished business: towards a reformational conception of truth’, P.R. (2009): 1). These are illuminated 
implicitly as follows:  
1. Societal principles implicitly illuminated by the Idea of Coherence;  
2. Life-giving disclosure implicitly illuminated by the Idea of Providence.  
In both respects, Zuidervaart further stresses the factual side rather than the cosmonomic side – in this 
regard his position is the opposite of that of Dooyeweerd, who tends to do the reverse. However, this does 
not place Zuidervaart outside the Reformational tradition – he is merely stressing elements of the larger 
picture which Dooyeweerd, especially, has neglected or under-emphasised. Nevertheless, in doing so, he 
tends himself to neglect the Idea of Origin, which explicitly informs and regulates Dooyeweerd’s 
position, and implicitly, Vollenhoven’s as well. This is a matter that will require a more sustained 
engagement with Zuidervaarts’s thought than is possible here. 
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Both philosophers therefore provide approximations to this descriptive view, even 
though neither is fully at home with its centre of gravity in the unfolding of relations 
over time. They approach this descriptive view from different positions: Vollenhoven 
comes to it on the basis on his account of individuals and their unfolding arrangements 
as ‘successive inter-individual’ relations. Dooyeweerd approaches this variously from 
his account of ‘differentiation’ in the opening process (according to which the ‘external 
aims’ (‘doeleindes’) of individuality-structures are opened up successively along the 
modal scale), or, alternatively ‘external enkapsis’ (when two distinct ‘individuality 
structures’ together form a larger complex without either losing their individual 
distinctiveness). Both ‘differentiation’ and ‘external enkapsis’ variously amount to a 
description of the cumulative elaboration and ever increasing complexity of a network 
of relations be it in the physical or biological worlds, or in human society. 
Vollenhoven’s and Dooyeweerd’s approaches reflect their respective emphases on the 
Ideas of Providence and Coherence; Vollenhoven approaches this descriptive view with 
his thinking illuminated by the Idea of Providence, whereas Dooyeweerd approaches 
this descriptive view with this thinking illuminated by the Idea of Coherence. What 
neither succeeds in doing is systematically to hold the two Ideas together, so that the 
account of the descriptive view by each of the philosophers is partial but 
complementary. 
 
We see then, even though this descriptive view is not one in which either of the two 
philosophers of this study are fully at home, that, nevertheless, it fills in a necessary gap 
in their joint coverage of the whole picture, and draws at least partially on certain, albeit 
different, elements in their respective accounts. 
 
6.2.4 The Philosophical Benefits of the Perichoretic Approach 
 
These descriptive views (of relations over time, and individuals over time, and 
individuals in relation – each regulated by the corresponding pairs of Ideas of Origin, 
Coherence and Providence) are complementary, and each is necessary for the full 
description of a specific state of affairs. The descriptive views help us to see the 
perichoretic interaction and balance among the Ideas considered in all their paired 





Together the three descriptive views provide a rounded picture in which the systematic 
insights of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd can be integrated and applied in a more 
systematic way without the problems that beset the thought of each on its own. While, 
broadly Vollenhoven’s analysis and presentation tends to have its locus in the first 
descriptive view (that of individuals over time), and Dooyeweerd’s in that of the second 
descriptive view (that of individuals in relation at a given time), yet their thought is not 
exclusively located in either of those two descriptive views. Both philosophers have 
elements that cross over into the descriptive views primarily reflected in the thought of 
the other, as well as in the third descriptive view (that of relations over time). For 
Dooyeweerd, this can be seen in his account of the different forms of enkapsis, which 








Thus we see how the original vision of the Lordship of Christ over every area of life 
enunciated by Abraham Kuyper can more fully be realised by drawing together the 
insights of Vollenhoven, on the one hand, and Dooyeweerd, on the other. We have 
looked at both in the light of Kuyper’s vision of the integrity of every individual before 
the Father, of the rule of the Son over ever kind of relation, and the providential 
working out of the Holy Spirit in bringing about new states of affairs in and through the 
temporal process.  
 
We have seen this, first, with respect to individuality drawing on Vollenhoven’s more 
robust account of factual individuality to complement Dooyeweerd’s more conceptual 
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account of ‘individuality-structures’ – however these latter may be interpreted. For both 
philosophers, individuality needs to be seen in the light of the Idea of the Origin, 
reflecting the work of the Father calling all things and persons into being. In the light of 
this Idea, both the naïve intuitive grasp of whole individuals as well as the ‘scientific’ or 
‘theoretical’ differentiation of the diverse and irreducible individuality-functions is 
made possible. 
 
Second, we have seen this with respect to relationality, allowing Dooyeweerd’s account 
of universal relations to correct what I have described asVollenhoven’s ‘modified 
monadism’. Relationality needs to be seen in the light of the Idea of Coherence, 
bringing together both Dooyeweerd’s Idea of ‘totality’ (effectively the noetic synthesis 
of the different kinds of relation) and the Idea of ‘coherence’ (effectively the ontic 
systasis of the different kinds of relation), which reflects the work of the Son in whom 
all things hold together. The Idea of Coherence illuminates the naïve intuitive ‘enstatic’ 
grasp of the way that the different kind of relations hold together, as well as a basis for 
‘scientifically’ or ‘theoretically’ distinguishing and ordering those relations. 
 
Third, we have seen that with respect to time, in that Vollenhoven’s ‘genetic’ 
determination provides a corrective to Dooyeweerd’s problematical notion of ‘cosmic 
time’. Here the retrieved Idea of Providence, eclipsed in Dooyeweerd’s thought since 
around 1930 by the Idea of ‘totality’, can help to provide the necessary illumination. 
This Idea of Providence is opened up by Vollenhoven’s account of the work of the Holy 
Spirit in the ‘positivisation’ of new situations. This makes possible the naïve grasp of 
entire events on the one hand, and the ‘scientific’ or ‘theoretical’ distinguishing of the 
different aspects of time. 
 
These three loci (individuality, relationality and time seen in the light respectively of the 
Ideas of Origin, Coherence and Providence) need to be seen as distinct, yet dynamically 
inter-dependent. Here the trinitarian notion of ‘perichoresis’ has been drawn on to trace 
out three ‘descriptive views’ showing the inter-relation in turn of the transcendentals 
considered pair by pair, in the light of the corresponding pairs of Ideas. Together these 
descriptive views provide a comprehensive and fully rounded basis on which to 
approach and make sense of any state of affairs to which systematic consideration needs 




transcendentals, as the necessary condition for experience, can be taken appropriately 
into account. In particular, it puts the Dooyeweerdian notion of ‘enkapsis’, which 
cannot satisfactorily be accounted for in terms of his ‘transcendental dimensions’ and 
‘cosmic time’, on a much sounder systematic footing, as the descriptive views each 
provide the framework for ‘internal’ or ‘foundational, ‘correlative’ or ‘environmental’, 
and ‘external’ or ‘symbiotic’ forms of enkapsis, respectively.722 
 
For a fully-rounded Reformational philosophy, it is necessary to see how conceptual 
knowledge, which arises from the distinguishing or ‘refraction’ of the modalities is 
made possible and complemented by the three forms of intuitive knowledge, which are 
regulated by the transcendentals of individuality, relationality and time. This is 
necessary for both ‘pre-scientific’ or naïve (i.e., modally undifferentiated) experience, 
as well as for ‘scientific’ or ‘theoretical’ (i.e., modally differentiated) reflection. In the 
case of ‘pre-scientific’ or ‘naïve’ experience, this intuition makes possible the grasp, 
respectively, of whole individuals, the ‘ontic systasis’ of the different kinds of relations 
and the entirety of events. In the case of ‘scientific’ or ‘theoretical’ reflection, the 
transcendentals seen in the light of the Ideas of Origin, Coherence and Providence 
constitute the three lenses through which the modalities are refracted to yield 




In conclusion, on the basis of Kuyper’s trinitarian vision, I have systematically 
compared the thought of Dirk Vollenhoven and Herman Dooyeweerd, and have put 
forward a way to reconcile their thought, without minimising their divergences but 
building on their complementarities. Further, in the light of a perichoretic analogy, I 
have sought to show how one can draw on their insights in a fully-rounded way through 
three ‘descriptive views’ – two of which lie across the respective axes of Vollenhoven 
and Dooyeweerd’s thought, together with a third axis, largely unaddressed by the two 
philosophers. While the major focus of this thesis is a systematic comparison of the two 
thinkers in the light of the historical location and development of their thought, the 
conclusions of this study have practical implications for Christians globally, today as in 
the twentieth century. The systematic insights that this study yields can provide a 
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philosophical framework to address the perennial questions which affect everyday 
human life and experience, as well as a methodology for corporate human projects in 
the academy and the public square. Building on the systematic work of Vollenhoven 
and Dooyeweerd, the task is now further to develop a Reformational ontology and 
epistemology, ever illuminated by the Ideas of Origin, Coherence and Providence which 
characterise the trustworthy commitment of the triune Persons to one another in the 






Appendix One: The Structure of Vollenhoven’s Philosophy 
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Appendix Two: The Structure of Dooyeweerd’s Philosophy 
 
 













































Appendix Three: A Perichoretic Reading of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd 
 
This links the emphases of Dooyeweerd and Vollenhoven: For Dooyeweerd, ‘cosmic 
time’ links relationality and individuality. Vollenhoven starts with individuality over 
time and sees relations constructed on that basis. Dooyeweerd is in blue, while 
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